Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T07:01:43.129Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2016

Edited by
Sanford C. Goldberg
Sanford C. Goldberg
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
Get access

Summary

A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Chapter
Information
The Brain in a Vat , pp. 251 - 264
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Achourioti, Theodora, Galinon, Henry, Martinez-Fernández, José, and Fujimoto, Kentaro (eds.) 2015. Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRef
Alston, William 1989a. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Alston, William 1989b. “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology,” in Alston, (1989a), pp. 185–226.
Alston, William 1989c. “Epistemic Circularity,” in Alston, (1989a), pp. 338–55.
Alston, William 1996. A Realist Conception of Truth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Anderson, D. 1993. “What is the Model-Theoretic Argument?” Journal of Philosophy 90: 311–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austin, John 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bach, Kent 1985. “A Rationale for Reliabilism,” Monist 68: 246–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bach, Kent 1997. “Do Belief Reports report Beliefs?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 215–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ball, D. 2007. “Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85: 457–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bays, Timothy 2001. “On Putnam and His Models,” Journal of Philosophy 98:. 331–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bays, Timothy 2007. “More on Putnam's Models: A Reply to Bellotti,” Erkenntnis 67: 119–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bays, Timothy 2009. “Skolem's Paradox,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N.. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-skolem/.
Beal, J. C. (ed.) 2007. Revenge of the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Becker, Kelly 2006. “Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge?” Dialectica 60: 79–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becker, Kelly 2012. “Methods and How to Individuate Them,” in Becker, and Black, (2012), pp. 81–97.
Becker, Kelly and Black, Tim (eds.) 2012: The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benacerraf, Paul 1965. “What Numbers Could Not Be,” Philosophical Review 74: 47–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benacerraf, Paul 1973. “Mathematical Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 70: 661–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergman, Michael and Coppenger, Brett (eds.) Forthcoming. Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bernecker, Sven 1996. “Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge,” Noûs 30: 262–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernecker, Sven 1998. “Self-Knowledge and Closure,” in Ludlow, and Martin, (1998), pp. 333–49.
Bernecker, Sven 2000. “Knowing the World by Knowing One's Mind,” Synthese 123: 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernecker, Sven 2004. “Believing that you Know and Knowing that you Believe,” in Schantz, (2004), pp. 369–76.
Bernecker, Sven 2014. “How to Understand the Extended Mind,” Philosophical Issues 24 (1): 1–23.
Bernecker, Sven and Pritchard, Duncan (eds.) 2011. Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Boghossian, Paul 1989. “Content and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics 17: 5–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boghossian, Paul 1997. “What the Externalist Can Know A Priori,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 161–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
BonJour, Laurence 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
BonJour, Laurence 2010. Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Bourget, David and Chalmers, David 2014. “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical Studies, 170(3): 465–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boyd, Richard 1991. “Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method,” in Earman, (1991), pp. 131–98.
Brown, Jessica 1995. “The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis 55: 149–56.Google Scholar
Brown, Jessica 2001. “Anti‐Individualism and Agnosticism,” Analysis 61: 213–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, Jessica 2004. Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 1986. “Brains in a Vat,” Journal of Philosophy 83: 148–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 1992a. “If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat,” Mind 101: 123–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 1992b. “Semantic Answers to Skepticism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73: 200–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 1995. “Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference,” Philosophical Quarterly 45: 199–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 1996. “Modest Transcendental Arguments,” Philosophical Perspectives 10: 265–80.Google Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 1999. “Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism,” in Stern, (1999), pp. 229–50.
Brueckner, Anthony 2003. “Trees, Computer Program Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses,” in Luper, (2003), pp. 217–26.
Brueckner, Anthony 2005. “Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge,” Veritas 50: 53–64.Google Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 2010. Essays on Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brueckner, Anthony 2011. “Skepticism and Semantic Externalism,” in Bernecker, and Pritchard, (2011), pp. 500–10.
Brueckner, Anthony 2012. “Skepticism and Content Externalism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N.: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/.
Brueckner, Anthony and Altschul, Jon 2010. “Terms of Envatment,” in Brueckner, Anthony, Essays on Skepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 174–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buckwalter, Wesley and Sytsma, Justin (eds.) 2015. The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Burge, Tyler 1979: “Individualism and the Mental,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burge, Tyler 1982. “Other Bodies,” in Woodfield, (1982), pp. 98–120.
Burge, Tyler 1988. “Individualism and Self-Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 85: 649–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burge, Tyler 2007. Foundations of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Burge, Tyler 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, Alexis and Plunkett, David 2013. “Conceptual Ethics I,” Philosophy Compass 8: 1091–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, Alexis and Plunkett, David 2013. “Conceptual Ethics II,” Philosophy Compass 8: 1102–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, John 2004. “Mathematics and Bleak House,” Philosophia Mathematica 12: 18–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burri, Alex (ed.) 1997. Language and Thought. New York: Walter de Gruyter.Google Scholar
Button, Tim 2011. “The Metamathematics of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Arguments,” Erkenntnis 74: 321–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Button, Tim 2013. The Limits of Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Button, Tim and Walsh, Sean MS. “Ideas and Results in Model Theory: Reference, Realism, Structure and Categoricity.” http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00472.
Chalmers, David 2005. “The Matrix as Metaphysics,” in Grau, (2005), pp. 132–77.
Clark, Andy 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, Andy 2009. “Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head,” Mind 118: 963–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, Andy 2010. “Memento's Revenge: The Extended Mind,” in Menary, (2010), pp. 43–66.
Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David 1998. “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58: 7–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, Peter and Hale, Bob (eds.) 1994. Reading Putnam. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Cohen, Stewart 1984: “Justification and Truth,” Philosophical Studies 46: 279–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conant, James (ed.) 1994. Words and Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Cook, Roy 2013. Paradoxes. Malden, MA: Polity Press.Google Scholar
Cosmelli, D. and Thompson, E. 2010. “Embodiment or Envatment? Reflections on the Bodily Basis of Consciousness,” in Stewart, and Di Paolo, (2010), pp. 361–85.
Cottingham, John, Stoothoff, Robert, and Murdoch, Dugald (eds.) 1984. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Damasio, Antonio 1994. Descartes's Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon Books.Google Scholar
David, Marian 1991. “Neither Mentioning ‘Brains in a Vat’ nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not Brains in a Vat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51: 891–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald 1983: “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” in Henrich, Dieter (ed.), Kant oder Hegel?Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, pp. 423–38.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald 1990. “Afterthoughts, 1987,” in Malichowski, (1990), pp. 136–68.
Davidson, Donald 1996. “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 93: 263–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Donald 1999. “Reply to Barry Stroud,” in Hahn, (1999), pp. 162–6.
Davidson, Donald 2001. “Knowing One's Own Mind,” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, David 1995. “Putnam's Brain Teaser,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25: 203–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, David 1997. “Why One Shouldn't Make an Example of a Brain in a Vat,” Analysis 57: 51–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davies, Martin 1998. “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant,” in MacDonald, Smith, and Wright, (1998), pp. 321–61.
Dell'Utri, Massimo 1990. “Choosing Conceptions of Realism: The Case of the Brains in a Vat,” Mind 99: 79–90.Google Scholar
DeRose, Keith 1999. “Introduction: Responding to Skepticism,” in DeRose, and Warfield, (1999), pp. 1–26.
DeRose, Keith 2000. “How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 38: 121–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeRose, Keith and Warfield, Ted (eds.) 1999. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Descartes, René 1984. “Meditations on First Philosophy,” in Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, (1984), pp. 1–62.
Devitt, Michael 1981. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Devitt, Michael 1983. “Realism and the Renegade Putnam,” Noûs 17: 291–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devitt, Michael 1984. Realism and Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Michael, Devitt 1996. Coming to Our Senses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Devitt, Michael 1997. “On Determining Reference,” in Burri, (1997), pp. 112–21.
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim 1987. Language and Reality. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim 1999. Language and Reality, edn. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Douglas, Heather 2009. Science Policy and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douven, Igor 1998. “Truly Empiricist Semantics,” Dialectica 52: 127–51.Google Scholar
Douven, Igor 1999a. “Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Reconstructed,” Journal of Philosophy 96: 479–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douven, Igor 1999b. “A Note on Global Descriptivism and Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 342–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douven, Igor 2013. “The Epistemology of Conditionals,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4: 3–33.Google Scholar
Douven, Igor 2015. “Experimental Approaches to Conditionals,” in Buckwalter, and Sytsma, (2015).
Douven, Igor, Horsten, Leon, and Romeijn, Jan-Willem 2010. “Probabilist Antirealism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91: 38–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dretske, Fred 1970. “Epistemic Operators,” Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dretske, Fred 1971. “Conclusive Reasons,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49(1): 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Earman, John (ed.) 1991. Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Ebbs, Gary 1992a. “Realism and Rational Inquiry,” Philosophical Topics 20: 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ebbs, Gary 1992b. “Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73: 239–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ebbs, Gary 1996. “Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 499–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Einheuser, Iris 2010. “The Model-Theoretic Argument against Quantifying over Everything,” Dialectica 64: 237–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enderton, Herbert 2001 [1972]. A Mathematical Introduction to Logic. San Diego, CA: Hardcourt.Google Scholar
Engel, Mylan 1992. “Personal and Doxastic Justification in Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 67: 133–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falvey, Kevin and Owens, John 1994. “Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism,” Philosophical Review 103: 107–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, Richard and Conee, Earl 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Field, Hartry 1994a. “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” Mind 103: 249–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Field, Hartry 1994b. “Are Our Logical and Mathematical Concepts Highly Indeterminate?” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: 391–429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Field, Hartry 2008. Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischer, Martin 2008. Davidsons semantisches Programm und deflationäre Wahrheitskonzeptionen. Frankfurt am Main: Ontos Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischer, Martin 2012. Review of Horsten (2011), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18: 403–5.Google Scholar
Fodor, Jerry 1987. Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Foley, Richard 1985: “What's Wrong with Reliabilism,” The Monist 68: 188–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forbes, Graeme 1995. “Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited,” Journal of Philosophy 92: 205–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fost, Joshua 2013. “The Extended Self, Functional Constancy, and Personal Identity,” Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 12: 47–66.Google Scholar
Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan 2012 [2006]. “Models in Science,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N.: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/.
Gärdenfors, Peter 2000. Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gärdenfors, Peter 2014. The Geometry of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Giere, Ronald 1988. Explaining Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glock, Hanjo (ed.) 2003. Kant and Strawson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Glymour, Clark 1982. “Conceptual Scheming, or Confessions of a Metaphysical Realist,” Synthese 51: 169–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, Sanford 2006a. “Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87: 301–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, Sanford 2006b. “An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for ‘Empty’ Natural Kind Terms,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 70: 55–76.Google Scholar
Goldman, Alvin 1976. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 73: 771–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grau, Christopher (ed.) 2005. Philosophers Explore the Matrix. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Grundmann, Thomas 2002. “Die Struktur des skeptischen Traumarguments,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 64: 57–81.Google Scholar
Grundmann, Thomas 2003. Der Wahrheit auf der Spur: Eine Verteidigung des erkenntnistheoretischen Externalismus. Paderborn: mentis.Google Scholar
Grundmann, Thomas 2007. “The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 69–87.Google Scholar
Grundmann, Thomas 2010. “Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg,” Philosophical Psychology 23: 481–509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grundmann, Thomas 2011. “Defeasibility Theory,” in Bernecker, and Pritchard, (2011), pp. 156–66.
Grundmann, Thomas and Misselhorn, Catrin 2003. “Transcendental Arguments and Realism,” in Glock, (2003), pp. 205–18.
Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) 2008. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hahn, Lewis (ed.) 1999. The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Chicago, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Halbach, Voker 2011. Axiomatic Theories of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin (eds.) 1997a. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin 1997b. “Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism,” in Hale, and Wright, (1997a), pp. 427–457.
Hanna, Robert 2011. “Minding the Body,” Philosophical Topics 39: 15–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hawking, Stephen 1993. Black Holes and Baby Universes and Other Essays. London: Bantam Books.Google Scholar
Heil, John and Mele, Al (eds.) 1993. Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Heylighen, Frances 2012. “A Brain in a Vat Cannot Break Out: Why the Singularity Must Be Extended, Embedded and Embodied,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 19: 126–42.Google Scholar
Hickey, Lance 2005. “The Brain in a Vat Argument,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Feiser, J. and Dowden, B.: http://www.iep.utm.edu/brainvat/.
Hofweber, Thomas 2007. “Validity, Paradox and the Ideal of Deductive Logic,” in Beal, (2007), pp. 145–58.
Hookway, Christopher 2010. “Pragmatism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N.: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/pragmatism/.
Horgan, Terry and Kriegel, Uriah 2008. “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind,” Monist 91: 347–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horsten, Leon 2011. The Tarskian Turn. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, Paul 1990. Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, Frank 1998. “Reference and Description Revisited,” Philosophical Perspectives 12: 201–18.Google Scholar
Jackson, Frank 2003. “Narrow Content and Representation – Or Twin Earth Revisited,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77: 55–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip 1993. “Some Content is Narrow,” in Heil, and Mele, (1993), 259–82.
Kallestrup, Jesper 2011a. “Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited,” Dialectica 66: 5–21.Google Scholar
Kallestrup, Jesper 2011b. Semantic Externalism. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel 1787 [1781]. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Smith, N. Kemp. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Keim-Campbell, Joseph, O'Rourke, Michael, and Silverstein, Harry (eds.) 2010. Knowledge and Skepticism. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy 5. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khlentzos, Drew 2011. “Challenges to Metaphysical Realism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E.N.: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/realism-sem-challenge/.
Klenk, Virginia 1976. “Intended Models and the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 5: 475–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korman, Dan 2006. “What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth,” Journal of Philosophy 103: 503–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kornblith, Hilary 2002. Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul 2011. “Nozick on Knowledge,” Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 162–224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kroon, Frederick 1987. “Causal Descriptivism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langacker, Ronald 2008. Cognitive Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeds, Stephen 2007. “Correspondence Truth and Scientific Realism,” Synthese 159: 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
LePore, Ernest and Ludwig, Kirk (eds.) 2004. Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, David 1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Philosophical Review 88: 513–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David 1983a. Philosophical Papers, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, David 1983b. “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David 1984. “Putnam's Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 221–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loar, Brian 1996. “Social Content and Psychological Content,” in Pessin, and Goldberg, (1996), pp. 180–91.
Ludlow, Peter 1995. “Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and the Prevalence of Slow-Switching,” Analysis 55 (1): 45–9.Google Scholar
Ludlow, Peter and Martin, Norah (eds.) 1998. Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Stanford, CA: CSLI Press.Google Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk 1992. “Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference,” Journal of Philosophical Research 17: 313–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Luper, Steven (ed.) 2003. The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate.Google Scholar
Luper-Foy, Steven (ed.) 1987a. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Luper-Foy, Steven 1987b. “The Possibility of Skepticism,” in Luper-Foy, (1987a), pp. 219–41.
Lyons, Jack 2013. “Should Reliabilists be Worried about Demon Worlds?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86: 1–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacDonald, Cynthia, Smith, Barry, and Wright, Crispin (eds.) 1998. Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Machuca, Diego, and Reed, Baron (eds.) Forthcoming. Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. London: Continuum.
Madden, Rory 2013. “Could a Brain in a Vat Self‐Refer?” European Journal of Philosophy 21: 74–93.Google Scholar
Maddy, Penelope 2005. “Mathematical Existence,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11: 351–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maddy, Penelope 2007. Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maddy, Penelope 2011a. Defending the Axioms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maddy, Penelope 2011b. “Naturalism, Transcendentalism, and Therapy,” in Smith, and Sullivan, (2011), pp. 120–56.
Malichowski, Alan (ed.) 1990. Reading Rorty. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Margalit, Avishai (ed.) 1979. Meaning and Use. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marino, Patricia 2006. “What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?” Philosophical Studies 127: 415–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marino, Patricia 2010. “Modest Correspondence versus Representation-Friendly Deflationism,” in Wright, and Pederson, (2010), pp. 218–31.
McGinn, Colin 2004. Mindsight. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McKinsey, Michael 1991. “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis 51: 9–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McLaughlin, Brian. and Tye, Michael 1998a. “Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge,” in MacDonald, , Smith, , and Wright, (1998), pp. 285–320.
McLaughlin, Brian and Tye, Michael 1998b. “Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?” Philosophical Review 107: 349–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Menary, Richard 2007. Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Menary, Richard (ed.) 2010. The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, Ruth 1987. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Moore, A. W. 2001. The Infinite, edn. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Moore, A. W. 2011. “Vats, Sets, and Tits,” in Sullivan, and Smith, (2011), pp. 42–54.
Moore, G. E. 1939. “Proof of an External World,” Proceedings of the British Academy 25.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1959. “Certainty,” in Philosophical Papers, London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 227–51.Google Scholar
Mostowski, Andrjez 1969. Constructible Sets with Applications. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Nagel, Thomas 1986. The View from Nowhere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Nozick, Robert 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Nuccetelli, Susanna (ed.) 2003. New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Parent, Ted 2013. “Externalism and Self-Knowledge,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N.: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/self-knowledge-externalism/.
Pedersen, Nikolaj and Wright, Cory (eds.) 2013. Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pessin, Andrew and Goldberg, Sanford (eds.) 1996. The Twin Earth Chronicles. New York: M. E. Sharpe.Google Scholar
Pfeifer, Niki and Douven, Igor 2014. “Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5: 199–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plantinga, Alvin 1982. “How to be an Anti-Realist,” Proceeding and Addresses of the APA 56: 47–70.Google Scholar
Plato 1992. The Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Plunkett, David and Sundell, Tim 2013. “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms,” Philosopher's Imprint 13: 1–37.Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2002a. “McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments,” Synthese 130: 279–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2002b. “Recent Work on Radical Skepticism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39: 215–57.Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2002c. “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10: 283–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2005. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2008. “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism,” in Haddock, and Macpherson, (2008), pp. 283–310.
Pritchard, Duncan 2012. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan. 2013. “Davidson on Radical Skepticism,” in LePore, and Ludwig, (2013), pp. 521–33.
Pritchard, Duncan and Ranalli, Chris 2013. “Rorty, Williams and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology,” Humanities 2: 351–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan and Ranalli, , , Chris Forthcoming a. “On Metaepistemological Scepticism,” in Bergman, and Coppenger, (eds.).
Pritchard, Duncan and Ranalli, , , Chris Forthcoming b. “Scepticism and Disjunctivism,” in Machuca, and Reed, (eds.).
Pryor, Jim 2000. “The Sceptic and the Dogmatist,” Nous 34: 517–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1975. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” in Putnam, Hilary (1979), Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 215–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1977. “Realism and Reason,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50: 483–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1979. “Reference and Understanding,” in Margalit, (1979), pp. 199–271.
Putnam, Hilary 1980. “Models and Reality,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 45: 464–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1981a. Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1981b: “Brains in a Vat,” in Putnam, (1981a), pp. 1–21.
Putnam, Hilary 1981c. “Two Philosophical Perspectives,” in Putnam, (1981a), pp. 49–74.
Putnam, Hilary 1982. “Reply to Two Realists,” Journal of Philosophy 79: 575–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1983a. Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1983b. “Introduction: An Overview of the Problem,” in Putnam, (1983a), pp. vii–xviii.
Putnam, Hilary 1983c. “Why There Isn't a Ready-Made World,” in Putnam, (1983a), pp. 205–28.
Putnam, Hilary 1990a. Realism with a Human Face. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1990b. “Is Water Necessarily H2O?” in Putnam, (1990a), pp. 54–79.
Putnam, Hilary 1992. “Replies,” Philosophical Topics 20: 347–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1993. “Realism Without Absolutes,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1: 179–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1994a. “Comments and Replies,” in Clark, and Hale, (1994), pp. 242–95.
Putnam, Hilary 1994b. “The Question of Realism,” in Conant, (1994), pp. 295–312.
Putnam, Hilary 1996. “Introduction,” in Pessin, and Goldberg, (1996), pp. xv–xxii.
Putnam, Hilary 2000. “Das modelltheoretische Argument und die Suche nach dem Realismus des Common sense,” in Willaschek, (2000), pp. 125–42.
Quine, Willard 1951. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in Quine, (1980), pp. 20–46.
Quine, Willard 1980. From a Logical Point of View, edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Regier, Terry 1996. The Human Semantic Potential. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand 1921. The Analysis of Mind. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.Google Scholar
Salerno, Joe 2010. “Truth-tracking and the Problem of Reflective Knowledge,” in Keim-Campbell, O'Rourke, and Silverstein, (2010), pp. 73–84.
Salmon, Nathan 1979. “How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference,” Journal of Philosophy 76: 703–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sawyer, Sarah 1999. “An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80: 358–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sawyer, Sarah 2001. “The Epistemic Divide,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 39: 385–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schantz, Richard (ed.) 2004. The Externalist Challenge. Berlin: de Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapiro, Larry 2004. The Mind Incarnate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Shapiro, Larry 2011. Embodied Cognition. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Sher, Gila 1991. The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Sher, Gila 1999. “On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth,” Synthese 117: 133–72.Google Scholar
Sher, Gila 2000. “The Logical Roots of Indeterminacy,” in Sher, and Tieszen, (2000), pp. 100–23.
Sher, Gila 2004. “In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 101: 5–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sher, Gila 2010. “Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic,” Erkenntnis 72: 151–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sher, Gila 2013a. “The Foundational Problem of Logic,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19: 145–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sher, Gila 2013b. “Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route from Thought to Reality,” in Pedersen, and Wright, (2013), pp. 157–79.
Sher, Gila 2015. “Truth as Composite Correspondence,” in Achourioti, et al. (2015), pp. 191–210.
Sher, Gila and Tieszen, Richard (eds.) 2000. Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, Theodore 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skolem, Thoralf 1929. “Über einige Grundlagenfragen der Mathematik,” in Skolem, (1970), pp. 227–73.
Skolem, Thoralf 1941.“Sur la Porté du Théorème Löwenheim-Skolem,” in Skolem, (1970), pp. 455–82.
Skolem, Thoralf 1958. “Une Relativisation des Notions Mathématiques Fondamentales,” in Skolem, (1970), pp. 633–8.
Skolem, Thoralf (1970). Selected Works in Logic, ed. Fenstad, E. J.. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.Google Scholar
Smart, J. J. C. 1995. “A Form of Metaphysical Realism,” Philosophical Quarterly 45: 301–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Joel and Sullivan, Peter (eds.) 2011. Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Peter 1984. “Could We Be Brains in a Vat?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14: 115–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soames, Scott 2005. Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 1993. “Putnam's Pragmatic Realism,” Journal of Philosophy 90: 605–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 141–53.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 2007a. A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 2007b. “Dreams and Philosophy,” in Sosa, (2007a), pp. 1–21.
Stalnaker, Robert 1989. “On What's in the Head,” Philosophical Perspectives 3: 287–319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert 1997. “Reference and Necessity,” in Hale, and Wright, (1997), pp. 534–54.
Steinitz, Yuval 1994. “Brains in a Vat: Different Perspectives,” Philosophical Quarterly 44: 213–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stern, Robert (ed.) 1999. Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Stern, Robert 2007. “Transcendental Arguments: A Plea for Modesty,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 143–61.Google Scholar
Stewart, John, Gapenne, Oliver, and Di Paolo, Ezikiel (eds.) 2010. Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stroud, Barry 1968. “Transcendental Arguments,” Journal of Philosophy 65: 241–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stroud, Barry 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sundell, Timothy 2011. “Disagreement, Error, and an Alternative to Reference Magnetism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 743–59.Google Scholar
Tarski, Alfred 1936. “On the Concept of Logical Consequence,” in Tarski, (1983 [1956]), pp. 409–20.
Tarski, Alfred 1983 [1956]. Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Thompson, Evan and Cosmelli, Diego 2011. “Brain in a Vat or Body in a World? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience,” Philosophical Perspectives 39: 163–80.Google Scholar
Thompson, Evan and Stapleton, Mog 2009. “Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories,” Topoi 28: 23–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tichý, Pavel 1986. “Putnam on Brains in a Vat,” Philosophia 16: 137–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tollefsen, Deborah 2006. “From Extended Mind to Collective Mind,” Cognitive Systems Research 7: 140–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tomasello, Michael 2003. Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Tomasello, Michael 2008. Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Tymoczko, Tom 1989a. “In Defense of Putnam's Brains,” Philosophical Studies 57: 281–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tymoczko, Tom 1989b. “Mathematical Skepticism: Are We Brains in a Countable Vat?” Philosophica 43: 31–47.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas 1992. “From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2: 6–29.Google Scholar
Velleman, Daniel 1998. “Review of Levin's ‘Putnam on reference and constructible sets’,” Mathematical Reviews 98c: 1364.Google Scholar
Vogel, Jonathan 1987. “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge,” in Luper-Foy, (1987a), pp. 197–215.
Vogel, Jonathan 2000. “Reliabilism Leveled,” Journal of Philosophy 97: 602–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vogel, Jonathan 2012. “The Enduring Trouble with Tracking,” in Becker, and Black, (2012), pp. 122–51.
Warfield, Ted 1992. “Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism are Compatible,” Analysis, 52: 232–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warfield, Ted 1995. “Knowing the World and Knowing Our Own Minds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55: 525–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warfield, Ted 1998. “A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing our Minds,” Philosophical Studies 92: 127–47.Google Scholar
Warfield, Ted 1999. “A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds,” in DeRose, and Warfield, (1999), pp. 76–92.
Warfield, Ted 2000. “How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 38: 121–48.Google Scholar
Weatherson, Brian 2003. “What Good Are Counterexamples?” Philosophical Studies 115: 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weatherson, Brian 2008. “Deontology and Descartes’ Demon,” Journal of Philosophy 105: 540–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weinberg, Jonathan, Nichols, Shaun, and Stich, Stephen 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29: 429–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Willaschek, Marcus (ed.) 2000. Realismus. Paderbon: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag.Google Scholar
Williams, J. Robert 2007. “Eligibility and Inscrutability,” Philosophical Review 116: 361–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, Mark 2000. “Inference and Correlational Truth,” in Chapuis, André and Gupta, Anil (eds.) Circularity, Definition, and Truth. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research / Munshiram Manoharlal.Google Scholar
Wilson, Mark 2006. Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, N L 1959. “Substances without Substrata,” Review of Metaphysics 12: 521–39.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Woodfield, Andrew (ed.) 1982. Thought and Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Wright, Cory and Pedersen, Nikolaj (eds.) 2010. New Waves in Philosophy: Truth. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin 1986. “Facts and Certainty,” Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429–72.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin 1991. “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon,” Mind 100: 87–116.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin 1992. “On Putnam's Proof that We Are Not Brains in a Vat,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 67–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, Crispin 1994. “On Putnam's Proof that We are Not Brains in a Vat,” in Hale, B. and Clark, P., Reading Putnam. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 216–41.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin 2000. “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox, and Putnam's Proof,” Philosophical Topics 10: 140–63.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin 2004. “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78: 167–212.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, Linda 2009. On Epistemology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.Google Scholar
Zalabardo, José 2009. “How I Know I'm Not a Brain in a Vat,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64: 65–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: The Brain in a Vat
  • Online publication: 05 June 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107706965.015
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: The Brain in a Vat
  • Online publication: 05 June 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107706965.015
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Bibliography
  • Edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: The Brain in a Vat
  • Online publication: 05 June 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107706965.015
Available formats
×