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5 - Conclusion

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Summary

The French assertion in consultations in New York on Monday 3 May, straight after the Athens agreement that (see 4.49, para 3) “it would be unthinkable for the Security Council to remain silent: we had to act today” was supported by the UK, Spain and Russia. The US statement that it was impossible for them to agree to a resolution that day but would favour a Security Council resolution at the right time was a serious blow for the VOPP. The brief Council statement was a clear signal of continuing division and the US opposition in New York and soon known to the Bosnian Serbs and their nationalist allies in Belgrade. This US hesitation coming two days before their meeting in Pale was a clear indication to the Bosnian Serbs that they could disown Karadžić's signature at Athens and suffer no major consequences. The European press also began to speculate about US policy over lifting the arms embargo and the opposition to it in Europe. The Athens agreement featured less and less.

The VOPP plan started to die when General Mladić intervened in the small hours of the morning in Pale on 6 May and defied Milošević. Mladić up until then had, with increasing animosity, accepted Milošević as being virtually his political boss. Early in the morning of 6 May the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted by 51 votes to 2 with 12 abstentions to call a referendum on the 15–16 May. This was despite the three Presidents, Milošević, Ćosić and Bulatović, as well the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, urging unconditional acceptance. It was, in effect, a rejection of the VOPP and a wartime referendum without any international supervision was an illegitimate device to endorse rejection.

Milošević rang Lord Owen later that same morning, having arrived back in Belgrade, angry, fed up and tired. He knew the significance of this reversal with the role of Mladić greatly enhanced. It explains why Milošević was not ready to go to Dayton over two years later unless he was the leader of the Serb delegation and had the casting vote so he could over-rule the Bosnian Serbs and particularly Mladić.

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Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Vance/Owen Peace Plan
, pp. 437 - 444
Publisher: Liverpool University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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