Book contents
- Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy
- Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Hellenistic Medicine, Strato of Lampsacus, and Aristotle’s Theory of Soul
- Chapter 2 Herophilus and Erasistratus on the Hēgemonikon
- Chapter 3 Galen on Soul, Mixture and Pneuma
- Chapter 4 The Partition of the Soul
- Chapter 5 Cosmic and Individual Soul in Early Stoicism
- Chapter 6 Soul, Pneuma, and Blood: The Stoic Conception of the Soul
- Chapter 7 The Platonic Soul, from the Early Academy to the First Century ce
- Chapter 8 Cicero on the Soul’s Sensation of Itself: Tusculans 1.49–76
- Bibliography
- Index Locorum
- Subject Index
Chapter 6 - Soul, Pneuma, and Blood: The Stoic Conception of the Soul
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 May 2020
- Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy
- Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Hellenistic Medicine, Strato of Lampsacus, and Aristotle’s Theory of Soul
- Chapter 2 Herophilus and Erasistratus on the Hēgemonikon
- Chapter 3 Galen on Soul, Mixture and Pneuma
- Chapter 4 The Partition of the Soul
- Chapter 5 Cosmic and Individual Soul in Early Stoicism
- Chapter 6 Soul, Pneuma, and Blood: The Stoic Conception of the Soul
- Chapter 7 The Platonic Soul, from the Early Academy to the First Century ce
- Chapter 8 Cicero on the Soul’s Sensation of Itself: Tusculans 1.49–76
- Bibliography
- Index Locorum
- Subject Index
Summary
Throughout its long history, Stoic philosophy was subjected to much criticism, from inside the school as well as from outside. This is particularly true when it comes to psychology. Roughly speaking, the Stoic soul is characterised by two main features: first, it is defined as a single and entirely rational substance which has no parts, in particular no irrational parts as is the case in Platonic and Aristotelian theories; this psychological monism is the ground for what I will call the ‘Stoic pledge’, namely that the moral agent is absolutely responsible for all his mental acts: impressions (phantasiai) and assents (sunkatatheseis), and also passions, virtues and vices, sensations, and so on. All of these are in our power, because we always have the ability to avoid them, to have second thoughts about them, and to put them right if they are wrong.
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- Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy , pp. 145 - 170Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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