Prospect

The goal of this chapter is to address a collection of philosophical problems facing the physicalist. Some of these are charges that any physicalist needs to be able to answer; others arise from specifically Christian concerns. The first is the simple (apparently simple?) question of how we know physicalism is true. The philosophical arguments seem to be interminable. I shall comment on the insufficiency of the sorts of arguments that are usually employed on behalf of dualism, and then sketch here my own proposal for the sort of argument that it would take to establish the truth of physicalism. I shall suggest that physicalism is best understood not as a philosophical thesis, but rather as the central component of a variety of well confirmed scientific theories.

Second, I shall deal with the problem of human distinctiveness: if we humans have no immortal souls to distinguish us from animals, then what is it that gives us a special place in God's creation? My answer will be that our distinctiveness lies primarily in the fact that we are able to be addressed by God and heed God's calling and commands. This will call for an examination of the issues of morality and religious experience. The topic of religious experience raises another issue. For humans to have experience of God, they must be capable of being affected by God in some way. Traditional views have taken the soul to be the “site” of divine action in human life.