Our survey of the mobilizations of 1639 and 1640 explains to a large degree the vulnerability of Charles I's government in autumn 1640. The weaknesses of the King's campaigns against Scotland are apparent: the difficulties in which the Council of War and the Ordnance Office found themselves, a chain of command rife with faction and ignorance, an appalling fiscal arrangement, the Crown's inability to hire mercenaries or to raise enthusiasm amongst the noblemen, and (perhaps above all) the dismal results of a decade of militia reform, which saw as its culmination disorder rather than discipline, inexperience rather than martial excellence. Can we then conclude that the military structure in England failed the King? On the contrary, it has been shown that Charles's decisions and policies brought about or aggravated these conditions. Governmental structures throughout Europe shared many of these flaws. The key to assessing English failure in the Bishops' Wars is to understand how the events of the campaigns occurred within the context of institutional limitations. The first chapter described how Charles I embarked upon and conducted the Bishops' Wars. The most striking conclusion one gleans from the narrative is that the royal strategies, and ensuing tactical moves, doomed the campaigns.

It is indeed true, as Conrad Russell has suggested, that the causes for the failure of 1640 are not necessarily the same as for 1639. But they are related, and in five critical categories Charles made the same or similar errors of judgement: strategy, officers, soldiers, supply, and tactics.