Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Economics and Psychology
- Part II Bargaining Theory, Behavior, and Evolutionary Psychology
- INTRODUCTION
- 5 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
- 6 Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games
- 7 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games
- 8 Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games
- 9 Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Psychology
- Part III Institutions and Markets
- Part IV Stock Markets and Bubbles in the Laboratory
- References
- Index
INTRODUCTION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Economics and Psychology
- Part II Bargaining Theory, Behavior, and Evolutionary Psychology
- INTRODUCTION
- 5 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
- 6 Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games
- 7 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games
- 8 Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games
- 9 Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Psychology
- Part III Institutions and Markets
- Part IV Stock Markets and Bubbles in the Laboratory
- References
- Index
Summary
Ultimatum and dictator game experiments have exposed major and fundamental weaknesses in the traditional assumptions underlying game theory (Guth et al., 1982). But I and my coauthors believe that these, and other important experiments, have also brought new understanding of human behavior, which may turn out to reflect favorably on game theory through a reinterpretation of key game-theoretic concepts in the light of these new experimental findings. This is potentially significant in setting the research agenda for both game theory and experiments to explore the scope and validity of this perspective. It is still too soon to say anything definitive about its validity. The chapters in this section represent the unfolding of this perspective in our research thinking. That thinking has changed dramatically in the course of our research program, particularly while conducting the research reported in Chapter 5, and in revising that chapter through several drafts, as we continued to do experiments to clarify our understanding of the phenomena. Subsequent papers, reprinted here as Chapters 6–9, reflect the further development of this research program. In this introduction, I will attempt to provide an integrative and summary statement based on this evolving point of departure from traditional game theory and the consequent alternative interpretations of the experimental results.
The primary objective of our ultimatum and dictator game research was to examine the sensitivity of the results to treatments designed to introduce explicit social conditions or contexts, which a priori we predicted would alter subject expectations and hence decisions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Bargaining and Market BehaviorEssays in Experimental Economics, pp. 79 - 89Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000