Book contents
- As War Ends
- As War Ends
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Complexity of the Organizational Design for Implementation of a Peace Accord
- 2 Violence, Grassroots Pressure, and Civil War Peace Processes
- 3 Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process
- 4 Determinants of State Strength and Capacity
- 5 The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia
- 6 Violence after Peace
- 7 Two Emblematic Peacebuilding Initiatives in Antioquia
- 8 From Counterinsurgency to Peacebuilding
- 9 Transitional Justice in the Colombian Final Accord
- 10 The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition
- 11 Una Tierra Inexplorada
- 12 Leading the Public to Peace
- 13 Securing the Peace and Promoting Human Rights in Post-Accord Colombia
- 14 Achieving an Unpopular Balance
- 15 Countering Violent Extremism through Narrative Intervention
- 16 Geographies of Truth in the Colombian Transitional Justice Process
- 17 Conclusion
- Index
- References
3 - Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2019
Book contents
- As War Ends
- As War Ends
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Complexity of the Organizational Design for Implementation of a Peace Accord
- 2 Violence, Grassroots Pressure, and Civil War Peace Processes
- 3 Land, Violence, and the Colombian Peace Process
- 4 Determinants of State Strength and Capacity
- 5 The Threat of Organized Crime in Post-Conflict Colombia
- 6 Violence after Peace
- 7 Two Emblematic Peacebuilding Initiatives in Antioquia
- 8 From Counterinsurgency to Peacebuilding
- 9 Transitional Justice in the Colombian Final Accord
- 10 The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition
- 11 Una Tierra Inexplorada
- 12 Leading the Public to Peace
- 13 Securing the Peace and Promoting Human Rights in Post-Accord Colombia
- 14 Achieving an Unpopular Balance
- 15 Countering Violent Extremism through Narrative Intervention
- 16 Geographies of Truth in the Colombian Transitional Justice Process
- 17 Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
On August 24, 2016, the Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos and leaders of the FARC rebel movement (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) signed a peace agreement designed to bring to an end the FARC insurgency that had lasted since 1964. One provision of the agreement was that it would be put to a vote in a plebiscite for Colombian citizens to ratify or reject. On October 2, 2016, the plebiscite was held and, surprisingly, 50.2 percent of voters rejected the agreement. Shortly thereafter, the Colombian government and FARC negotiated and signed a revised agreement and sent it directly to the Colombian legislature for ratification, bypassing a second referendum. Both houses of the Congress ratified the agreement, marking a formal end to the war between FARC and the government of Colombia.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- As War EndsWhat Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice, pp. 68 - 90Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James, and Santos, Rafael. (2013). “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (S1), 5–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Albertus, Michael, and Kaplan, Oliver. (2013). “Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (2), 198–231.Google Scholar
Arjona, Ana. (2016). “Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Wartime Social Order: A Process‐Driven Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil War.” Latin American Politics and Society 58 (3), 99–122.Google Scholar
Berrebi, Claude, and Klor, Estebam. (2008). “Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate.” American Political Science Review 102 (3), 279–301.Google Scholar
Bravo, Carlos, and Maldonado, Gerardo. (2012). “Las balas y los votos: ¿qué efecto tiene la violencia sobre las elecciones?” in Aguilar Rivera, José Antonio (ed.) Las bases sociales del crimen organizado y la violencia en México. Mexico: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública Federal.Google Scholar
Collier, Paul, and Vicente, Pedro C. (2012). “Violence, Bribery, and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Public Choice 153 (1), 117–147.Google Scholar
Esteve, Maria, and Vargas, Natalia. (2016). Por qué Colombia dijo No a la paz con las FARC. Available Online: www.desarrollando-ideas.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/10/161003_DI_plebiscito_Colombia_FARC_ESP.pdf.Google Scholar
Gallego, Jorge. (2011). “Civil Conflict and Voting Behavior: Evidence from Colombia.” Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1911983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1911983.Google Scholar
Joshi, Madhav, and David Mason, T. (2010). “Land Tenure, Democracy, and Patterns of Violence during the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2005.” Social Science Quarterly 91 (4), 984–1006.Google Scholar
Joshi, Madhav, and Quinn, Jason Michael. (2016). “Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict.” British Journal of Political Science. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123415000381.Google Scholar
Joshi, Madhav, Melander, Erik, and Quinn, J. Michael. (2017). “Sequencing the Peace: How the Order of Peace Agreement Implementation Can Reduce the Destabilizing Effects of Post-Accord Elections.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (1), 4–28.Google Scholar
Keels, Eric. (2017). “Electoral Reforms and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements.” International Interactions DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1296834.Google Scholar
Ley, Sandra. (2017a). “Electoral Accountability in the Midst of Criminal Violence: Evidence from Mexico.” Latin American Politics and Society 59 (1), 2–27.Google Scholar
Ley, Sandra. (2017b). “To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral Participation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution DOI: 10.1177/0022002717708600.Google Scholar
Mason, T. David. (1986). “Land Reform and the Breakdown of Clientelist Policies in El Salvador.” Comparative Political Studies 8 (4), 487–517.Google Scholar
Mason, T. David. (2004). Caught in the Crossfire: Revolution, Repression, and the Rational Peasant. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Rapoport, David, and Weiberg, Leonard. (2000). Elections and Violence. Terrorism and Political Violence 12 (3–4), 15–50.Google Scholar
Scott, James. (1976). The Moral Economy of the Peasants. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Scott, J. C., and Kerkvliet, B. J. (1977). “How Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy (in Southeast Asia),” in Schmidt, S. (ed.) 483–507. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: University of California PressGoogle Scholar
Wilkinson, Steven I. (2006). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- 1
- Cited by