It is generally assumed that general justice in Nicomachean Ethicsv is an ethical virtue. There are at least two ways in which to understand this statement. One might either take the claim to be that justice is best defined as an ethical virtue, or one might take it to mean only that it is possible to characterize justice in terms of ethical virtue, without thereby holding justice to be an ethical virtue. The first claim seems to be taken for granted in most of the literature. I wish to argue that this is misguided, and that only the second claim is supported by the text. In relation to individuals, general justice is a characteristic of actions, and not an ethical state. This is not to say that Aristotle never refers to an individual as just. It is to say, however, that in his considered account, this should be seen as a shorthand way of referring either to actions, or to characteristics of the individual in question that are not identical to justice.