An important question regarding Aristotle’s moral anthropology is whether or not human beings can become perfectly good. Should we consider Aristotle’s paradigmatically virtuous agent (who appears under the different names of spoudaios, phronimos, agathos, epainetos, epieikēs, or kalos kagathos) as an ideal figure, i.e. as someone who permanently and infallibly executes morally correct actions? Is his character irreversibly transformed into a state of perfection? Might we describe his inner condition as that of perfect psychic harmony? Or is it true, as some interpreters claimed, notably Shane Drefcinski and Howard Curzer,1 that the virtuous man (Aristotle never mentions female candidates) can act badly? Does he perform, at least to some extent or from time to time, slightly suboptimal actions, or perhaps even more: evil deeds? If Aristotle’s moral anthropology allowed for some imperfection or even considered imperfection as an unavoidable part of the human condition, it would be close to the view of the philosophos held by Plato. If, on the other hand, Aristotle defended an ideal of absolute perfection, he would be somewhere contiguous to the Stoic concept of the sage (sophos).