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10 - Aftermath of Victory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2017

Dina Rezk
Affiliation:
University of Reading
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Summary

He just didn't really believe in his heart that his people were against him, that he was in danger, or if he did, he was very fatalistic about it. It was a sort of Islamic fatalism. If it happened, it would be God's will. I'm the president of the people, I'm the father of these people. He used to personalize everything. ‘My canal.’ ‘My army.’ He really was a sort of father of his people.

Roy Atherton, 1990

The Yom Kippur War was a radical turning point in Egypt's history. Indeed, the successful surprise attack on Israel shifted the whole political and psychological balance of power across the Middle East and beyond. Irrespective of the military facts, it was from this plateau of ‘victory’ that Sadat came to be considered a veritable statesman. He was credited with inviting Western investment in Egypt's economy (infitah), opening the Suez Canal to international navigation, and eventually embarking on an unprecedented trip to Jerusalem that culminated in an Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. Following the war, Sadat pursued a contentious melange of domestic and foreign policies that came to define contemporary Egypt. A debate about Sadat the man and leader ensued.

Our historical understanding of these changes through Western eyes is understandably based primarily on the memory of those individuals present or involved in the post-1973 negotiations. Kissinger describes Sadat's actions as demonstrating ‘the transcendence of the visionary’. President Carter's recollection is a little more guarded, depicting Sadat as a character ‘extraordinarily inclined towards boldness’. Ismail Fahmy, Egyptian Foreign Minister between 1973 and 1977, attributes Sadat's achievements to an ‘impulsive style’ of ‘split-second decision making’ and a quest for personal fame. The memoirs of General Gamasy and Heikal explicitly accuse Sadat of squandering Nasser's achievements domestically, and Egypt's international standing abroad in the aftermath of the 1973 war. It is perhaps only a slight oversimplification to suggest that, broadly speaking, there is something of a ‘cultural divide’ between Western narratives which portray the personality of Sadat, his achievements and his legacy in a positive light, and their Arab counterparts which tend to do the opposite.

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The Arab World and Western Intelligence
Analysing the Middle East, 1956–1981
, pp. 284 - 324
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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