Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Appearances of the Good
- Introduction
- 1 The Basic Framework: Desires as Appearances
- 2 The Basic Framework: From Desire to Value and Action
- 3 The Subjective Nature of Practical Reason
- 4 The Objective Nature of Practical Reason
- 5 Deontological Goods
- 6 Motivation without Evaluation? Unintelligible Ends, Animal Behavior, and Diabolical Wills
- 7 Evaluation and Motivation Part Company? The Problem of Akrasia
- 8 Evaluation without Motivation? The Problem of Accidie
- Bibliography
- Index
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 August 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Appearances of the Good
- Introduction
- 1 The Basic Framework: Desires as Appearances
- 2 The Basic Framework: From Desire to Value and Action
- 3 The Subjective Nature of Practical Reason
- 4 The Objective Nature of Practical Reason
- 5 Deontological Goods
- 6 Motivation without Evaluation? Unintelligible Ends, Animal Behavior, and Diabolical Wills
- 7 Evaluation and Motivation Part Company? The Problem of Akrasia
- 8 Evaluation without Motivation? The Problem of Accidie
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
There is an old formula of the schools, nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur, nisi sub ratione mali. [We desire only what we conceive to be good; we avoid only what we conceive to be bad.]
(Kant, Critique of Practical Reason)It is hardly unfair, if unfair at all, to suggest that the philosophical view is overwhelmingly that the good or only the good attracts.
(Michael Stocker, “Desiring the Bad”)Whether accurate or not, Stocker's description of the philosophical landscape in the late seventies would have rung true to many philosophers at the time. Views that accepted what Kant calls the “old formula of the schools,” or, as will call them, “scholastic views,” enjoyed widespread acceptance through long periods of the history of philosophy. I would hazard a guess that something like what Kant describes as the “old formula of the schools,” and perhaps even stronger versions of it, were widely taken for granted around Kant's time, and they were certainly still very influential when Stocker wrote “Desiring the Bad.” But wherever the historical truth lies, the climate has changed significantly. Most philosophers accept that we do not necessarily desire the good. Partly because of the influence of Stocker and others, the current philosophical “mainstream” position is that evaluative attitudes (such as judging that something is good, valuing, etc.) do not determine and are not to be identified with motivational attitudes (such as desires, wants, etc.).
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- Appearances of the GoodAn Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason, pp. 1 - 20Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007