Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Decidability and enumerability
- 3 Axiomatized formal theories
- 4 Capturing numerical properties
- 5 The truths of arithmetic
- 6 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 7 Interlude: Taking stock
- 8 Two formalized arithmetics
- 9 What Q can prove
- 10 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 11 Primitive recursive functions
- 12 Capturing p.r. functions
- 13 Q is p.r. adequate
- 14 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 15 The arithmetization of syntax
- 16 PA is incomplete
- 17 Gödel's First Theorem
- 18 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 19 Strengthening the First Theorem
- 20 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 21 Using the Diagonalization Lemma
- 22 Second-order arithmetics
- 23 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's conjecture
- 24 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 25 The derivability conditions
- 26 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 27 Reflections
- 28 Interlude: About the Second Theorem
- 29 µ-Recursive functions
- 30 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 31 Turing machines
- 32 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 33 Halting problems
- 34 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 35 Proving the Thesis?
- 36 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Decidability and enumerability
- 3 Axiomatized formal theories
- 4 Capturing numerical properties
- 5 The truths of arithmetic
- 6 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 7 Interlude: Taking stock
- 8 Two formalized arithmetics
- 9 What Q can prove
- 10 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 11 Primitive recursive functions
- 12 Capturing p.r. functions
- 13 Q is p.r. adequate
- 14 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 15 The arithmetization of syntax
- 16 PA is incomplete
- 17 Gödel's First Theorem
- 18 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 19 Strengthening the First Theorem
- 20 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 21 Using the Diagonalization Lemma
- 22 Second-order arithmetics
- 23 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's conjecture
- 24 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 25 The derivability conditions
- 26 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 27 Reflections
- 28 Interlude: About the Second Theorem
- 29 µ-Recursive functions
- 30 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 31 Turing machines
- 32 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 33 Halting problems
- 34 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 35 Proving the Thesis?
- 36 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In 1931, the young Kurt Gödel published his First and Second Incompleteness Theorems; very often, these are simply referred to as ‘Gödel's Theorems’. His startling results settled (or at least, seemed to settle) some of the crucial questions of the day concerning the foundations of mathematics. They remain of the greatest significance for the philosophy of mathematics – though just what that significance is continues to be debated. It has also frequently been claimed that Gödel's Theorems have a much wider impact on very general issues about language, truth and the mind.
This book gives proofs of the Theorems and related formal results, and touches – necessarily briefly – on some of their implications. Who is this book for? Roughly speaking, for those who want a lot more fine detail than you get in books for a general audience (the best of those is Franzén, 2005), but who find the rather forbidding presentations in classic texts in mathematical logic (like Mendelson, 1997) too short on explanatory scene-setting. So I hope philosophy students taking an advanced logic course will find the book useful, as will mathematicians who want a more accessible exposition.
But don't be misled by the relatively relaxed style; don't try to browse through too quickly. We do cover a lot of ground in quite a bit of detail, and new ideas often come thick and fast. Take things slowly!
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems , pp. xiii - xivPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007