Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Decidability and enumerability
- 3 Axiomatized formal theories
- 4 Capturing numerical properties
- 5 The truths of arithmetic
- 6 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 7 Interlude: Taking stock
- 8 Two formalized arithmetics
- 9 What Q can prove
- 10 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 11 Primitive recursive functions
- 12 Capturing p.r. functions
- 13 Q is p.r. adequate
- 14 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 15 The arithmetization of syntax
- 16 PA is incomplete
- 17 Gödel's First Theorem
- 18 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 19 Strengthening the First Theorem
- 20 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 21 Using the Diagonalization Lemma
- 22 Second-order arithmetics
- 23 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's conjecture
- 24 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 25 The derivability conditions
- 26 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 27 Reflections
- 28 Interlude: About the Second Theorem
- 29 µ-Recursive functions
- 30 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 31 Turing machines
- 32 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 33 Halting problems
- 34 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 35 Proving the Thesis?
- 36 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Capturing numerical properties
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Decidability and enumerability
- 3 Axiomatized formal theories
- 4 Capturing numerical properties
- 5 The truths of arithmetic
- 6 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 7 Interlude: Taking stock
- 8 Two formalized arithmetics
- 9 What Q can prove
- 10 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 11 Primitive recursive functions
- 12 Capturing p.r. functions
- 13 Q is p.r. adequate
- 14 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 15 The arithmetization of syntax
- 16 PA is incomplete
- 17 Gödel's First Theorem
- 18 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 19 Strengthening the First Theorem
- 20 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 21 Using the Diagonalization Lemma
- 22 Second-order arithmetics
- 23 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's conjecture
- 24 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 25 The derivability conditions
- 26 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 27 Reflections
- 28 Interlude: About the Second Theorem
- 29 µ-Recursive functions
- 30 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 31 Turing machines
- 32 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 33 Halting problems
- 34 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 35 Proving the Thesis?
- 36 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The previous chapter concerned axiomatized formal theories in general. This chapter introduces some key concepts we need in describing formal arithmetics in particular, notably the concepts of expressing and capturing numerical properties. But we need to start with two quick preliminary sections, about notation and about the very idea of a property.
Three remarks on notation
(a) Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem is about the limitations of axiomatized formal theories of arithmetic: if a theory T is consistent and satisfies some other fairly minimal constraints, we can find arithmetical truths that can't be derived in T. Evidently, in discussing Gödel's result, it will be very important to be clear about when we are working ‘inside’ some specified formal theory T and when we are talking informally ‘outside’ that particular theory (e.g. in order to establish truths that T can't prove).
However, we do want our informal talk to be compact and perspicuous. Hence we will tend to borrow the standard logical notation from our formal languages for use in augmenting mathematical English (so, for example, we might write ‘∀x∀y(x + y = y + x)’ as a compact way of expressing the ‘ordinary’ arithmetic truth that the order in which you sum numbers doesn't matter).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems , pp. 28 - 36Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007