Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-pjpqr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-01T01:52:39.823Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

35 - From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird

Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Steven S. Smith
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Jason M. Roberts
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Ryan J. Vander Wielen
Affiliation:
Temple University, Philadelphia
Get access

Summary

Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond explore the conditions under which presidential nominees do not gain Senate confirmation. They find that individuals who wish to see a nominee fail are more successful when they discover negative information about a nominee and manage to publicize it through the media or committee hearings in the Senate.

The U.S. Congress was designed to make legislating difficult. Fragmented power and multiple decision points afford those opposed to a bill ample opportunities to defeat it. In the Senate more than the House, members have significant parliamentary rights that allow them to delay action on legislation. Most bills introduced in Congress are ignored. Presidential proposals fare only slightly better – about one-fourth make it into law. In sum, for legislation introduced in Congress, there is a presumption of failure.

Nominations are different. Presidential nominees, even for the highest offices in the executive branch and the judiciary, typically are approved with little opposition. Although senatorial prerogatives to block action apply to nominations as well as to legislation, when the Senate receives a presidential nomination, there is a presumption of success. For several reasons, the Senate by tradition defers to the president in the staffing of the government and judiciary. First, the Constitution affords the president greater authority over appointments than over legislation. Furthermore, if the Senate turns down a nominee, there is no assurance that the replacement will be less objectionable.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Krutz, Glen S., Fleisher, Richard, and Bond, Jon R.. 1998. “From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate”American Political Science Review 92(4): 871–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×