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5 - The Limits of Costly Protest

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2022

LaGina Gause
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Summary

Gause contends that reelection incentives motivate legislators to support protest demands, especially as protesters’ resources decrease. However, how legislators respond to salient protest demands may depend on legislator or congressional district characteristics.The empirical models in the previous chapter include control variables to account for the influence of public opinion, partisanship, and legislators’ personal preferences on legislative behavior. Those empirical models provide evidence for the average legislator’s support of protesters’ preferences.

This chapter looks more closely at a legislators’ electoral context to evaluate whether certain legislators or congressional districts misalign with the theory of costly protest and legislative behavior. The results demonstrate that all legislators are responsive to the costly protest of their constituents. A legislator’s party, race, or electoral vulnerability changes the degree but seldom the direction of legislative voting behavior in favor of low-resource protesters.

Type
Chapter
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The Advantage of Disadvantage
Costly Protest and Political Representation for Marginalized Groups
, pp. 120 - 140
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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  • The Limits of Costly Protest
  • LaGina Gause, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: The Advantage of Disadvantage
  • Online publication: 17 February 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070171.005
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  • The Limits of Costly Protest
  • LaGina Gause, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: The Advantage of Disadvantage
  • Online publication: 17 February 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070171.005
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • The Limits of Costly Protest
  • LaGina Gause, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: The Advantage of Disadvantage
  • Online publication: 17 February 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070171.005
Available formats
×