We now understand that Socrates believes that all desire is for the good. This understanding has been facilitated by the hierarchy of desire that is described in the Gorgias. Using this framework, we assume that people always endeavor to reach the best end available in their current situation. Such endeavors lead to subordinated desires for that which is the best means to that best end. As a result, agents always do that which they believe is the best means to the best end in their current situation. This suggests that Socrates must believe that all desire is rational. Indeed, Socrates confirms that this is true in the Protagoras, where he argues that no one errs willingly in the pursuit of happiness. Does Socrates really believe that everyone approaches every crossroad in their lives by weighing the various alternatives strictly in light of what they judge to be true about the world?

The notion that all desire is for the good and therefore all purposive behavior is rational has come to be called “Socratic intellectualism.” The name alone is offensive to the view with which I opened Chapter 2. By saying that our desire for the good works in concert only with beliefs to control our behavior, Socrates seems to be discounting any possible role for desires that are base or irrational. He seems to be discounting emotion altogether, as if people operated from a purely scientific basis. Certainly this claim flies in the face of robust evidence.