Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- PART 1 DEFINING THE FIELD, ITS THEORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND CHANGES AFTER THE COLD WAR
- 2 Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems
- 3 Reflections on Intelligence Historiography since 1939
- 4 A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics
- 5 Intelligence Analysis after the Cold War – New Paradigm or Old Anomalies?
- PART 2 RESEARCH ON NEW CHALLENGES, METHODS, AND THREATS
- PART 3 INTELLIGENCE, POLITICS, AND OVERSIGHT
- Index
- References
4 - A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics
from PART 1 - DEFINING THE FIELD, ITS THEORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND CHANGES AFTER THE COLD WAR
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- PART 1 DEFINING THE FIELD, ITS THEORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND CHANGES AFTER THE COLD WAR
- 2 Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems
- 3 Reflections on Intelligence Historiography since 1939
- 4 A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics
- 5 Intelligence Analysis after the Cold War – New Paradigm or Old Anomalies?
- PART 2 RESEARCH ON NEW CHALLENGES, METHODS, AND THREATS
- PART 3 INTELLIGENCE, POLITICS, AND OVERSIGHT
- Index
- References
Summary
(T)he standard depiction of the battle of Gettysburg as the accidental collision of two armies marching half blindly…(was) true only for the Confederates. Their 150-mile march from the Rappahannock River to Pennsylvania was penetrated by soldier-spies…Thus General Meade was able to foresee that the enemy would concentrate at or near Gettysburg. His forces seized commanding heights there and surprised the arriving Confederates, who never overcame the Federals' initial advantage of position.
Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the UnionIntelligence has made a dramatic difference to the outcomes of battles. Yet, scholars have not developed analytical techniques for assessing when intelligence matters in international politics, why it does, or the relative intelligence capabilities of states – a point that Michael Warner makes in Chapter Two. True, several political scientists have written important studies that have put surprise attacks, such as Pearl Harbor and September 11, 2001, in larger perspective. Former intelligence officers have occasionally revealed their experiences in memoirs that suggest the causes of intelligence success and failure. In general, however, the two realms of theory and practice have not talked to one another. Practitioners seem uncomfortable encouraging inquiry in such a sensitive area; academics seem to have few theory-building objectives related to the field; and, with a few notable exceptions, political scientists have shunned intelligence – perhaps in part because they are so unfamiliar with its workings.
Whatever the reason, the lack of scholarly attention to the discipline of intelligence seems odd.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- National Intelligence SystemsCurrent Research and Future Prospects, pp. 58 - 92Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
References
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