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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2012

Bruce Wydick
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University of San Francisco
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Print publication year: 2007

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  • References
  • Bruce Wydick, University of San Francisco
  • Book: Games in Economic Development
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619663.016
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  • References
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  • Book: Games in Economic Development
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  • References
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  • Book: Games in Economic Development
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619663.016
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