To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In this chapter, we bring together a queer menagerie of LGBQTNB human lives, specifically in the form of a focus on veganism and animal rights, beauty influencers and ‘cruelty-free’ makeup, and the kink practice known as ‘pup play’. What unites this seemingly disparate group of topics is a focus on the consumption of animals as food for humans or as fodder for human fantasies, and the ways in which a consumerist logic provides a point of intersection between human and animal lives that is arguably oriented to the former, rather than the latter. Obviously, veganism, ‘cruelty-free’ makeup, and kink are not unique to LGBQTNB people. However, each of these three topics takes unique forms or play out in specific ways in the context of LGBQTNB people’s lives. In focusing on the specific forms that these three topics take in the context of LGBQTNB people’s lives, we are mindful in this chapter that whilst some of the practices that LGBQTNB people may engage in through their relationships with animals may take specific forms, they nonetheless sit in (and serve to reinforce) broader social contexts wherein anthropocentrism serves to centre human standpoints.
Veganism has increased in popularity in the past decade and, despite being a characteristic protected by law, is often viewed negatively by the general population. Little is known about the attitudes of healthcare professionals despite the potential influence on practice and eating disorder patient care. This is one of the first studies to investigate attitudes toward veganism within specialist eating disorder, general mental health and other professionals.
A one-way ANOVA indicated all professionals held positive views toward veganism. General mental health professionals held statistically more positive veganism attitudes than specialist eating disorder and other professionals.
As one of the first studies to suggest eating disorder professionals are not biased against veganism, it has important clinical practice implications, particularly when exploring motivations for adopting a vegan diet (health, weight loss, environmental or animal welfare concerns) in patients with eating disorders. Implications for further research are provided.
I argue that eating meat is morally good and our duty when it is part of a practice that has benefited animals. The existence of domesticated animals depends on the practice of eating them, and the meat-eating practice benefits animals of that kind if they have good lives. The argument is not consequentialist but historical, and it does not apply to nondomesticated animals. I refine the argument and consider objections.
The number of people following a vegan diet in the UK is increasing. Eating disorder clinicians are anecdotally reporting that more of their patients with anorexia nervosa are wanting to follow a vegan diet. The relationship between veganism and eating disorders is unclear. A fictitious scenario is used to explore these issues. An approach is described that clinicians may follow to help patients to understand the potential relationship between their eating disorder and veganism. The human rights issues this involves are also explored. It is hoped that this article will make readers more aware of this complex issue and the impact it can have on engagement with services and on treatment options.
The chapter argues that the general right to conscientious exemption in Canada should not be interpreted to be available only to religious people. This is for several reasons. First, the general right to conscientious exemption is available under the right to freedom of conscience under s 2(a) of the Canadian Charter and s 3 of the Quebec Charter. Albeit there are only a handful of cases on this right and even though the SCC has not unequivocally delivered a judgment on this, it is clear that the existing cases hold that freedom of conscience protects non-religious conscientious beliefs. Secondly, even though the general right to conscientious exemption arising under anti-discrimination statutes appears to be a privilege of only those with religious beliefs, it has been argued that this would violate the Canadian Charter guarantee of equality rights under s 15 and freedom of conscience under s 2(a). The appropriate remedy, for most of the anti-discrimination statutes, would be to read in conscience as a protected characteristic. This would entail that, in relation to all the rules of law which guarantee the general right to conscientious exemption, the right is not a privilege of those that object on the basis of a religious belief.
To explore adherence to a plant-based diet from the perspective of goals- and motivations-based systems.
A cross-sectional, survey-based study was conducted regarding eating patterns, goals and motivations for current eating habits.
Data were collected using an online survey platform, including the Goal Systems Assessment Battery (GSAB) and other survey tools.
University students were recruited, including thirty-three students reporting successful maintenance of a plant-based diet (Adherents) and sixty-three students trying to adhere to a plant-based diet (Non-adherents).
Using GSAB subscale scores, discriminant function analyses significantly differentiated adherents v. non-adherents, accounting for 49·0 % of between-group variance (χ2 (13) = 42·03, P < 0·000). It correctly classified 72·7 % of adherents and 88·9 % of non-adherents. Constructs including value, self-efficacy, planning/stimulus control and positive affect were significant and included in the discriminant function. Logistic regression results suggested that participants who successfully adhered to a plant-based diet were seventeen times more likely to report ‘To manage or treat a medical condition’ as motivation and almost seven times more likely to report ‘To align with my ethical beliefs’ as motivation compared with non-adherents. However, these participants were 94 % less likely to report ‘To maintain and/or improve my health’ as motivation compared with non-adherents. Controlling for motivations, hierarchical logistic regression showed that only planning as part of the GSAB self-regulatory system predicted adherence to a plant-based diet.
Values-based approaches to plant-based diets, including consideration for ethical beliefs, self-efficacy and proper planning, may be key for successful maintenance of this diet long-term.
Chapter 1 explains a natural law understanding of cooperation with evil, uses it to develop an understanding of consumer boycotts, and applies this understanding to the question: What kinds of choices are appropriate with respect to the boycott of the meat industry proposed by vegetarians, vegans, and others? The chapter pays particular attention to the so-called threshold argument against consumer meat purchases.
A popular view holds that no wrong is done to an animal when it is killed painlessly. In arguing against this view in the previous chapter, I granted for the sake of argument that chickens are merely sentient. I framed the discussion this way to make clear that the case against anti-speciesist versions of humane slaughter does not depend on revisionary claims about the cognitive abilities of food animals. Contemporary science, however, suggests that the cognitive abilities of chickens are more extensive than is generally recognized, to the point that they possess a primitive form of self-consciousness. If chickens have mental abilities that place them in an intermediate status between merely sentient beings and persons, this will have bearing not only on the arguments I examined in the last chapter, but on any attempt to justify slaughtering them, including attempts that employ Singer’s or potentially other versions of protectionist theory. The revised understanding of chicken cognition thus poses a separate challenge to protectionist arguments for humane slaughter, independent of the challenge posed by the time-relative interest account. The version of primitive self-consciousness that I defend innovates on previous versions to include a primitive ability to conceive of oneself through time.
This chapter analyzes the ethics of killing animals when animals are assumed to be unable to form desires about the future and to lack a conception of themselves through time. Even if their mental abilities are so limited, they can still be harmed by being killed, and so inducing their deaths will require justification. My argument employs the notion of a time-relative interest, which is the interest an entity has in continuing to live. This interest is shaped by two factors: the gain or loss of future well-being, and the amount of psychological continuity between the entity now and in the future (when its well-being improves or declines). After outlining the time-relative interest account I note how it differs from another influential argument that takes future well-being into account, Don Marquis’ argument against abortion. I then defend the time-relative interest account from the criticism that it fails to grant weight to interests a deceased individual would have come to posses had he or she not died. Finally, I show why my view is consistent with a universal legal ban on infanticide.
Animal rights and related notions of animal protection have long been thought to entail a plant-based diet. An increasingly popular view in the animal ethics debate challenges this idea by arguing that even if animals warrant a high degree of moral standing we are permitted or even obliged to eat meat. Some arguments to this effect maintain that greater harms accrue to animal in plant agriculture than in certain forms of free-range animal husbandry. Others cite a loss in value that would occur if animals raised for food no longer existed. Still other arguments for ethical omnivorism cite new technologies such as humane slaughter systems, which are said to painlessly kill animals in a manner consistent with Peter Singer's philosophy of animal liberation, or in vitro meat, which is sourced in a petri dish rather than the body of a living animal. Finally some philosophers invoke plant "neurobiology" to challenge the possibility of not eating sentient beings. Despite their differences these arguments all defend a new omnivorism, one that justifies eating meat within a framework of animal protection.
In 2013 researchers at a lab in the Netherlands created a hamburger by taking stem cells from a piece of beef and exposing it to a growth hormone to induce growth. The result was a new kind of hamburger: one made from beef, but which was not carved out of the body of an animal. In vitro meat is flesh that was not derived from the carcass of an animal. As such, it redeploys a concept familiar to protectionism, that of meat itself, so as to finally justify a new omnivorism. In vitro meat represents a form of meat-eating that protectionism should condone, even celebrate. Its arrival should prompt us to widen our concept of what meat is to include lab-grown beef, pork, and chicken. It should also oblige us to examine the criticisms of in vitro meat that have been made by thoughtful animal protection philosophers, and show how such criticisms can be overcome. Crucial to doing so is revising our concept of what meat is.
The philosophy of animal protection traditionally takes for granted our least controversial moral views, such as the idea that other human beings can make genuine moral claims on us. It then seeks to enhance them with further principles of its own. In this way it is like an application for a phone or computer, which achieves functionality by being added to an existing operating system. My primary concern is with the operating system, not the application. I seek to outline two principles that have been common to most versions of animal protection: anti-speciesism and moral individualism. While not every argument for protectionism endorses both claims, the great majority do, and so outlining these two principles are the best place to begin. (Insofar as a critique of protection rejects either of these notions it will be a rejectionist critique rather than a separatist one.) Both principles achieve their force by presupposing certain moral claims that are not unique to protectionism. The most relevant of these are the bedrock claim that causing human suffering requires justification, and that moral judgment commonly (but not universally) involves extending equal consideration to the interests of individuals affected by our decisions.
Steven Davis has offered an influential argument for the view that the diet most consistent with animal protection philosophy is one that contains some meat. Davis cites the accidental death of field animals during vegetable harvesting. Empirical studies suggest that the number of field mice, rats, and similar creatures killed in crop cultivation may outnumber the total animal deaths involved in the raising of beef cattle, so long as the cows are raised on a diet of grass rather than grain. If so, then the most logical diet for animal advocates to adopt is one that includes hamburger and milk from grass-fed cows, in order to reduce the overall number of animals killed. Davis's argument for burger veganism overlooks philosophically significant forms of harm to human beings that are present in beef production but not vegetable harvesting, and bases his argument on the implausible assumption that there is no difference between deliberate and accidental killing. A final problem bedevils not only Davis’s orginal argument but subsequent variations that defend eating Australian red meat and roadkill. It is that more than one current trend in plant agriculture causes little or no collateral harm to animals.
The moral status of animals is a subject of controversy both within and beyond academic philosophy, especially regarding the question of whether and when it is ethical to eat meat. A commitment to animal rights and related notions of animal protection is often thought to entail a plant-based diet, but recent philosophical work challenges this view by arguing that, even if animals warrant a high degree of moral standing, we are permitted - or even obliged - to eat meat. Andy Lamey provides critical analysis of past and present dialogues surrounding animal rights, discussing topics including plant agriculture, animal cognition, and in vitro meat. He documents the trend toward a new kind of omnivorism that justifies meat-eating within a framework of animal protection, and evaluates for the first time which forms of this new omnivorism can be ethically justified, providing crucial guidance for philosophers as well as researchers in culture and agriculture.
The study aimed to evaluate the dietary vitamin B6 intake and determine the vitamin B6 concentration in blood samples of German vegans.
Design and setting
Cross-sectional study with 33 examination sites all over Germany.
Ninety-three vegans (50 females) with a mean (±standard deviation (SD)) age of 43.7 ± 15.7 years who took no vitamin supplements.
Dietary intake was assed using a semi-quantitative food-frequency questionnaire. Erythrocyte aspartate aminotransferase activity coefficient (EAST-AC) was calculated as the ratio of stimulated (pyridoxal 5'-phosphate added) to unstimulated activity in blood samples that were provided after an overnight fast.
Mean ± SD vitamin B6 intake was 2.83 ± 0.98 mg day−1 and mean ± SD protein intake was 56.6 ± 21.7 g day−1. Of the participants 4% showed vitamin B6 intakes lower than daily recommended intakes for Germany, 16% showed EAST-AC > 1.85, and a further 58% showed EAST-AC of 1.5–1-85. Moderate vegans were affected to a lesser extent than strict vegans. None of the established confounders was a significant predictor of EAST-AC. In logistic regression analyses the contribution of nutriments and cereals to pyridoxine intake was the only predictor of EAST-AC classified as < 1.85 and ≥ 1.85, respectively.
In spite of the high total intake of vitamin B6, an adequate concentration in blood samples could not be realised for a majority of the participants. Due to the health implications of a marginal pyridoxine status, vegans should be encouraged to include foods with a high bioavailability of pyridoxine, such as beans, lentils and bananas, in the daily diet.
The study aimed to evaluate the homocysteine and cobalamin status of German vegans and determine whether the intake of very small amounts of foods of animal origin can improve this status.
Design and setting:
Cross-sectional study, Germany.
The dietary and nutritional intakes of 131 vegans (73 women, 58 men; a range: 20.2–82.1 years) were evaluated using a general questionnaire and two food–frequency questionnaires.
The prevalence of inadequate cobalamin status in volunteers of the German Vegan Study was 28.2%, and that of hyperhomocysteinaemia, 38.1%. Moderate vegans were affected to a lesser extent than were strict vegans. Duration of veganism and cobalamin concentration were inversely correlated (Spearman's r = -0.175, P = 0.047). Folate concentration and erythrocyte aspartic acid aminotransferase activity were not correlated with plasma homocysteine concentration, but duration of veganism correlated positively with homocysteine concentration (Spearman's r = 0.319, P < 0.001). Cobalamin and homocysteine concentrations were inversely correlated (when controlling for duration of veganism; r = -0.602, P < 0.001).
Cobalamin status needs to be improved in order to minimise the risk of hyperhomocysteinaemia.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.