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This article focuses on the conflicts over market access rules on the two primary Italian stock exchanges, Milan and Genoa. These conflicts disrupted the quality of information produced by the two markets. Official brokers aimed to defend their monopoly on brokerage and capture rents by limiting market access. Banks wanted wider access so as to avoid paying these rents, create an opaque market and maximize the benefit from their informational advantage. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Milan Exchange implemented a transparent market organization while the Genoa Exchange remained opaque, creating a complementarity between them which fostered the development of the securities market overall. When in 1907 a violent crisis erupted in the dominant Genoa Exchange, legislation was adopted to harmonize the organization of the Italian exchanges.
Responding to mistrust in the European agencies’ risk assessments in politically salient cases, the European Union (EU) legislator, the European Food Safety Authority and the European Medicines Agency alike have accelerated their efforts to foster EU regulatory science transparency. These simultaneous endeavours have, however, taken place in a fragmented legislative and administrative context, with each agency operating under a different legal framework. By focusing on authorisation procedures, from registration of studies to authorisation of novel foods, pesticides and human medicines, this article examines the resulting regimes governing the disclosure of scientific data by EU agencies to identify common trends and sectoral specificities. Against the background of an overall shift towards enhanced transparency, we shed light on, first, the circulation of institutional arrangements and practices among agencies and, second, the new dimensions of transparency emerging from these developments. We also highlight the remaining sectoral differences and argue that they could have potentially large impacts on the amount and type of information disclosed and on the level of transparency perceived by stakeholders and citizens. We argue that more coherence across the sectoral transparency regimes is needed, in particular in light of the agencies’ contested legitimacy and of their increasing cooperation on cross-cutting issues like antimicrobial resistance and medicine and pesticide residues in food.
Organized immaturity refers to the capacity of widely institutionalized sociotechnical systems to challenge qualities of human enlightenment, autonomy, and self-determination. In the context of surveillance capitalism, where these qualities are continuously put at risk, data transparency is increasingly proposed as a means of restoring human maturity by allowing individuals insight and choice vis-à-vis corporate data processing. In this article, however, I draw on research on General Data Protection Regulation–mandated data transparency practices to argue that transparency—while potentially fostering maturity—itself risks producing new forms of organized immaturity by facilitating user ignorance, manipulation, and loss of control of personal data. Considering data transparency’s relative “successes” and “failures” regarding the cultivation of maturity, I outline a set of possible remedies while arguing for a general need to develop more sophisticated ethical appreciations of transparency’s complex and potentially problematic implications for organized (im)maturity in the digital age.
The present study investigates the relation of procedural transparency and compliance with authorities’ regulations. The underlying assumption is that procedural transparency encourages compliance with regulations. In an incentivized experiment, 666 participants took on the role of a business owner and had to fill in a form and spend a certain amount of their income as compliance costs to adhere to safety rules. In a 2 (Business Size: small vs big) × 2 (Penalty Rate: equal vs unequal) × 2 (Penalty Scheme: transparent vs nontransparent) between-subjects design, we investigated whether an unequal penalty rate for small-size in contrast to big-size businesses had a different effect on compliance when this difference was transparent compared to when it was not transparent. Business income, compliance costs, and audit probability were varied within-subject, over 18 decision rounds. We find that the deterring effect of a higher penalty rate for big-size compared to small-size businesses under a nontransparent unequal penalty scheme is attenuated when the same information is available. This supports the idea of a backfiring effect and suggests that authorities need to carefully consider what information about their procedures to communicate in order to avoid the unintended negative effects of increasing transparency.
Farm animal welfare has now been studied, within a scientific framework, for several decades. The framework does not include ethical issues, but unless measurements of animal welfare at farm level are embedded in an ethical context, there is a danger that these measurements will not be properly utilised. This paper considers the relationship between ethical questions and animal welfare assessment. In it, the following four key ethical questions are identified. What is the baseline standard for morally acceptable animal welfare? What is a good animal life? What farming purposes are legitimate? What kinds of compromise are acceptable in a less-than-perfect world? The authors suggest that animal welfare scientists need to reflect carefully on these questions if welfare assessments are to be properly interpreted and put to practical use. Such reflection will lead to a more transparent appreciation of the values underlying welfare assessment. In this way, it will both offer welfare scientists a greater awareness of their own value-assumptions and enable the same scientists to communicate effectively with the wider audience — farmers, consumers, pressure groups, policy-makers and so on — for which the results of animal welfare assessments are of concern.
To-date, the dominant approach to improving farm animal welfare has consisted of a combination of voluntary improvements undertaken by farmers and the tightening of legal requirements. However, history suggests that there is a limit to the improvements capable of being secured by this approach. In this paper, it is argued that economic principles can and should have an important role when new, market-driven and other approaches are set up to improve farm animal welfare. The paper focuses on two ways in which economic principles can improve analyses of animal welfare. The first is by helping to define priorities as to which aspects of animal welfare should be promoted. Here, economic approaches can be used to capture and synthesise the perspectives of all the stakeholders, including the animals, in a transparent and systematic way. The second way is by helping to ensure that incentives are set up in the right way. Where the benefits and costs of improving animal welfare are initially distributed unevenly across stakeholders so that a socially desirable situation will not develop automatically, or be implemented, suitable economic principles may help to create incentives which correct this situation. Thus, if society is to achieve its goal of improving animal welfare, scholars from different disciplines should collaborate in identifying animal needs, assessing stakeholder preferences, making priorities transparent and providing incentives that make solutions realistically attainable.
This Chapter provides health policymakers, managers, and care providers with an overview of strategies that enforce the key principles of good governance presented in Chapter 4. Strengthening participatory governance, building policy capacity, institutionalizing procedures to incorporate evidence in policymaking, and building regulatory capacity are critical for strengthening participation, transparency, and accountability and enforcing the rule of law. There is a variety of potential strategies that health system managers can adapt to improve governance of health systems at the policy, institutional, and healthcare professional levels, these include: (1) strengthening effectiveness of decentralization at the policy level; (2) linking accreditation to incentives, such as public funding or contractual agreements, at the institutional level; and (3) professionally led self-regulation at the health care professionals’ level. Control of corruption requires political reforms with a focus on open exchange of information, channels for participation of citizens in policymaking, and penalties for the misuse of power. It is important to note that the evidence on governance strategies in L&MICs remains elusive. Health leaders and managers need to cautiously assess and adapt strategies to their own contexts.
Trilogues represent a decisive stage in the European Union (EU) legislative process and often settle the substantive content of EU legislation. During trilogues, negotiations move fast and new solutions are actively identified by the negotiators. The (lack of) transparency of trilogues has been repeatedly criticised in recent years, yet the EU institutions have defended their “space to think”. Relying on a set of interviews with trilogue participants, this paper mirrors the institutional practices in the final stages of EU law-making against the requirements of openness in the EU Treaties, which aim to strengthen “democracy by allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed the basis of a legislative act”. The paper argues that, despite noble proclamations, the EU’s legislative practices are characterised by institutional discretion and the lack enforcement of transparency requirements. The paper describes how trilogues are conducted and how questions involving risk management and technically complex issues are assessed in this process. Greater transparency would also help to ensure that risks and alternatives are properly assessed and would thus contribute to better-quality risk regulation in the EU.
Chapter 3 explores government sensitivities to terrorist violence. If the situation in Xinjiang is to escalate into something with broad international implications, it will be because Chinese domestic politics lead it to do so. As a consequence, it is vital to understand Chinese official sensitivities about terrorism. To develop this insight, we turn to official media coverage of terrorist violence to clarify how Chinese government authorities balance domestic and international priorities when approaching terrorist violence. Specifically, we examine media coverage of terrorist events in Xinjiang and provide an empirical account of how quickly and how transparently authorities provide information about these incidents to their domestic audience. We show that while transparency can foster the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy at home and abroad, the Party nearly always prioritizes short-term domestic stability. This reveals the extent to which counterterrorism policy is, and will likely remain, conservative and risk averse.
Rule combination can contribute to morphological simplicity. Synchronically, rule combinations (like word combinations) are sometimes stored as formulaic units, and this fact contributes to a morphological system’s processing simplicity, since accessing a stored rule combination directly is simpler than decomposing that combination into its component rules for separate lookup. Stored, formulaic rule combinations may also contribute to diachronic simplifications of a language’s morphology, since they are the locus of reanalyses that may eventuate in “affix telescoping,” the development of a rule combination into a simple rule. But affix telescoping is not a monolithic phenomenon; it involves the reduction of a rule combination’s combinatory transparency along at least four dimensions. Thus, it is possible to find rule combinations that are progressing toward reanalysis as simple rules without yet having reached the point of reanalysis.
The question of how best to tackle anthropogenic climate change is a thorny one: besides scientific uncertainty regarding the consequences of climate change, another difficulty is that the recommendations of climate experts may clash with the priorities of citizens, interest groups and political institutions. With the European Green Deal, the European Union (EU) recently made significant advances in climate policy; at the same time, and as is well known, the EU and its institutions have long been criticised for their “democratic deficit” and for their failure to involve all civil society actors equally in EU law-making processes. This article sheds light on the legal framework governing civil society participation in EU law-making, and more specifically on the Commission’s consultations pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Treaty on European Union. It then critically assesses selected features of two consultations conducted by the Commission in connection with the European Climate Law, which it evaluates from the perspective of the EU primary law principles of democracy, openness and transparency. Through this analysis, and by suggesting how future climate consultations could be further improved, the article aims to contribute to the (still nascent) legal scholarship on civil society participation in environmental and climate policy.
Chapter 4 explores the utility of different WTO rules in disciplining market-distortive behaviour of SOEs and subsidies, including GATT rules on import monopolies, state trading enterprises (STEs), transparency, and anti-dumping (AD) measures. In our view, these rules are all of limited utilities, albeit for different reasons: the rules on import monopolies and STEs are quite narrow in terms of the coverage of policy instruments and the prescribed obligations, the transparency obligation is rather tooth-less, while the ability to use AD measures to deal with market distortions due to state intervention has been curtailed by the Appellate Body (AB) in recent cases.
Chapter 6 provides a critical evaluation of the new rules on SOEs developed in international trade and investment agreements, with the CPTPP as the leading example. Despite its reputation as a ’twenty-first century high-standard trade agreement’, we argue that the SOE rules in the CPTPP do not add much to the existing rules in the WTO and are less rigorous than China’s WTO-plus obligations discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter then examines some major post-CPTPP trade and investment agreements with significant rules on SOEs, including the EU–Japan FTA, the EU–Vietnam FTA, the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the CAI. As one of China’s latest international agreements, the CAI is also the first treaty where China agreed to SOE rules outside the WTO. Again, the main substantive obligation here – the one on commercial considerations – simply repeats the existing obligation in China’s WTO accession package. While all of the FTAs discussed in this chapter should be praised for setting new and higher standards of transparency, they do not resolve the longstanding problem of enforcement – the most challenging issue under the WTO’s transparency regime.
This chapter explores the changes that AI brings about in corporate law and corporate governance, especially in terms of the challenges it poses for corporations. The law scholar Jan Lieder argues that whilst there is the potential to enhance the current system, there are also risks of destabilisation. Although algorithms are already being used in the board room, lawmakers should not consider legally recognizing e-persons as directors and managers. Rather, academia should evaluate the effects of AI on the corporate duties of boards and their liabilities. By critically examining three main topics, algorithms as directors, AI in a management board, and AI in a supervisory board, the author suggests the need for transparency in a company’s practices regarding AI for awareness-raising and the enhancement of overall algorithm governance, as well as the need for boards to report on their overall AI strategy and ethical guidelines relating to the responsibilities, competencies, and protective measures they established. Additionally, the author argues that a reporting obligation should require the boards to deal with questions of individual rights and explain how they relate to them.
The EU has been reluctant to engage in the negotiations for a UN treaty on business and human rights because such a treaty would have an impact on the competitiveness of EU-based corporations in the global marketplace, in particular, vis-à-vis competitors from developing and emerging states. Bearing in mind these observations relating to the EU’s position in the ongoing treaty process, this chapter aims to assess whether the EU has been able to mitigate the effects on the competitiveness of EU-based corporations in its unilateral ‘business and human rights’ legislative initiatives. After assessing which initiatives have been prioritised by the European Commission, this chapter investigates to what extent competition from non-EU corporations – and, in particular, corporations from developing and emerging states – has been taken into account during the drafting process of these initiatives, and to what extent they have a regulatory impact on such corporations. This chapter also discusses private international law issues.
The law scholar Dustin Lewis explores the requirements of international law with regard to the employments of AI-related tools and techniques in armed conflict. The scope of this chapter is not limited to Lethal Autonomous Weapons (AWS) but also encompasses other AI-related tools and techniques related to warfighting, detention, and humanitarian services. After providing an overview of international law applicable to armed conflict, the author outlines some preconditions necessary to respect international law. According to Lewis, current international law essentially presupposes humans – and not artificial, non-humans – as legal agents. From that premise, the author argues that any employment of AI-related tools or techniques in an armed conflict needs to be susceptible to being administered, discerned, attributed, understood, and assessed by human agents.
The global climate crisis poses many risks; for instance, relating to the environment, to the economy and to public health. The mitigation and management of such risks create a complex and multifaceted regulatory conundrum that requires quick, flexible, efficient and adaptive policy solutions that transcend the state level. A quick look in the body of regulatory instruments employed in the field of climate change policy will reveal that soft law is used very frequently by the European Commission to aid with the application, transposition and interpretation of European Union (EU) environmental legislation relating to climate change. While soft law has become ever more prominent in the EU legal order and has been studied extensively at the ex-post phase (ie concerning its effects or effectiveness), little academic attention has been paid to the process of soft law-making. In simple terms, we know very little about how soft law instruments are made. This article peeks behind the scenes of soft law and examines the transparency and participation credentials of the articulation process of Commission Guidance Documents in the field of climate change regulation adopted under key legal acts in the field.
We conclude with an analysis of the constraints that the connections world imposes on Asia’s growth prospects, and the policy options for relaxing them. One is the ability of powerful businesses and families to entrench themselves by virtue of their connections to government and/or politicians. Both parties gain so there is no incentive to change. Because marginal changes are unlikely to be credible, we propose a series of interrelated radical measures to disrupt and refashion the connections world including prohibitions on cross-holdings and inheritance taxation, as well as boosting competition policy and improving political transparency. We also outline some of the main pressure points in Asia going forward. These include the ability to innovate and construct effective entrepreneurial ecosystems and the pressure to create sufficient jobs. There is also the ballooning inequality of income and wealth. High inequality is associated with economic under-performance and susceptibility to political turmoil. Progressive taxes can mollify inequality, but permanent solutions rest in targeting their source: the connections world.
While witnessing the dismantling of a rule-based multilateral trading system, trade negotiators and diplomats in the US and the EU have revamped trade liberalisation through free trade agreements (FTAs). The failed TPP, TTIP, the renegotiation of NAFTA, and the rise of the Pacific Alliance in Latin America have put trade policy under scrutiny by media and civil society. As a result, trade negotiators have acquired new legal expertise in administrative and investment law to justify the need for innovative FTAs. As part of their limited negotiating capital, trade negotiators and diplomats have deployed neutral concepts of transparency and efficiency to justify the incorporation of domestic preferences. An analysis of the EU’s four Asian FTA transparency commitments offers insights into how national transparency mandates, together with geopolitical realities of international trade regimes, constitute the bargaining power of trade negotiators. The politicisation of legal expertise and trade negotiator’s negotiating capital creates a set of constraints and agency that allows for wiggle room in articulating, bargaining, and drafting what appears as neutral transparency provisions in FTAs.
A global federal government would be a mighty instrument – and lots of power-hungry leaders and groups from around the planet will no doubt vie with each other to manipulate it to their parochial ends. The global institutions will therefore need to incorporate robust mechanisms to ensure that they remain rigorously accountable, fully transparent, and genuinely independent and impartial in their basic functioning. Four features would therefore be important to include in such a government: strong subsidiarity, the separation of powers, an executive branch with plural leadership, and a high bar of supermajority voting before major action can occur in the world legislature. A second key goal for this government will be to reduce the gross disparities in wealth and opportunity that divide the world’s peoples. One plausible mechanism for achieving this would be a UN-run system of Guaranteed Minimum Income, implemented globally. Such a government could also adopt pragmatic policies to nudge the world’s autocratic nations toward higher degrees of democratization and respect for human rights.