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The Introduction presents the main idea of the book, namely that populism should be understood and assessed in terms of the kind of recognition for the people that it demands. The debate over the meaning and value of populism is fundamentally a debate over how democracy should recognize the people. Many people in contemporary societies feel disrespected and populism provides the recognition that they feel they have lost or never attained. The populist politics of resentment should not be understood as blindly emotional but as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that can be explained by people’s beliefs and principles. However, not all struggles for recognition contribute to the deepening of democracy, and we must distinguish between different kinds of recognition in order to understand why populism is often a threat to democratic principles and practices. The Introduction explains that the book is a study of the reasons people may have for supporting populism rather than the causes of populism. As a corollary of studying reasons rather than causes, populism is defined as a set of claims that can be assessed for their validity. The last part of the Introduction provides an overview of the book.
Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and unconnected to facts and principles. Democratic Respect argues instead that we should approach the populist politics of resentment as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that are intimately connected to people's factual and moral beliefs. By associating populist resentment with alleged violations of democratic principles, we can discuss what citizens and governments owe one another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
The article argues that Penelope recognizes Odysseus at Odyssey 23.32–33, not, as is usually held, at 205–06. Recognition is here analysed as a multi-componential process, in which Penelope’s coming to know Odysseus’ identity must be distinguished from her letting on that she knows, and in which her recognition of the man before her as her long-lost husband does not automatically entail the immediate rekindling of all the old emotions. The narrative of Odyssey 23.1–230 is shown to be interested in tracing Penelope’s progression through the various components of recognition (knowledge, acknowledgement, emotional reconnection). The article explores the reasons why Penelope may consent to full reunion with Odysseus a good deal later than she has actually recognized him. Among these reasons, as well as the need for emotional attunement between Odysseus and Penelope, is Penelope’s need to ‘manage face’ vis-à-vis Eurycleia, Telemachus and Odysseus. It is argued, further, that the narrative of the Odyssey characteristically requires us to read the minds of its characters, above all Penelope in book 23. A mind-reading approach to the poem is justified in principle and grounded in a detailed reading of Odyssey 23.1–230. The wider interpretative implications for the poetics of the poem as whole are also explored.
Arbitrators derive their jurisdiction from the agreement of the parties. The underlying contractual basis of their jurisdiction and the supervisory powers of the courts over arbitrator’s jurisdictions raises several issues which are examined in this chapter.
The first part of the paper briefly examines the principle of competence-competence and its ramifications on various matters, such as who has, or should have, priority to rule on jurisdiction (the courts or the tribunals) and what should be the appropriate level of scrutiny by the supervising courts.
The second part examines which issues are to be regarded as ‘jurisdictional’. A broader or narrower understanding of the term will reflect on the scope of the courts’ review.
The third part examines who and when is to rule on jurisdiction and the various scenarios that can be triggered depending on how the jurisdictional review is initiated. Prior to the constitution of the tribunal the matter can only be brought before the court. Once the tribunal is constituted, the issue of jurisdiction can be brought both before the court and before the tribunal, and the court may be called upon to review tribunal’s findings. Post-award jurisdictional review can be triggered both in the set-aside and recognition proceedings. Issues of particular importance in this regard are standard of review to be used by the courts and whether the courts should be entrusted to review negative jurisdictional rulings of the tribunals.
The final part of this chapter discusses anti-suit and anti-arbitration injunctions and their perceived pros and cons, form and legal basis.
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is no less important a matter in international arbitration than in national court litigation. Nothing less than the finality of an adjudication is at stake. In principle, a tribunal should decline to adjudicate a dispute if it has already been adjudicated either in a prior judgment or award. Apart from all the disadvantages of duplicative proceedings, a tribunal’s failure to treat a prior adjudication as preclusive made lead to set aside of its award. Even if an adjudication is final and binding, or in the case of an award entitled to recognition, certain so-called “identities” must be established, whether identity of party, identity of claim, or identity of object, or all of the above. But how are they to be defined? Herein lies the difficulty for tribunals. The requirements of res judicata are a matter of forum law and, unlike a national court, an arbitral tribunal has no forum law and derives little if any guidance from the parties’ agreements, arbitration laws or institutional rules. Tribunals have a choice-of-law challenge, their best options being the res judicata norms of one body of national law or another and an international standard if one can be ascertained.
Commercial parties engaged in international transactions will typically resist agreeing to submit disputes to their counterparty’s national court system due to the real or perceived ‘home court advantage’. While international arbitration solves the problem with respect to the dispute on the merits, the arbitrators’ authority ends with the rendering of their award, and they cannot compel compliance with the award if voluntary compliance is not forthcoming. For that, the prevailing party – now an award creditor – must turn to the national courts, where the ‘home court advantage’ can re-emerge: the place of arbitration may have been located in the award debtor’s state, giving its courts the power to annul the award; or the award debtor’s assets may be uniquely located in its home state, making that the only practical enforcement forum. And problems may be particularly acute where the award debtor is the State itself or a state-controlled entity. The present chapter considers a potential option for an award creditor whose commercial arbitration award is annulled on arbitrary or parochial grounds by the courts of the seat, or wrongfully denied enforcement in that or another jurisdiction: the use of investment arbitration to enforce commercial arbitration awards as a vindication of rights and remedies under international law.
This chapter deals with the German position on States and their organs. It is divided into five parts; territorial sovereignty, political independence, Statehood and recognition, organs of the State and their status and State succession. The first part deals with the legal consequences of Germany’s non-recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea while distinguishing the same from sanctions policies, Germany’s position on the international legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Germany’s views on the presence of Thailand’s king in and his conduct of State affairs from Germany and Germany’s position on Israel’s annexation plans in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The second part addresses Germany’s response to the new Hong Kong national security law, and Germany’s position on Taiwan. The third part, statehood and recognition, encompasses Germany’s opinion on Palestine not being a State party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Germany’s non-recognition of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’, and Germany’s support of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer.
By the Caroline era, London’s broader theatergoing public contained within it the smaller subset of a theatrical community – those playgoers collectively invested in the cultivation of their dramatic knowledge and interpretive acuity. Chapter 4 offers a phenomenological prehistory of this community, locating its activation in the moment of performance itself. The chapter traces the formation of this theatrical community alongside the dramatic trope of impersonation, which constructed the unknown depths and vicissitudes of individual identity as a function of the bifurcated structure of the playhouse. Through readings of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and The Comedy of Errors, the anonymous Look About You, John Fletcher’s Love’s Cure, and Dekker and Middleton’s The Roaring Girl, this chapter argues that the formation of spatially relational identities in impersonation plots extended from the stage to the amphitheater: constituted as a series of mirror images only partially revealed, London’s theatrical community was produced by spectators’ mutual recognition of their uncertainty about one another.
Immanuel Kant maintained throughout his life that non-human persons likely exist but he failed to specify how we could recognise them. In this article, I argue (a) that non-human organisms can be considered non-human persons if they can be judged as belonging to a species with a moral vocation, and (b) a species can be judged as having a moral vocation if at least one of its members is able to make what I will call a “moral sacrifice” in which that member sacrifices its physical life for the sake of its moral life.
This chapter focuses on the reconfiguration of land tenure and authority in Marovo Lagoon, a rural area subject to widespread and destructive industrial logging. Women as a social group are known to be largely excluded from formal negotiations regarding logging, and this chapter considers the extent to which this can be traced to a flawed legislative framework, to patriarchal kastom or the erosion of women’s rights by colonisation. Drawing on archival and ethnographic work, it demonstrates that missionaries and colonial officials recognised some idealisations of masculine authority while disregarding other forms of influence, facilitating a simplification of the land tenure system that has enabled some male leaders to consolidate their control over resources. The reproduction of particular idealisations of masculine authority over land continues today, and simultaneously constitutes land control as a masculine domain. While contemporary inequalities can be partially traced to the structural features of the property system, they also emerge from long-term processes of colonial intrusion, capitalist development and the erosion of important aspects of gendered attachments to land.
I begin with an account of the fundamental aims of Hegel’s ‘science of right’ so as to show how his account of property faces two key challenges: justifying the concept of property and any specific form of it, on the one hand, and integrating property into the system of right, which includes subordinating it to any higher moments of right, on the other. I then turn to Hegel’s argument for private property. I distinguish between two interpretations of his argument: the ‘embodiment’ interpretation and the ‘recognition’ interpretation. I identify serious problems with the first interpretation and then argue for a version of the second one that entails the type of triadic model of the concept of property developed by Fichte and already implicit in Kant’s Rechtslehre. I show that this triadic model, and thus Hegel’s full argument for private property, becomes explicit only at the stage of contract. Next, I discuss how Hegel seeks to integrate private property into ethical life, and I argue that the idea of ethical life is, in fact, more compatible with some form of common or collective property because this form of property is more expressive of this idea.
This chapter begins with Fichte’s early theory of property as presented in his defence of the French Revolution from 1793. My intention is to show how tensions within this theory of property can be explained in terms of an unsuccessful attempt to establish a necessary connection between the right to property and labour. In the later Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte’s attempt to explain the connection between the right to property and labour leads him to reject his earlier dyadic (person–thing) model of the concept of property. A triadic (person–thing–person) model is instead shown to follow from Fichte’s understanding of the concept of right and the role of recognition in his theory of right. The connection between the right to property and labour is explained in terms of how each person’s property rights must enable him or her to live from his or her labour. This will be shown to demand forms of property other than private property in relation to certain activities and the resources required by them. Fichte nevertheless speaks of ‘absolute property’ and thereby suggests the possibility of some role for private property within the rational state.
This pioneering work explores a new wave of widely overlooked conflicts that have emerged across the Andean region, coinciding with the implementation of internationally acclaimed indigenous rights. Why are groups that have peacefully cohabited for decades suddenly engaging in hostile and, at times, violent behaviours? What is the link between these conflicts and changes in collective self-identification, claim-making, and rent-seeking dynamics? And how, in turn, are these changes driven by broader institutional, legal and policy reforms? By shifting the focus to the 'post-recognition,' this unique study sets the agenda for a new generation of research on the practical consequences of the employment of ethnic-based rights. To develop the core argument on the links between recognition reforms and 'recognition conflicts', Lorenza Fontana draws on extensive empirical material and case studies from three Andean countries – Bolivia, Colombia and Peru – which have been global forerunners in the implementation of recognition politics.
Glöckner and Bröder (2011) have shown that for 77.5% of their participants’ decision making behavior in decisions involving recognition information and explicitly provided additional cues could be better described by weighted-compensatory Parallel Constraint Satisfaction (PCS) Models than by non-compensatory strategies such as recognition heuristic (RH) or Take the Best (TTB). We investigate whether this predominance of PCS models also holds in memory-based decisions in which information retrieval is effortful and cognitively demanding. Decision strategies were analyzed using a maximum-likelihood strategy classification method, taking into account choices, response times and confidence ratings simultaneously. In contrast to the memory-based-RH hypothesis, results show that also in memory-based decisions for 62% of the participants behavior is best explained by a compensatory PCS model. There is, however, a slight increase in participants classified as users of the non-compensatory strategies RH and TTB (32%) compared to the previous study, mirroring other studies suggesting effects of costly retrieval.
We investigated the extent to which the human capacity for recognition helps to forecast political elections: We compared naïve recognition-based election forecasts computed from convenience samples of citizens’ recognition of party names to (i) standard polling forecasts computed from representative samples of citizens’ voting intentions, and to (ii) simple—and typically very accurate—wisdom-of-crowds-forecasts computed from the same convenience samples of citizens’ aggregated hunches about election results. Results from four major German elections show that mere recognition of party names forecast the parties’ electoral success fairly well. Recognition-based forecasts were most competitive with the other models when forecasting the smaller parties’ success and for small sample sizes. However, wisdom-of-crowds-forecasts outperformed recognition-based forecasts in most cases. It seems that wisdom-of-crowds-forecasts are able to draw on the benefits of recognition while at the same time avoiding its downsides, such as lack of discrimination among very famous parties or recognition caused by factors unrelated to electoral success. Yet it seems that a simple extension of the recognition-based forecasts—asking people what proportion of the population would recognize a party instead of whether they themselves recognize it—is also able to eliminate these downsides.
Relationship of international law and municipal law — Treaties — Treaty of Guarantee between United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, 1960 — Need for incorporation of international treaties — Effect of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 in international and domestic law
Recognition — Recognition of Northern Cyprus — Non-recognition of Northern Cyprus by United Kingdom — Acts amounting to recognition — Co-operation with law enforcement authorities of unrecognized entity
Jurisdiction — European Arrest Warrant — Jurisdiction over individuals from unrecognized States — Jurisdiction for crimes committed within England and Wales — Jurisdiction under European Convention on Human Rights, 1950
Human rights — Human Rights Act 1998 — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Article 3 of European Convention prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment — Article 6 of European Convention providing right to a fair trial — Conditions within prisons and courts of Northern Cyprus — Evidence relevant in European Convention on Human Rights claims — Extent of territorial jurisdiction — Whether claimant within jurisdiction of United Kingdom for purposes of European Convention — Whether claimant being granted permission to challenge provision of material to Northern Cyprus police on this ground — The law of England
Research on the processing of recognition information has focused on testing the recognition heuristic (RH). On the aggregate, the noncompensatory use of recognition information postulated by the RH was rejected in several studies, while RH could still account for a considerable proportion of choices. These results can be explained if either a) a part of the subjects used RH or b) nobody used it but its choice predictions were accidentally in line with predictions of the strategy used. In the current study, which exemplifies a new approach to model testing, we determined individuals’ decision strategies based on a maximum-likelihood classification method, taking into account choices, response times and confidence ratings simultaneously. Unlike most previous studies of the RH, our study tested the RH under conditions in which we provided information about cue values of unrecognized objects (which we argue is fairly common and thus of some interest). For 77.5% of the subjects, overall behavior was best explained by a compensatory parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) strategy. The proportion of subjects using an enhanced RH heuristic (RHe) was negligible (up to 7.5%); 15% of the subjects seemed to use a take the best strategy (TTB). A more-fine grained analysis of the supplemental behavioral parameters conditional on strategy use supports PCS but calls into question process assumptions for apparent users of RH, RHe, and TTB within our experimental context. Our results are consistent with previous literature highlighting the importance of individual strategy classification as compared to aggregated analyses.
It has been proposed that recognition can form the basis of simple but ecologically rational decision strategies (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer (1999) found that constructing share portfolios based on simple name recognition alone often yielded better returns than the market index. We describe four studies with seven samples of participants from three countries (total N = 319) in which the returns of recognized and unrecognized shares from several stock markets were tracked over various periods of time. We find no support for the claim that a simple strategy of name recognition can be used as a general strategy to select stocks that yield better-than-average returns. However, there was some suggestion in the data that recognition performs better when the market is falling and worse when it is rising. A follow-up study indicated that the absence of an overall recognition effect could not easily be attributed to our reliance on student participants or smaller samples than Borges et al. (1999) had used. We conclude that, with respect to changes in value, selecting stocks on the basis of name recognition is a near-random method of portfolio construction that offers little, if any, benefit to the personal investor.
The diversity, ingenuity and differences of opinion displayed in the articles of the recent special issues on the recognition heuristic are testament to the power and theoretical fertility of a simple idea about the role of recognition in decision making. In this brief comment I mention a number of these papers, but my focus is on points of agreement and disagreement with the conclusions drawn by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) in their review of a decade’s worth of research on the recognition heuristic.
I describe and discuss the sometimes heated controversy surrounding the recognition heuristic (RH) as a model of inferential decision making. After briefly recapitulating the history of the RH up to its current version, I critically evaluate several specific assumptions and predictions of the RH and its surrounding framework: recognition as a memory-based process; the RH as a cognitive process model; proper conditions of testing the RH; measures of using the RH; reasons for not using the RH; the RH as a non-compensatory strategy; evidence for a Less-is-more effect (LIME); and the RH as part of the toolbox. The collection of these controversial issues may help to better understand the debate, to further sharpen the RH theory, and to develop ideas for future research.