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The opening chapter revolves around the questions: What does liberalism purport to include within the defence of neutrality? What scope is available for conceptions of the good to meet, to mingle and to rival each other? In order to answer these questions, we need to understand what liberal democracy is about, what its ground rules are and how we can distinguish liberal democracies from illiberal societies. To address these important questions, the chapter avails itself of the Rawlsian justice as fairness theory which greatly influenced the liberal discourse during the past century. The Rawlsian theory of justice is supplemented with Kantian and Millian ethics. The chapter elucidates two important concepts without which it is impossible to imagine any liberal democracy: respect for others, inspired by Kantian and Rawlsian philosophies, and the Harm Principle derived from J. S. Mill’s ethics. It is the Harm Principle that guides us in prescribing boundaries to conduct. The necessity in introducing boundaries is further explained by the concept of the ‘democratic catch’.
Chapter 7 is one of three chapters that reflects on the rise of economic expertise during the twentieth century. It places the development of Tinbergen’s econometric techniques within a broader political context in which political parties during the middle of the twentieth century moved away from ideological and class-based foundations and toward general interest parties, known as people’s parties (or in German Volksparteien). This generated a demand from within politics for a new type of economic expert, who served no longer as party ideologues, but rather as policy experts. This was most visible in the social-democratic parties, such as the Dutch SDAP, which transformed in the PvdA (Labor Party). During the same period economists presented themselves increasingly as experts to the state, who could scientifically pursue the general interest. These developments run counter to the more widely known story about economics becoming a value-free science as proclaimed by Lionel Robbins. The chapter argues that Tinbergen’s contributions are best understood as a continuation of the German tradition of Staatswissenschaften, which pursued economics in service of the state.
Herbert of Cherbury saw himself as a peacemaker. In De Veritate (1624) Herbert posits that religious conflict will disappear once people realize that they share core beliefs, monotheistic essentials he dubs the Common Notions in a nod to Stoicism. He proposes to refute skepticism by isolating criteria for truthful cognition: chiefly, conformity and consent. Why did Herbert, a champion of truth and enemy of skepticism, end up embracing skeptical impartiality and neutrality? The chapter argues that Herbert changes owing to his experiences during the Civil War and as a diplomat, but also following his work of the 1630s, composing his histories: Expedition to the Isle of Rhé and The Life and Reign of Henry VIII. Yet the seeds for this change are already present in his philosophy of mind, growing out of the appreciation for beauty implicit in his ideals of conformity and consent. The chapter shows that the corollaries of Herbert’s philosophy extend beyond political accommodation to neutrality and aesthetic detachment. Herbert’s work constitutes a valuable case-study of the connections forged between epistemology and politics in the turbulent second quarter of the seventeenth century.
My task in this book is to develop a theory of property premised on a conception of autonomy as self-determination or self-authorship, terms that I use interchangeably. In this account, property empowers self-determining individuals to pursue their conception of the good, and this autonomy-enhancing telos legitimizes property and shapes its legal contours. I am not claiming that propertyless individuals cannot be self-determining, but rather that property tends to make an important contribution to personal self-authorship.
Arbitration is widely used in the international commercial arena. When contracting parties come from different countries, arbitration is often selected to adjust contractual disputes. One of the reasons for this preference has to do with the adoption in 1958 of the New York Convention, which effectively secures the enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards. Another reason is that arbitration enables the parties to create a neutral forum, detached from local courts, for transborder controversies to get adjudicated in an impartial manner. The argument that courts may be biased against ousiders raises interesting issues about the best ways to guarantee impartiality in a world where nationality seems to matter. International commercial arbitration also poses questions concerning the role of arbitrators in the lawmaking process. Are arbitrators generating a body of transnational law that is autonomous from democratically-enacted national legislation?
Expert authority is regarded as the heart of international bureaucracies’ power. To measure whether international bureaucracies’ expert authority is indeed recognised and deferred to, we draw on novel data from a survey of a key audience: officials in the policy units of national ministries in 121 countries. Respondents were asked to what extent they recognised the expert authority of nine international bureaucracies in various thematic areas of agricultural and financial policy. The results show wide variance. To explain this variation, we test well-established assumptions on the sources of de facto expert authority. Specifically, we look at ministry officials’ perceptions of these sources and, thus, focus on a less-studied aspect of the authority relationship. We examine the role of international bureaucracies’ perceived impartiality, objectivity, global impact, and the role of knowledge asymmetries. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that de facto expert authority does not rest on impartiality perceptions, and that perceived objectivity plays the smallest role of all factors considered. We find some indications that knowledge asymmetries are associated with more expert authority. Still, and robust to various alternative specifications, the perception that international bureaucracies are effectively addressing global challenges is the most important factor.
It takes up the South China Sea arbitration case between China and Philippines concerning maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. The relevant arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines, first on the jurisdiction and admissibility issues in October 2015, and then on the merits in July 2016. China has not only refused to accept the tribunal’s jurisdiction but also vigorously attacked the validity and legality of the final award. China’s handling of this case has several implications for its approach to international dispute settlement. The South China Sea Arbitration may have given China two takeaways: the appreciation of the importance of using international law and the understanding that foreign countries – led by the United States – again are using international law as a disguise to violate China’s sovereignty. A combination of these two factors will strengthen the prevailing attitude of treating international law as a tool to protect China’s national interest, rather than a serious belief in international rule of
The period of American neutrality during the first three years of World War I (1914-1917) was marked by widespread disagreement. Widespread propaganda advocated neutrality as well as intervention on either side. Propaganda advocating different positions nevertheless tended to use some of the same—often gendered and sexualized—imagery to solicit and channel American emotions. Once the US declared war, the creation of a state-sanctioned propaganda agency, The Committee on Public Information (CPI), produced a flow of information that was both intense and univocal in its support for the war. Meanwhile, legislative acts legalized censorship, enabling the Post Office, government at all levels, and even non-state actors to police speech, jail and attack pacifists, and limit dissenting publications. The widespread use of media to secure public consent for and participation in the war effort is an element of modern, total war. The media landscape was permanently changed. Propaganda moved through social channels and frequently targeted and depended upon women to both relay and follow its messages; after the war, largely as a result, women gained the vote. Other legacies were more negative. Some modernist writers and artists would denounce martial (ab)uses of language and to adopt new strategies (including irony) to undermine notions of linguistic and political certainties.
At the outbreak of World War I, a handful of British and Italian diplomats and statesmen wished to exploit the traditionally good Anglo-Italian relations to change the geo-strategic chessboard of the conflict. But centrifugal forces produced the longest and more complex negotiations over a neutral country’s intervention in the whole war.
Ireland, a small state, and America, a great power, had little in common by 1938–9. But on the eve of the Second World War, security needs brought interaction between the two countries. Both states intensified military preparedness. But the London factor was influential again during negotiations when the American government agreement to sell arms and equipment was with British approval. The chapter concludes that the inevitable inclusion of Ireland in the US-defined war zone illustrated again de Valera’s misunderstanding of US foreign policy concerns. This gap between reality and aspiration was highlighted throughout the war also as Ireland adhered to neutrality while US neutrality was abandoned in 1941 proof also of the differing needs of a small vulnerable state and a great power and their respective leaders.
How did Irish and American diplomacy operate in Washington DC and Dublin during the 1930s era of economic depression, rising fascism and Nazism? How did the Anglo–American relationship affect American–Irish diplomatic relations? Why and how did Éamon de Valera and Franklin D. Roosevelt move their countries towards neutrality in 1939? This first comprehensive history of American and Irish diplomacy during the 1930s focuses on formal and informal diplomacy, examining all aspects of diplomatic life to explain the relationship between the two administrations from 1932 to 1939. Bernadette Whelan reveals how diplomats worked on behalf of their governments to implement Franklin D. Roosevelt and Éamon de Valera's foreign policies – particularly when Éamon de Valera believed in the existence of a 'special' transatlantic relationship but Franklin D. Roosevelt increasingly favoured a strong relationship with Britain. Drawing on a wide range of under-used sources, this is a major new contribution to the history of American and Irish diplomacy and revises our understanding of the importance of Ireland to a US administration.
Since antiquity, arbitration has been well known in the Italian peninsula.1 Basic rules of arbitration are today spelled out in the Italian civil procedure code (hereinafter CCP). The code was enacted in 1940, but has, since then, undergone radical changes, including a comprehensive reform in 2006.2 Despite the fact that current rules are largely in line with those of other countries and with international legal standards, Italy is generally perceived, by insiders and outsiders alike, as a nonfriendly arbitration country.3
Arbitration is prized as a cost-effective, confidential dispute resolution process, where the parties have considerable autonomy in deciding how the procedure should take place. On the international level, compared to litigation, it has the additional benefit of being easily enforceable in states that are members of the New York Convention.
Nevertheless, it is impracticable to expect absolute independence and impartiality. Human beings by nature establish relationships at different levels with people, places, things, and ideas, and because of this, biases are inevitable. Conflicts of interest are a changing reality because economic, social, professional, and human relationships are mutable – that is, they are permanently changing.6 The independence and impartiality of arbitrators are issues linked to the intensity of relationships and other types of nuances.7 As the poet Antonio Machado stated, “The best among the good ones is that one who knows that everything in life is a matter of measure: a little bit more, something less.”8
Parasites sometimes expand their host range and cause new disease aetiologies. Genetic changes can then occur due to host-specific adaptive alterations, particularly when parasites cross between evolutionarily distant hosts. Characterizing genetic variation in Cryptosporidium from humans and other animals may have important implications for understanding disease dynamics and transmission. We analyse sequences from four loci (gp60, HSP-70, COWP and actin) representing multiple Cryptosporidium species reported in humans. We predicted low genetic diversity in species that present unusual human infections due to founder events and bottlenecks. High genetic diversity was observed in isolates from humans of Cryptosporidium meleagridis, Cryptosporidium cuniculus, Cryptosporidium hominis and Cryptosporidium parvum. A deviation of expected values of neutrality using Tajima's D was observed in C. cuniculus and C. meleagridis. The high genetic diversity in C. meleagridis and C. cuniculus did not match our expectations but deviations from neutrality indicate a recent decrease in genetic variability through a population bottleneck after an expansion event. Cryptosporidium hominis was also found with a significant Tajima's D positive value likely caused by recent population expansion of unusual genotypes in humans. These insights indicate that changes in genetic diversity can help us to understand host-parasite adaptation and evolution.
This chapter complements part 4 of Chapter 1 by engaging with and refuting several objections which may be mounted to the arguments advanced there. Those objections are considered in this chapter while making the case for an attractive interpretative theory of how conscientious exemptions should be regulated in a liberal state. A liberal state is here understood to be one committed to individual freedom and state neutrality between different conceptions of the good life. This chapter calls the interpretative theory the Liberal Model of Conscientious Exemptions. This theory has the following four defining propositions:A. The liberal state should grant a general right to conscientious exemption.B. The liberal state should refrain from passing moral judgement on the content of the beliefs which give rise to a claim for conscientious exemption.C. The liberal state should neither privilege nor disadvantage religious beliefs over non-religious ones when considering whether to grant a conscientious exemption.D. The liberal state should grant conscientious exemptions to claimants who sincerely hold a conscientious objection which would not disproportionately impact the rights of others or the public interest.The chapter defends each of the propositions in turn.
Multinational enterprises faced new political risks after World War II in the context of decolonization and the Cold War. The risks were particularly high in Asia between 1945 and 1970. Although the relevant literature has focused essentially on organizational innovation and strategic choices in explaining how firms dealt with these new political risks, this article explores the informal roles that governments of small, neutral countries played in supporting their multinationals abroad. Looking at the case of Nestlé in Asia, the article argues that the backing of the Swiss federal authorities was crucial for the company to overcome various kinds of risks and ensure a long-term presence in the region.
Chapter 5 investigates my counter-example, the rogue diplomat whose indiscipline harmed U.S. interests. Joseph P. Kennedy, a contributor to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1932 and 1936 election campaigns, demanded Embassy London as a reward, and FDR obliged. Upon arriving in Britain, Kennedy concluded that Adolf Hitler's Wermacht was invincible, that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's strategy of appeasement was correct, and that America had to remain neutral. Kennedy repeatedly misrepresented the Roosevelt administration's anti-fascist policy. Whereas FDR and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were endeavoring to bring American--and world - opinion around to a posture of resistance to Hitler, Kennedy proclaimed that America had no stake in the conflict and that, moreover, he expected Germany to win any war that might break out. No matter how often FDR ordered Kennedy to hold his tongue, he would not comply. Germany's 1939 invasion of Poland horrified the ambassador, who forecast an end to democracy in Europe and America. At the close of Kennedy's thousand days in London, Anglo-American relations were in tatters and Britain stood alone against the Nazi juggernaut. Few did more than Kennedy to bring about this hideous state of affairs.
This chapter reconsiders the cultural condition of 1940s Ireland in the context of wartime neutrality, exploring the literary response to the hostilities in Ireland itself, north and south, and the complex positioning of the writers involved who treated its effects on a domestic landscape, including Máirtín Ó Cadhain, Kate O’Brien, Elizabeth Bowen and Benedict Kiely. How did Irish writers respond to the aftermath of the Second World War and, in particular, the filtering of information about the Holocaust? The Irish author and playwright Denis Johnston, a BBC correspondent in the Middle East for much of the conflict, represents one of those with direct experience of the action and its diplomatic fallout. This chapter challenges a historical acceptance that Ireland became increasingly insular and detached as a result of its wartime political neutrality, and identifies instead a set of important literary engagements driven by the wider horizon of the conflict.