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This chapter asks what it is about “intelligence” (nous) that, in Aristotle’s view, makes “understanding” or “insight” (noēsis) its proprietary work. It argues that the answer lies in the peculiar clarity and distinctness of that activity. This clarity and distinctness, it argues, make intelligence the very “form” or “measure” of its objects – what they all “have in common,” what “makes” them intelligible, what their intelligibility consists in.
This chapter shows how Templer recognised that the MCP’s October 1951 Resolutions had shifted the strategic initiative to government, but also that it had increased the importance of winning ‘hearts and minds’. It shows how he increased both punishment and reward, and resettlement amenities and training to secure kills, until late in his term, but above all optimised the government, military and committee system, and the policy towards Orang Asli and the jungle. He created a better system and learning organisation, which in turn started to experiment with the big combined food control–Special Branch–military operations that would start to clear communist committees out of one area after another. The next chapter shows how that learning took off over 1953–4, providing a solution to the problem Briggs had not cracked: how to ‘clear’ areas. Rejecting both hagiographic and hateful accounts of Templer, it reveals the truth about the man, and about the perfecting of Malaya’s counterinsurgency apparatus and the constant refining of its recipe of ingredients.
Aristotle maintains that defining "intelligence" (nous) requires first defining its activity, “understanding” or “insight” (noēsis) which requires first having considered its objects, intelligible beings (noēta). This chapter is about the nature of these objects: what about them makes them intelligible? My principal proposals are that what makes them intelligible is that they are "separate" and "unmixed," and that because, insofar as they are intelligible, they are, in their essence, "activity."’ I am aware this makes it sound as though Aristotle takes intelligibility to consist in some kind of intelligence. But in fact this is a result he is committed to, by the doctrines that intelligence is intelligible and that there is something that intelligible objects "all are in common"; for the alternative, as he himself says, is to suppose that intelligence "will have something mixed-in, which makes it intelligible just like the rest." The challenge, then, is not to steer clear of this result, but to make sense of it. My proposal is that the key to this lies in realizing that and why Aristotle thinks of intelligibility as a creature of intelligence.
Although the development of creativity is an oft-stated goal for students, it is seldom infused into school curricula, nor are teachers explicitly trained on how to promote it within their classrooms, even in the context of selective programs. We have several goals for this chapter. The first is to describe our view of the current status of creativity education for advanced pre-university students, noting its minimal presence except in artistic domains. Second, we differentiate the concepts of gifted education and talent development, favoring the latter as the direction of the future for enhancing the role of creativity. Third, we address some challenges for applying creativity in the gifted and talented classroom.
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical relationships between wisdom and aspects of intelligence, personality, emotions and well-being, and value orientations. Relationships between wisdom and other psychological characteristics vary considerably by wisdom measure. On average, wise people tend to be somewhat more intelligent than not-so-wise people. They also tend to be more open to new experiences and ideas. Wise people are generally quite happy with their lives, although there are many people who are happy without also being wise. Wise people care more than other people about self-direction and a common good.
Intelligence is inversely associated with schizophrenia (SCZ) and bipolar disorder (BD); it remains unclear whether low intelligence is a cause or consequence. We investigated causal associations of intelligence with SCZ or BD risk and a shared risk between SCZ and BD and SCZ-specific risk.
To estimate putative causal associations, we performed multi-single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) Mendelian randomization (MR) using generalized summary-data-based MR (GSMR). Summary-level datasets from five GWASs (intelligence, SCZ vs. control [CON], BD vs. CON, SCZ + BD vs. CON, and SCZ vs. BD; sample sizes of up to 269,867) were utilized.
A strong bidirectional association between risks for SCZ and BD was observed (odds ratio; ORSCZ → BD = 1.47, p = 2.89 × 10−41, ORBD → SCZ = 1.44, p = 1.85 × 10−52). Low intelligence was bidirectionally associated with a high risk for SCZ, with a stronger effect of intelligence on SCZ risk (ORlower intelligence → SCZ = 1.62, p = 3.23 × 10−14) than the reverse (ORSCZ → lower intelligence = 1.06, p = 3.70 × 10−23). Furthermore, low intelligence affected a shared risk between SCZ and BD (OR lower intelligence → SCZ + BD = 1.23, p = 3.41 × 10−5) and SCZ-specific risk (ORlower intelligence → SCZvsBD = 1.64, p = 9.72 × 10−10); the shared risk (ORSCZ + BD → lower intelligence = 1.04, p = 3.09 × 10−14) but not SCZ-specific risk (ORSCZvsBD → lower intelligence = 1.00, p = 0.88) weakly affected low intelligence. Conversely, there was no significant causal association between intelligence and BD risk (p > 0.05).
These findings support observational studies showing that patients with SCZ display impairment in premorbid intelligence and intelligence decline. Moreover, a shared factor between SCZ and BD might contribute to impairment in premorbid intelligence and intelligence decline but SCZ-specific factors might be affected by impairment in premorbid intelligence. We suggest that patients with these genetic factors should be categorized as having a cognitive disorder SCZ or BD subtype.
States accused of perpetrating cyber operations typically do not confirm or deny responsibility. They issue ‘non-denial denials’ or refuse to comment on the accusations. These ambiguous signals are prevalent, but they are largely ignored in the existing cyber literature, which tends to treat credit claiming as a binary choice. The ambiguity of non-denial denials and ‘non-comments’ allows states to accomplish two seemingly opposed goals: maintaining crisis stability and leaving open the possibility of their involvement in the attack. By deliberately remaining a suspect, a state can manipulate rivals’ perceptions of its cyber capability and resolve. Refusing to deny responsibility can also shape rivals’ perceptions of allies’ capabilities, enhancing the credibility of deterrence. All of this can be accomplished without the escalatory risks that would come with an explicit admission of responsibility. Where previous research has focused on the dangers of escalation and the limitations of costly signalling with cyber, we show that non-denial denials and non-comments make cyber operations considerably more useful than the literature appreciates.
It is well established that reaction time and IQ test scores are correlated, although the strength of this relationship is a matter of debate (Neisser et al., 1996). It was proposed that processing speed is a component of intelligence (Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010; Hunt, 2011). In our previous research we have not revealed the relationship between IQ and reaction time in children (Kiselev et al., 2000). However, it is possible that reaction time can predict intelligence test scores in the developmental perspective.
This study investigated whether visuomotor reaction time in 5 year-old children predicts intelligence test scores in 8 year-old children using the longitudinal approach.
The participants were 35 children (17 males and 18 females) at the age of 5 years (5,34±0,45). We used computerized sensorimotor technique (Kiselev et al., 2009) to investigate visuomotor reaction time in children. Children completed simple, discrimination and choice reaction time tasks. The IQ of 8-year children was assessed by the WISC.
The regression analysis has revealed the significant (p≤0,05) relationships between discrimination and choice reaction time tasks in 5 years-old children and non-verbal IQ performance in these children at 8 years of age. However, we did not find this relationship for simple reaction time task.
In view of obtained results it can be assumed that visuomotor reaction time in preschool children can predict non-verbal intelligence test scores in the developmental perspective. The received data can give new perspective in the understanding the interrelation between reaction time and IQ in children.
The study of convergent cognitive evolution aims to understand how similarities in physical and social intelligence emerge in evolutionarily distant species. This field, which is relatively new, has focused on a number of taxa, including nonhuman primates, corvids, and other birds, cetaceans, canids, and elephants. In this chapter, we highlight the social minds of elephants in particular, with a review of existing observational and experimental research. Investigations of the proximate mechanisms that underlie social behavior require an understanding of how an animal "sees," "hears," "touches,"and "smells" its world. Thus, we emphasize the need to take elephants’ sensory perspective into account when investigating their cognition, especially considering their exceptional olfactory and acoustic senses. We briefly review the literature on elephant social cognition, and discuss the relevance of such research to elephant conservation.
Describes growing human health issues linked to exposure to a multiplicity of chemicals and mixtures. Impacts on the human brain, intelligence and mental disorders, autism, ADHD, depression, child and adult cancers, developmental diseases of children, sexual, gender and reproductive disorders, obesity and diabetes, ‘mystery’ disorders, re-emergence of ‘old’ conditions. The epigenetic curse. The case for precaution.
How effective are states at assessing and predicting the nuclear intentions of foreign countries? Drawing on close to 200 US assessments of foreign countries’ proliferation intentions between 1957 and 1966, this research note finds that close to 80 percent of testable US assessments were correct and that they shifted from highly inaccurate in the late 1950s to highly accurate in the 1960s. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, I conclude that learning from early failures led the intelligence community to achieve higher accuracy.
Chapter 6 will move the discussion from what obligations states have under IHRL to how states have to act in order to fulfil these obligations in practice. This chapter tests state practice against the human rights framework in order to evaluate whether states comply with their human rights obligations when they deal with hostage-taking. By drawing on a wide range of practice by states which have experienced terrorist attacks over the years as well as counter-piracy measures adopted by various states, this chapter seeks to improve our understanding of what states do in response to hostage-taking and how they can better incorporate the needs of hostages in their responses.
Preclinical and clinical studies suggest that males and females may be differentially affected by cannabis use. This study evaluated the interaction of cannabis use and biological sex on cognition, and the association between observed cognitive deficits and features of cannabis use.
Cognitive measures were assessed in those with regular, ongoing, cannabis use (N = 40; 22 female) and non-using peers (N = 40; 23 female). Intelligence, psychomotor speed, and verbal working memory were measured with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Digit Symbol Test, and Digit Span and Hopkins Verbal Learning Test, respectively. Associations between cognitive measures and cannabis use features (e.g., lifetime cannabis use, age of initiation, time since last use of cannabis, recent high-concentration tetrahydrocannabinoid exposure) were also evaluated.
No main effects of group were observed across measures. Significant interactions between group and biological sex were observed on measures of intelligence, psychomotor speed, and verbal learning, with greatest group differences observed between males with and without regular cannabis use. Psychomotor performance was negatively correlated with lifetime cannabis exposure. Female and male cannabis use groups did not differ in features of cannabis use.
Findings suggest that biological sex influences the relationship between cannabis and cognition, with males potentially being more vulnerable to the neurocognitive deficits related to cannabis use.
There has been renewed interest over the last twenty years in Ryle's claims and arguments about knowledge-how. Elzinga (2018) and Löwenstein (2017) have both recently defended independent Ryle-inspired accounts of knowledge-how. In what follows, I will propose and defend an amendment to accounts of knowledge-how like those of Elzinga and Löwenstein. I argue that this amendment provides an additional needed distinction between the performance robustness provided by certain performance methods (or styles), and the robustness of an agent's ability to perform according to such methods (or styles). Additionally, the proposed amendment, if adopted, will make the amended views even more Rylean. I argue for this, in part, through original exegetical work on an under-discussed theme in Ryle's philosophy of mind: the relation between semi-hypothetical statements, methodological act-description, and knowledge-how.
This chapter returns to the question of Steinbeck’s purported failures as a writer by arguing that his novel Of Mice and Men--a book often taught at the middle-school level--is an experimental work that offers a partial alternative to high modernism’s interest in characters with mental disabilities. The novel’s undeveloped themes, clunky characterization, brutal melodrama, sweeping determinism, and easy sentimentalism originate in a curious fact about the book’s genre: Steinbeck intended it as a “novel to be played”--performed as drama in the theater. The book has an uncanny duality, placing readers both in a novel and in a would-be stage performance, whereby characters are also actors, objects also props, spaces also stage sets. Like Lennie, the character with mental disabilities at the center, the novel is formally “disabled” and behaves in ways not unlike Samuel Beckett’s modernist plays, defined by a failure to signify and mean. Comparing the novel-as-play with the actual three-act play version that Steinbeck wrote later, we also see the limits of the argument for a “modernist” Steinbeck, as the book’s aesthetic failures create a novel that does not fully develop as a literary work.
Aristotle wrote extensively about the character and behavior of non-human animals in his Historia Animalium. One aspect of character is cognitive abilities. The chapter sets out Aristotle’s views on the cognitive abilities of animals, evidenced also in other works such as the Metaphysics and De Anima. All animals perceive but many also have imagination, memory, and practical intelligence. For Aristotle nonhuman animals have a sort of practical intelligence suited to their particular ways of life. The considerable overlap in cognitive abilities between human and nonhuman animals allows Aristotle to establish a biological basis for many human traits. Many nonhuman animals not only manage to organize their lives and negotiate new challenges but also maintain relationships with each other over extended periods. Social relationships require complex communication and involve a very important type of intelligence which is perfected in the most political of animals, human beings. The chapter ends with an account of how human cognition differs from that which occurs in other animals.
Covert action has long been a controversial tool of international relations. However, there is remarkably little public understanding about whether it works and, more fundamentally, about what constitutes success in this shadowy arena of state activity. This article distills competing criteria of success and examines how covert actions become perceived as successes. We develop a conceptual model of covert action success as a social construct and illustrate it through the case of ‘the golden age of CIA operations’. The socially constructed nature of success has important implications not just for evaluating covert actions but also for using, and defending against, them.
How powerful are national security bureaucrats? In the United States, they seem to be more than mere administrators, while remaining subordinate to elected politicians. However, despite a rich literature in American political development on bureaucratic autonomy across a variety of policy areas, national security remains undertheorized. Although the origins and evolution of the national security bureaucracy have received substantial scholarly attention, the individuals within this bureaucracy have not. In this article, I examine a case study of how one of these individuals bluntly ran up against the limits of his power. After the Second World War, J. Edgar Hoover's plans for a “World-Wide Intelligence Service” were swiftly shot down by the Truman administration, which adopted a sharp distinction between domestic and global intelligence instead. I pin this abject defeat on three interrelated factors: the resistance of President Truman, the array of bureaucratic competitors emerging from the Second World War, and deep aversion among key decision makers to the prospect of an “American gestapo.” While tracing this historical narrative, I also challenge accounts of Hoover as a near-omnipotent Washington operator, question the extent to which war empowers national security bureaucrats, and foreground the role of analogies in shaping the national security state.
Low birth weight is associated with adult mental health, cognitive and socioeconomic problems. However, the causal nature of these associations remains difficult to establish owing to confounding.
To estimate the contribution of birth weight to adult mental health, cognitive and socioeconomic outcomes using two-sample Mendelian randomisation, an instrumental variable approach strengthening causal inference.
We used 48 independent single-nucleotide polymorphisms as genetic instruments for birth weight (genome-wide association studies’ total sample: n = 264 498) and considered mental health (attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, obsessive–compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), schizophrenia, suicide attempt), cognitive (intelligence) and socioeconomic (educational attainment, income, social deprivation) outcomes.
We found evidence for a contribution of birth weight to ADHD (OR for 1 s.d. unit decrease (~464 g) in birth weight, 1.29; 95% CI 1.03–1.62), PTSD (OR = 1.69; 95% CI 1.06–2.71) and suicide attempt (OR = 1.39; 95% CI 1.05–1.84), as well as for intelligence (β = −0.07; 95% CI −0.13 to −0.02) and socioeconomic outcomes, i.e. educational attainment (β = −0.05; 95% CI −0.09 to −0.01), income (β = −0.08; 95% CI −0.15 to −0.02) and social deprivation (β = 0.08; 95% CI 0.03–0.13). However, no evidence was found for a contribution of birth weight to the other examined mental health outcomes. Results were consistent across a wide range of sensitivity analyses.
These findings support the hypothesis that birth weight could be an important element on the causal pathway to mental health, cognitive and socioeconomic outcomes.
Adaptive Intelligence is a dramatic reappraisal and reframing of the concept of human intelligence. In a sweeping analysis, Robert J. Sternberg argues that we are using a fatally-flawed, outdated conception of intelligence; one which may promote technological advancement, but which has also accelerated climate change, pollution, the use of weaponry, and inequality. Instead of focusing on the narrow academic skills measured by standardized tests, societies should teach and assess adaptive intelligence, defined as the use of collective talent in service of the common good. This book describes why the outdated notion of intelligence persists, what adaptive intelligence is, and how it could lead humankind on a more positive path.