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This paper explores a “public gathering” which took place every evening from 1991 to 2017 in Victory Square (Shengli guangchang 胜利广场), a public square in Tianjin. The essay opens with an analysis of the type of publicness that stems from the way participants “do things together.” It then describes how a specific public realm appears through the way participants “talk together.” It finally suggests that even if they are overrun with doubt, indeterminacy and anxiety, or embedded in a specific distance-based sociality, the conversations on Victory Square are not a minor, secondary activity. On the contrary, they take place on a common stage where participants interact with one another, reveal themselves as unique individuals and discuss their everyday affairs and common practices. Grasped as an “intermediary public sphere,” this type of gathering engenders and reinforces not only shared meanings and evaluations but also practical knowledge whose validity goes beyond this situated gathering.
Taking the essential thesis of legal positivism to be that all law is positive law, that all law has sources, Green considers the relationships between legal positivism and ‘its closest cousin’, legal realism, focusing mainly on American legal realism. He looks at why legal realists disagree with legal positivists about the role of legal rules in explaining judicial decision-making. Noting that positivists and realists agree that law is constituted by social facts, that judges sometimes make law, and that law is morally fallible, he locates the point of disagreement in their different understandings of the boundary-lines between law and non-law. Green’s idea is that, unlike positivists, realists believe that a significant number of sources of law are only permissive sources – i.e. sources which judges are permitted, but not required, to use. These can sometimes be outweighed by considerations of policy, justice or the equities of the case, etc., which explains why realists can hold that law is so indeterminate as to undermine the causal efficacy of legal rules, while sharing the positivist view that all law has sources.
This introductory chapter lays out the method, theory and historical framework of the study. It focuses on the potential for historical materialism to help us better understand and critique international law uncovering its structural complicity with oppression, exploitation and dispossession. Along with offering a succinct summary of the capitalist mode of production in Marxist thought, the chapter also reflects on the benefits of combining textual deconstruction with materialist analysis in order to better comprehend law as a textual discipline that is at the same time profoundly entangled with extra-textual processes of capitalist accumulation. Drawing from epistemology and the Marxist philosopher, Luis Althusser, the author defends the importance of a symptomatic reading of international legal materials that centres a specifically juridical problematic.
Chapter 2 provides a contextual discussion of why some non-States Parties object to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The chapter engages with the allegation that the Rome Statute infringes on the sovereignty of non-States Parties by allowing the ICC to prosecute their nationals in certain circumstances. This involves an analysis of how the Statute affects non-States Parties and an evaluation of whether such effects amount to an infringement of State sovereignty. How sovereignty interacts with international law is largely a matter of perspective, and how States perceive sovereignty shapes their view of whether there is an acceptable legal basis for the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction provisions. This chapter argues that the ICC needs to recognise such concerns and formulate the legal basis for its jurisdiction in a way that maximises the role of State consent.
Chapter 1 examines the theoretical basis of the best interests principle. This chapter examines the implications and demands of the principle, and it explores how the principle is to be applied. In line with the guidance provided by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the best interests principle is understood to be a right, the content of which is guided by reference to the other rights contained in the UNCRC. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the best interests principle to be realised in a structured manner, namely one that is guided by the UNCRC. The chapter provides further nuance to the best interests principle by identifying a new conceptual framework for its application. This framework is designed to overcome the perceived deficiencies of the principle. The framework not only is largely based on the guidance of the Committee, but also suggests that social science literature should be incorporated into the best interests assessment to provide broader guidance about what is ‘best’ for children in particular situations.
Incoherentism about vagueness is the view that vague expressions/concepts are incoherent due to their vagueness. This chapter elaborates on what incoherentism is, and defends a particular incoherentist view. It presents an overview of important arguments for and against incoherentism. Among arguments for the view are claims that it provides an attractive account of the nature of vagueness, and of the way in which vagueness is associated with indeterminacy. Among arguments against the view are claims that it presupposes a mistaken view on semantic/conceptual competence, and that the view sits ill with how ubiquitous vagueness is. The specific view defended is compared to the views of Michael Dummett, Terence Horgan and Peter Unger.
This article analyzes a general equilibrium growth model with overlapping generations and (production-induced) environmental degradation. Individuals react to environmental damages through mitigation or adaptation. In the former case, they reduce production and its environmental impact. In the latter, they do not tackle the causes of the problem but rather its consequences (i.e., the wellbeing loss due to environmental degradation) by increasing defensive expenditures. Despite its simplicity, the model can generate different long-term outcomes: convergence to a stationary state following a unique trajectory or local/global indeterminacy. In the last scenario, initial conditions (history) and individual expectations matter and the model can generate coordination failures and endogenous fluctuations. Results cast doubt on solutions to environmental problems relying on the role of individual behavior change or adaptation.
This study examines the effects of borrowing for public services that increase households' utility (i.e., utility-generating government services) in an AK endogenous growth model. We assume that the government has a target debt ratio. The European Union and the United Kingdom adopt such debt policy rules. We find that application of a debt policy rule into utility-generating government spending causes indeterminacy of the transition path. We point out that the level of the target debt ratio, the tax rate, and the household utility parameters are important determinants of indeterminacy when considering utility-generating government services.
This paper examines the stability of sunspot equilibria in one-sector RBC models under infinite horizon learning. We present general conditions under which the reduced-form model can possess E-stable sunspot equilibria and apply these conditions to three prominent one-sector RBC models. We find that the rational expectations sunspot equilibria are generally unstable under learning.
This paper presents a Ramsey-like dynamic small open economy with endogenous labor migration. In the model, the domestic economy is free to borrow or lend as much as it wants at the given world interest rate, and individuals are supposed to be free to move from a country to another in response to the emergence of a wage differential between countries. Our analysis can be ideally split in two parts. Initially, we propose a baseline model in which only natives are allowed to save and invest in capital assets and traded bonds, whereas immigrants are credit constrained. Next, we provide an extension in which all individuals, including immigrants, have full access to international financial markets. We find that the steady state is always local indeterminate, and that the adjustment dynamics of the competitive equilibrium is dependent upon the initial level of the immigration ratio.
The perception that inflation targeting (IT) runs a high risk of indeterminacy when a significant share of households are too poor to save is an artifact of the closed economy. In the open economy, the Taylor principle is generally valid for both contemporaneous and forward-looking IT. Active policy in contemporaneous IT guarantees determinacy, eccentric cases aside. In forward-looking IT, the scope for active policy is constrained by an upper bound on the Taylor coefficient. The upper bound is insensitive, however, to the share of poor, nonsaving households. Moreover, it can be increased substantially–to a level that does not bind–through reserve sales/purchases that limit exchange rate volatility.
This paper considers a pure exchange overlapping generations model in which the money-growth rate is endogenous and follows a feedback rule. Different specifications for the monetary policy rule are analyzed, namely a so-called current, forward, or backward-looking feedback rule, depending on whether the monetary authority uses the actual, expected, or last observed values of the inflation rate to set the monetary policy. We study how the responsiveness of the policy rule with respect to inflation affects the determinacy of the monetary equilibrium. A policy rule is called aggressive (moderate) if it responds strongly (moderately) to inflation deviations from the target. We show how aggressive feedback rules, depending on the considered timing, can reinforce mechanisms that lead to indeterminacy or may lead the inflation rate to fluctuate around the monetary equilibrium at which monetary policy is aggressive. A leaning against the wind policy seems to be more desirable from an equilibrium determinacy point of view. On the contrary, a leaning with the wind policy could not be the recommended policy for the Central Bank.
It is commonly accepted that credit market frictions are an important source of macroeconomic fluctuations. But what is the link between the two? And what is the driving factor of asset prices volatility? To answer these questions, we have introduced a specific credit friction, limited commitment, in a general equilibrium model with production and investment in productive capital, where agents can trade bonds. The model always displays a stationary equilibrium where bonds are traded. More importantly, limited commitment may generate stochastic endogenous fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling volatile expectations (sunspots), yielding credit and investment cycles and bond price volatility consistent with data.
This study constructs a variety expansion growth model with public research spending. Public researchers financed by taxes on asset income, consumption, and corporate profits raise the productivity of private research and development. We show that the welfare-maximizing level of public research spending is below the growth-maximizing level. With regard to tax policy, a zero-profit tax maximizes the welfare of households. In addition, the study analyzes the dynamics of the economy, showing that equilibrium is indeterminate when the government's revenue source depends on an asset income tax.
This paper investigates, in the case of the euro area, the standard assumption that the liquidity trap steady state, which arises from the existence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, is locally unstable. We show that the policy function of the European Central Bank (ECB) is described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. Then, using our estimations, we show that around the liquidity trap steady state the equilibrium is locally determinate for most plausible parameter values. Finally, we find that an inflation shock is more efficient than a demand shock to escape the liquidity trap steady state.
We investigate the role of nonseparable preferences in the occurrence of macroeconomic instability under a balanced-budget rule where government spending is financed by a tax on labor income. Considering a one-sector neoclassical growth model with a large class of nonseparable utility functions, we find that expectations-driven fluctuations occur easily when consumption and labor are Edgeworth substitutes or weak Edgeworth complements. Under these assumptions, an intermediate range of tax rates and a sufficiently low elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption lead to instability.
In one-sector neoclassical growth models, consumption externalities lead to an inefficient allocation in a steady state and indeterminate equilibrium toward a steady state only if there is a labor–leisure trade-off. This paper shows that in a two-sector neoclassical growth model, even without a labor–leisure trade-off, consumption spillovers easily lead to an inefficient allocation in a steady state and indeterminate equilibrium toward a steady state. Negative consumption spillovers that yield ove-accumulation of capital in a one-sector model may lead to underaccumulation or overaccumulation of capital in two-sector models, depending on the relative capital intensity between sectors. Moreover, a two-sector model economy with consumption externalities is less stabilized than an otherwise identical one-sector model economy.