The use and development of algorithms in health care, including machine learning, contributes to the discovery of better treatments for patients and offers promising perspectives in the fight against cancer and other diseases. Yet, algorithms are not a neutral health product since they are programmed by humans, with the risk of propagating human rights infringements. In the medical area, human rights impact assessments need to be conducted for applications involving AI. Apart from offering a consistent and transversal substantive approach to AI, human rights law, and in particular the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, would allow the targeting of all stakeholders, including the corporations developing health care algorithms. Such an approach would establish a chain of duties and responsibilities bringing more transparency and consistency in the overall process of developing AI and its later uses. Although this approach would not solve all AI challenges, it would offer a framework for discussion with all relevant actors, including vulnerable populations. An increase in human rights education of medical doctors and data scientists, and further collaboration at the initial stages of algorithm development would greatly contribute to the creation of a human rights culture in the techno-science space.

As an aspiring mental health clinician have you ever wondered about entering private practice, how to decide if private practice is for you, if you should start your own practice or join a group practice, what specific education and training will help prepare you to enter private practice, and what you need to know and do to be successful in private practice? If so, this chapter will provide you with all this information and much more. Readers will learn business aspects of practice to include establishing and running a successful private practice, legal and tax issues, hiring and managing staff members, selecting a niche area of practice to specialize in, marketing your practice (with sample letters provided for your use), expert consultants to utilize to help ensure your success, and common pitfalls to avoid. Additionally, numerous resources are provided that will be of use to any private practitioner.

Chapter 1 presents an overview of the IP licensing industry and covers the business assumptions and goals of IP transactions, including market and geographic expansion, modularization, monetization, rights aggregation and platform leadership.

Human rights and business have long been perceived as two separate domains, with human rights considered to be a shield and protection against the abuse of governmental power. It has only been more recently that private actors such as corporations have come onto the radar of human rights scholars, while those concerned with corporations and corporate responsibility have hardly adopted a human rights perspective. Hence, bringing business and human rights together has not been intuitive for either human rights scholars or corporate responsibility researchers. Accordingly, learning “business and human rights” (BHR) actually means unlearning both business and human rights, at least to some degree. A certain taken-for-grantedness of “business as usual” often provides fertile ground for corporate human rights violations and the inadequacies of the current international legal system that provides the shield for their impunity.

Histories of the interaction between business and the New Deal have emphasized a movement from concord, to doubt, to full-blown animosity by 1935–36. The advent of the American Liberty League is often seen as emblematic. For J.P. Morgan & Co. the New Deal was fracturing – in its banking business, in its politics, and among its partners. While the Pecora hearings dominated American media in May-June 1933, Glass–Steagall was the fulcrum on which the Morgan bank and the New Deal pivoted. Glass–Steagall dictated that J.P. Morgan & Co. must make a choice between commercial and investment banking. From the late summer of 1933 Morgan efforts were bent to securing its revision. Unable to secure modification of Glass–Steagall, the Morgan partners split on their appreciation of Roosevelt and the New Deal. Jack Morgan became a strident critic, while Leffingwell argued that the New Deal had saved capitalism. Simultaneously, the partners, reeling, became ever more cautious as bankers, embracing a conservatism that reflected their hope that the provisions of Glass–Steagall would not be implemented. When this failed, they created Morgan Stanley as an independent investment bank as a temporary adaptation.

This concluding chapter first briefly summarizes the argument to explain variation in the processes and mechanisms that lead victims to pursue distinct strategies of resistance to criminal extortion. It then identifies the broader implications that follow from the book’s core findings, including the need to bring victims more squarely into our research on the politics of crime, unpack how victims understand and experience criminal victimization, broaden our approach to the political consequences of criminal victimization to include resistance, and complicate the ways in which we think about relations between police and communities. The chapter outlines a future research agenda on the politics of crime that emphasizes greater attention to the intersection between the political economy of development and the politics of crime as well as criminal governance, armed politics, and the ways in which attention to the understandings of victims can help move us beyond a focus on relations between states and criminals as limited to the binary of corruption or conflict. The final part of the chapter discusses a series of policy implications based on the book’s analysis and findings.

This chapter argues that civilian resistance to criminal victimization is a gap in the growing literature on the politics of crime. It contends that much of the existing research on crime focuses on drug-related violence. But most people in Latin America experience organized crime not through spectacular acts of drug violence, but instead through the everyday victimization associated with criminal extortion. The chapter identifies the contributions that the book makes to the literatures on the politics of crime, our understanding of business as a victim of crime, and the need for dialogue between the study of crime and the political of development. The chapter previews the argument to explain variation in the processes and mechanisms that lead to different strategies of resistance. It concludes by outlining the structure of the book.

Chapter 3 traces, for the first time, the role of women as mistresses of apprentices, using their membership of the freedom to set up businesses and train girls in them. Some became free after apprenticeship themselves and went on to establish generations of female artisans stretching into the eighteenth century: as single women, they had a unique and characteristic pattern of business. Others, as wives and widows, gained their role through and after marriage, producing an interesting position where they were training girls without formal training themselves, in a system that ran effectively parallel to that of male apprenticeship. The particular features of female apprenticeship fit flexibly around women’s lives, as well as reflecting the contingency of women’s economic autonomy. The last section of the chapter reconstructs the kinship and friendship networks through which mistresses and apprentices were bound together, creating a capillary system of skills, favours and credit.

Stephen Howard, who served at Chief Sustainability Officer at the IKEA Group and co-founded the “We Mean Business” Coalition, describes how the role of businesses has evolved and how businesses created positive dynamics for COP 21. In the 2000s, well-organized business lobbies were pushing against climate action, and COP 15 left Howard frustrated. Trying to change things, in 2014 Howard and others formed the We Mean Business Coalition and major companies made commitments to 100 per cent renewable energy. The events, Howard assesses, created a new dynamic, as policymakers understood that some businesses considered climate inaction a danger to jobs and growth. At COP 21, businesses pushing for climate action used a high level of organization, clear policy asks, and repeated messaging to create a context that made it easier for negotiators and politicians to reach agreement. Howard assesses that such context was critical, and he doubts that the deal would have happened without the business community. Going forward, Howard’s advice is to differentiate the business community into separate groups and work with each of them in different ways.