Despite the growth in scholarship on diverse religious communities in Turkey, little attention has been paid to Twelver Shiʿi Muslims. Since the founding of the Republic, the Turkish state's foundational secularist agenda has attempted to control and promote a single hegemonic form of Islam, and Shiʿa have faced continuous issues practicing their faith in public as a result. While the liberalization of the past three decades has allowed Shiʿism to enter the public sphere, the community has had to continue navigating limitations on their expression of religious difference. Based on fieldwork in Eastern Anatolia, this article deepens understandings of Islam in Turkey by showing how Shiʿa have negotiated their position vis-à-vis both secularist and Sunni-majority actors and policies across various religious and political currents. Rejecting categorization as either mezhep (sect) or minority, Shiʿa have demanded independence from state religious control while also asserting their allegiance to the Republic and nation as Turkish Muslims.

After the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the Turkish state started to produce a new official history of the event as a narrative of popular resistance against a military coup for the sake of democracy. This narrative with a religious aura was supported by “democracy watch” meetings and new commemoration days, museums, and monuments across Turkey. It was based on four concepts, symbolized by the Rabia sign: one nation, one homeland, one flag, and one state. However, the use of the Rabia sign has fallen from grace recently, creating a critical gap or “glitch” in the mnemonic infrastructure. This paper offers a visual categorization of July 15 monuments across Turkey and positions them in the historiography of Turkish national monuments. Finally, Rabia monuments are analyzed as a case study to show part of the complex (trans)national narratives of the “New Turkey.”

After Ekrem İmamoğlu won as Istanbul’s mayor, the contestation between the city and central government resembled other cases of liberal mayors winning in illiberal populist regimes. To expand liberal democracy, the mayor sought to reinvigorate effective democratic citizenship by increasing access to information, creating more inclusive governance networks through public participation opportunities, limiting the regime’s clientelism and rent-seeking opportunities in real estate and contracting, and (re)creating social solidarity. The national government responded by extensively covering “scandals” and continuing populist rhetoric to maintain polarization, limiting the city’s financial resources, and moving power and projects to agencies they still controlled. This article uses Istanbul to develop this model and illustrate how İmamoğlu has made progress in each area despite the central government’s effort to constrain his administration.

Despite a growing body of literature on the advancement of autocratic tactics and toolkits in competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs), we lack sufficient knowledge on the strategies that the opposition builds against populist-authoritarian governments. Using two top autocratizing cases – Turkey and Hungary – this article singles out ‘transnationalization’ as one such novel strategy. ‘Transnationalization’ is defined as a strategy through which opposition-led subnational executives transform local and global boundaries by consciously forming a link with the liberal-democratic world in order to expand their space for manoeuvre. Conducting a qualitative content analysis of the Istanbul and Budapest mayors' international Twitter accounts and using evidence from elite interviews with officials from Istanbul and Budapest municipalities, we demonstrate the material, symbolic and political means of this strategy and the rationalist and normative motivations behind it. By discussing the what, how and why of a transnationalization strategy, we fill an important gap in the scholarship regarding opposition strategies in CARs.

An archaeological field project designed to investigate Palaeolithic occupation is being undertaken in Mardin Province, south-east Turkey. New sites have been identified and recorded systematically, including Şıkefta Elobrahimo Cave. Together, these provide ample evidence for hominin presence in this area since the Middle Palaeolithic.

Magmatic activity in the Sakarya Zone, an important segment of the Alpine orogenic belt, continues intermittently from the middle Carboniferous to Miocene. In this study, we provide geochronological and geochemical data from the Dağdibi Pluton in the eastern Sakarya Zone to present some inferences on the source region and petrogenesis of the middle Eocene magmatism. U–Pb zircon geochronology from two granodiorite samples gives middle Eocene ages of 44.75 ± 0.92 and 45.01 ± 0.59 Ma. The pluton is mainly composed of K-feldspar, plagioclase, quartz, Mg-hornblende/actinolite, Fe–Ti oxides and small amounts of biotite, and secondary chlorite and epidote. Parental magma of the intrusive rocks has a high-K calc-alkaline affinity with metaluminous character. The oxygen fugacity values vary between −18 and −17. The rocks show slightly radiogenic 87Sr/86Sr(i) (0.704845–0.705726) ratios and ϵNdi values between −0.96 and +0.52. Pb–Pb isotope ratios are typical for those of the lower continental crust. ϵHf(i) values of the zircons range from 0.14 to 10.26. The geochemical and isotopic features of the pluton point to a parental magma derived from a depleted mantle that was metasomatized by fluids during previous subduction events. The volumetric abundances of the rock types are decreased as the silica content increase, implying that the fractional crystallization is the most important process during the formation of the present compositional range of the pluton. Amphibole, plagioclase and Fe–Ti oxides are the fractionated phases while K-feldspar is largely accumulated. In the light of the data presented above, slab breakoff is regarded as the geodynamic process responsible for the formation of the Dağdibi Pluton in the middle Eocene.

This article examines the management and instrumentalisation of migration and mobility as an area of contested governance in civil wars. Building on work in migration studies and rebel governance, it shows how migration and mobility regimes form part of the structure of violent armed conflicts, as both states and non-state actors seek to control processes and consequences of mobility and migration to their advantage. Governance of migration during conflict involves the strategic use of mechanisms of migration governance for the purposes of achieving conflict aims. This article develops a framework for understanding how migration governance is instrumentalised in civil war as a means of managing and controlling populations. The framework is then applied to the case of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and beyond through an analysis of three areas of migration governance that have played significant roles in this extended regional conflict: forced migration and refugee governance; border management; and diaspora engagement. The analysis provides a challenge to dominant state-centric, securitisation and humanitarian approaches to migration and security by pointing to the political and spatial complexity of contested migration governance in situations of protracted conflict.

An earthquake measuring 7.7 magnitude on the Richter scale occurred at 04:17am on February 6, 2023 in the Pazarcık district of Kahramanmaraş province Turkey. In the hours following the 7.7 magnitude event in Kahramanmaraş, a second 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck the region and a third 6.4 magnitude earthquake struck Gaziantep, causing extensive damage and death. A total of ten provinces directly experienced the earthquake, including Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, Gaziantep, Osmaniye, Malatya, Adana, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Adıyaman, and Kilis. The official figures indicate 31,643 people were killed, 80,278 were injured, and 6,444 buildings were destroyed within seven days of the earthquakes (as of 12:00pm/noon on Monday, February 13th). The area affected by the earthquake has been officially declared to be 500km in diameter. This report primarily relies on observations made by pioneer Emergency Physicians (EPs) who went to the disaster areas shortly after the first earthquake (in the early stages of the disaster). According to their observations: (1) Due to winter conditions, there were transportation problems and a shortage of personnel reaching disaster areas on the first day after the disaster; (2) On the second day of the disaster, health equipment was in short supply; (3) As of the third day, health workers were unprepared in terms of knowledge and experience for the disaster; and (4) The subsequent deployment of health personnel to the disaster area was uncoordinated and unplanned on the following days, which resulted in the health personnel working there not being able to meet even their basic needs (such as food, heating, and shelter). During the first week, coordination was most frequently reported as the most significant problem.

The use of force in foreign territories has been contained in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, with the authorisation of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in ‘cases deemed legitimate by international law’ and where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party. Yet Turkey's extraterritorial use of force against armed non-state actors lead to the most important question of identifying the circumstances under which the Turkish authorities have long justified military intervention in foreign territories. This article aims to assess whether Turkey's use of force and alleged extraterritorial self-defence contravenes international law. In order to address how Turkey interprets the right to use armed force and the right of self-defence, and to bring clarity to the state's approach to international law on the use of force (jus ad bellum), the article explores Turkey's practice based on the assessment of the Turkish military intervention in Syria, in line with both bilateral security or defence treaties to which Turkey is a party and the use of force in self-defence. The aim is to determine whether Turkey's justifications are compatible with the jus ad bellum criteria.

The limited success of employment-based social protection measures under the diverging patterns of post-COVID-19 recovery rekindled interest in a social policy framework known as the Basic Income (BI) support. We test the potential of the BI program using five alternative scenarios ranging from households with income less than half of median income to all adults with estimates of their respective fiscal costs. We then employ an applied general equilibrium model to analyze the economy-wide effects and welfare implications for Turkey in the long run through 2030. We evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of both a business-as-usual fiscal program and an alternative (green BI scenario) comprising of (i) carbon tax levied on the fossil fuel producing industry; (ii) corporate income taxation policy reform that aims at expanding the revenue base and consolidation of the fiscal space of the government; and (iii) restructuring of public consumption expenditures by introducing rationality and efficiency in the structure of fiscal expenditures. Our model solutions reveal that a green BI scenario not only achieves a higher GDP and welfare in the medium to long run but also helps Turkey to reduce its carbon emissions in line with the global policy challenges of a green recovery.