For the past decade, U.S. communications policymakers have been debating the need for net-neutrality regulation of “dominant” communications carrier platforms. One of the reasons advanced for regulating these carriers derives from a fear that carriers could reduce competition in the production and distribution of video media through their ownership of media companies, but is there any evidence supporting the notion that vertically integrated communications companies have successfully used such a strategy? This paper provides evidence from the financial markets that carrier integration into video production has not redounded to the benefit of these companies’ stockholders. In fact, this integration appears to reduce the value that investors place on such carriers, a result that suggests that the difficulties in managing a large, vertically integrated media and communications company more than offset any benefits (if any) that may derive from anticompetitive behavior induced by vertical integration.

This article is about a partially untold story: the central role played by intermediate or ‘meso’ institutions in urban water supply. Three central functions are identified: translating policies and laws into operational targets; monitoring; and incentivizing operators. This paper considers which aspects of institutional design and capacity allow meso-institutions to perform these functions successfully, and conversely what constrains them from doing so. It explores this issue through a careful examination of urban water provision in seven Asian cities which represent a range of macro-institutional environments and micro-institutional arrangements. The analysis shows that in many cases meso functions are performed inadequately or not at all for water supply, with negative consequences for the quality of service. This is particularly evident in cases where ownership and decision rights are not clearly defined and allocated.

This paper explores the role of microeconomic analysis in policy formulation by assessing how the regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) that federal regulatory agencies prepare for important proposed rules may affect outcomes when regulations are challenged in court. Conventional wisdom among economists and senior regulatory officials in federal agencies suggests that high-quality economic analysis can help a regulation survive such challenges, particularly when the agency explains how the analysis affected decisions. However, highlighting the economic analysis may also increase the risk a regulation could be overturned by inviting court scrutiny of the RIA. Using a dataset of economically significant, prescriptive regulations proposed between 2008 and 2013, we put these conjectures to the test, studying the relationships between the quality of the RIA accompanying each rule, the agency’s explanation of how the analysis influenced its rulemaking decisions, and whether the rule was overturned when challenged in court. The regression results suggest that higher-quality RIAs are associated with a lower likelihood that the associated rules are later invalidated by courts, provided that the agency explained how it used the RIA in its decisions. Similarly, when the agency described how the RIA was used, a poor-quality analysis appears to increase the likelihood that the regulation is overturned, perhaps because it invites a greater level of court scrutiny. In contrast, when the agency does not describe how the RIA was utilized, there is no correlation between the quality of analysis and the likelihood that the regulation will be invalidated.

The Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) of the European Union (EU) claims to be based on a risk-based approach to avoid over-regulation and to respect the principle of legislative proportionality. This paper argues that risk-based regulation is indeed the right approach to AI regulation. At the same time, however, the paper shows that important provisions of the AI Act do not follow a truly risk-based approach. Yet, this is nothing that cannot be fixed. The AI Act provides for sufficient tools to support future-proof legislation and to implement it in line with a genuine risk-based approach. Against this background, the paper analyses how the AI Act should be applied and implemented according to its original intention of a risk-based approach, and what lessons legislators around the world can learn from the AI Act in regulating AI.

Outlining the economic significance of the role of global supply chains (GSCs) in the organisation of the global economy, this paper initially presents some indications of health and safety outcomes in low- and middle-income counties (LMICs) where GSCs source much of the production destined for use in advanced economies. It goes on to discuss the operational dynamics of these chains and the corporate priorities that they reflect, which, it argues, do little to improve the poor work health and safety (WHS) outcomes in LMICs. It then examines evidence for the effectiveness of various private and public regulatory strategies that are claimed to bring about improved health and safety practices and outcomes among GSC suppliers in these countries. The paper critically evaluates this evidence and argues that, while there may be some examples of effective strategies and regulatory practices in particular contexts, their overall influence remains limited. It identifies and discusses the principal reasons for these limitations and concludes that the global regulation of conditions of labour – including WHS – at the end of GSCs falls well short of universal best practice and is, more generally, insufficient to counter the economic forces working against the maintenance of adequate standards of worker protection.

We argue it is efficient/desirable for central banks to operate retail Instant Payments (IP) schemes and infrastructure, considering that (i) payment service providers (PSPs) face a problem of collective action, which limits their capacity to deliver a cheap, fast, open-architecture and interoperable IP scheme; and (ii) this problem may be overcome by a central bank (economically neutral actor) with a dual role of regulator and operator of IP schemes, especially by mandating participation of large PSPs and ensuring that the low cost of infrastructure is passed on to consumers. We corroborate with data from Brazil’s Pix and India’s UPI, where the efficiencies of central bank-led IP schemes also led to social gains through financial inclusion.

This paper examines the historical development and contemporary landscape of Islamic financial law in Central Asia. Rooted in Sharia principles such as avoiding riba (usury), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling), Islamic finance has evolved into a sophisticated framework that promotes equity, transparency, and social welfare. In Central Asia, a predominantly Muslim region shaped by diverse cultural influences, Islamic financial jurisprudence reflects a unique blend of traditional practices and modern regulations. The growth of Islamic finance in this region is driven by increasing awareness, regulatory support, and integration with global markets. Key principles like the prohibition of interest, risk-sharing, and asset-backed financing underpin the operations of Islamic financial institutions.

Case studies from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan illustrate successful implementation strategies. The paper concludes by emphasizing the potential for Islamic finance to drive sustainable economic development in Central Asia and the need for ongoing research, collaboration, and policy support to navigate the complex dynamics of this evolving field.