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Two imprisoning factors, rumination and loneliness, on the individual level, and two imprisoning factors, social isolation and over-positioning economy, at the collective level are extensively described. Several implications for the organization of the self in contemporary society are outlined: the increasing density and heterogeneity of I-positions, frequency of “visits” by unexpected positions, and larger “position leaps.” Then, the phenomenon of “over-positioning economy” as one of the main implications of neoliberalism is discussed in more depth. A sociological theory is introduced to account for the “asymmetrical penetration” of the economic value sphere into other value spheres (e.g., education, science, love). Also, on the level of the self, a one-sided penetration occurs as economic positions, such as consumer and entrepreneurial positions, are increasingly influencing other I-positions that, as a consequence, are at risk of losing their uniqueness. In all these cases, possible trajectories into the direction of self-liberation are sketched.
This chapter looks at the direction the debates on social and economic human rights took after the adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966 and until the late 1980s. The focus is on the United Nations as the debates here reflected larger political questions about the meaning and relevance of social and economic rights as obligations in the unfolding post-colonial world. With decolonisation, the former colonial powers had been ‘liberated’ from the obligations of empire while many rulers in newly independent states used the new-found sovereignty to avoid scrutiny of the broad range of human rights. Decolonisation proved to be the perfect storm for social and economic rights denial. This would be further entrenched by expanding neo-liberal reforms and debt management leading to the ‘lost decade’ for development during the 1980s. Despite social and economic rights being continually neglected, the chapter argues that they always remained central to the problem of human rights.
This paper examines the motivations and consequences of Labatt’s anti–drinking and driving campaign. The paper considers the economic and political conditions that enabled Canada’s largest brewer to execute a cause-advertising campaign and to establish itself as a “responsible corporation”—even when its leadership cared less about the deleterious effects of Labatt products and more about the company’s earnings. It examines neoliberal governance and the relationship between the public and private sector in tackling a prominent social problem—impaired driving—and how a for-profit business used its influence to create a new subjectivity: the “responsible drinker,” who did not drive while under the influence. It seeks to situate Labatt’s campaign within an increasingly neoliberal, individualistic political economy. This paper argues that Labatt’s actions were part of the neoliberal agenda toward “responsibilization” that shifted the responsibility for drunk driving away from regime-based institutions and onto the individual, allowing the neoliberal state to govern from a distance. It demonstrates that contrary to neoliberal rhetoric the state did not shrink during the late twentieth century but rather took on new regulatory functions.
Recognition of co-operatives as a legitimate business model and form of economic participation was significantly challenged by the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s with its emphasis on individuals and markets. This fueled an externally and internally driven push to demutualize co-operatives and convert them into Investor Owned Businesses (IOB). While the international trend to demutualize emerged from the end of the Second World War, evidence indicates it accelerated from the late 1980s until the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. Drawing on an ongoing project of historical data collection and visual analysis of Australian co-operatives, this paper explores the Australian experience with demutualization, particularly with regard to agriculture. In line with the international experience, there has been a surge in Australian demutualization since the 1980s. However, while demutualization continues to be a feature of the Australian landscape post-GFC as co-operatives tackle with the changed political and economic environment, the paper also challenges the view that demutualization is inevitable for agricultural co-operatives. Co-operative managers can make strategic choices to avoid demutualization and retain member control. Further, co-operative culture and the persistence of co-operative clusters in particular regions can blunt the push to demutualize.
Economies - and the government institutions that support them - reflect a moral and political choice, a choice we can make and remake. Since the dawn of industrialization and democratization in the late eighteenth century, there has been a succession of political economic frameworks, reflecting changes in technology, knowledge, trade, global connections, political power, and the expansion of citizenship. The challenges of today reveal the need for a new moral political economy that recognizes the politics in political economy. It also requires the redesign of our social, economic, and governing institutions based on assumptions about humans as social beings rather than narrow self-serving individualists. This Element makes some progress toward building a new moral political economy by offering both a theory of change and some principles for institutional (re)design.
Since the 1980s, archaeology has been further embedded in a reinforced and accelerating capitalist ideology, namely neo-liberalism. Most archaeologists had no alternative but to adapt to it through concessions to the free-market economy and to the so-called mitigations taking place within development. However, it is now apparent that the ongoing global socio-ecological disaster we are facing cannot be reversed with compromises but rather with a radical engagement against the injunctions of competition and growth. I suggest that we must anticipate the necessary transformations of archaeology in the coming decades, before archaeology becomes a technical avatar of the neo-liberal dogma, or before its complete annihilation for being deemed ‘superfluous’ (Wurst 2019, 171) by the capitalist regime. In this paper, I will use the idea of ‘degrowth’ to propose a new paradigm for archaeology by applying the concepts of civil disobedience, voluntary simplicity, redistribution of means and the ethics of no-growth.
In this article, I present an analysis of the conditions that led to the success of an NGO coalition to challenge and bring about the suspension of a workfare program in Israel. I compare the Israeli contention against workfare with similar mobilizations that took place in France and Germany, in order to identify conditions that may enhance challenges to the politics of conditionality. I argue that the success of collective action against a workfare programme in Israel was precipitated by the formation of a loose coalition of civil society organizations which succeeded in seizing opportunities, gaining access to institutionalized political systems, and mobilizing allies from the ranks of political elites. Moreover, I demonstrate these opportunities’ fluidity, such that the loss of certain allies engendered the workfare programme’s rebirth. The article concludes by outlining lessons that can be learned from this case.
What will lead to meaningful change in legal education? And what should be the direction(s) of change? In the United States, as elsewhere, law schools are caught between critics who want them to be more responsive to the changing legal market and the needs of private employers, and critics who want them to do more to resist and shape the private market and promote the public good. These critiques are not wholly incompatible as a blueprint for curricular reform. Increasing students’ exposure to new skills and technologies, experiential training and projects, and collaboration with other professions, provides ‘opportunities for critical analysis and reflection’ as well as making students more employable.
Once characterised as a relatively stable profession, unfettered by the influence of modernity and strongly resistant to external forces, the legal services sector has in recent years exhibited marked change. Efforts to preserve profit margins increasingly eroded by the introduction of new fee models, the demand for increased billing transparency, rising client expectations, the adoption of technology and heightened market competition from high volume legal process outsourcers, have all contributed to the sector’s evolution. In what has been viewed as a clear shift towards corporatisation and commercialisation, the legal profession in a number of jurisdictions has moved away from the broader social mission on which it was founded and in which it existed as ‘a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade’. Free market ideologies have undermined ‘justice and rights in the discourse of law’, and in its place, the generation of profit has become the primary indicator of success.
The 1963 Geldard Report on the University of Virginia faculty described the early Virginia School economists as “neo-liberal” and asserted they failed to provide graduate students a modern education. Only an extract describing the economics department was known before so the evaluation could not be put into context. Had the authors of the report known modern economics, they would have remarked on Allais lectures at the TJC in 1957. Neo-liberal was then an unusual word. As it has come to be used, neo-liberalism supposes an idealization of efficiency and market activity. This differs from an earlier liberalism, which emphasized exchange and viewed democracy as government by discussion. Coase’s advice to the Fabian Society committee for broadcasting reform was to remove the BBC’s monopoly position by breaking it into competing services provided by the government, to allow taxpayers a wider choice of television and radio programs, with more points of view. Buchanan’s club theory is remarkable in this context because the distinction between market activity and public activity is fuzzy. The neo-liberal charge ignores the importance of the compensation brought about by logrolling.
On 1 May 1990, during the 18th Special Session on international economic cooperation, the General Assembly passed a resolution supporting a ‘Declaration on International Economic Co-operation, in Particular the Revitalization of Economic Growth in Development of the Developing Countries’. The overarching framework of the Declaration is the ‘strong commitment to a global consensus to promote urgently international economic co-operation for sustained growth of the world economy’ and the revitalisation of economic growth in developing countries after the 1980s, ‘a decade lost to development’. The Declaration was the product of a ‘long and arduous negotiations’ and ‘protracted … discussions’ which, after its adoption, was celebrated as a ‘pioneering landmark in the annals of international economic co-operation’. In retrospect though, it has been all but forgotten.
In the framework of a critical illustration of the contemporary history of economics, this chapter illustrates the various streams of neo-liberalism, from Ordoliberalism to Mises’s new Austrian school and Hicks’s Austrian capital theory, from Friedman and the Chicago school to rational expectations and supply-side economics, from the public choice school to political economics, from the Mount Pélerin Society to the Washington consensus and the idea of expansionary austerity. Step by step, the feeble theoretical and conceptual foundations of this set of theories are critically discussed.
In the framework of a critical illustration of the contemporary history of economics, this chapter provides an (original) illustration of Hayek’s thought: his formative years, his contributions to the theory of the trade cycle and the theory of capital and the subsequent debates with Sraffa and Kaldor, his theory of the spontaneous order and of the market as a mechanism of knowledge diffusion, his political individualism and the similarities/differences to the notions of methodological individualism , liberism and liberalism, his thesis on the denationalization of money.
This chapter tests the main empirical hypothesis introduced at the end of Chapter 7. If it is true that the most significant mode of persistence of the Christian Democratic ideology in the contemporary political landscape is not as a partisan phenomenon, but rather as a feature of established institutional frameworks and political cultures in regimes where it previously held a dominant political position, then many of its distinctive features should still be visible in these institutional frameworks and political cultures. To see whether this is indeed the case, I will focus on one such regime in particular: the EU.
Recent scholarship on the shift to the right in Asian democracies has predominantly been focused on political organisations, leaving social movements outside of them largely understudied. This article brings forth the link between the rise of right-wing politics in Indonesia—often associated with Islamic populist narratives—and the role of the market. It studies the way halal consumerism has helped shape the narrative of the ummah, an idea that was mobilised during the largest religiously-driven demonstration in the capital city Jakarta on 2 December 2016. By explicating the melding of Islamic piety and consumerism, this study illustrates how halal consumerism aid middle-class Muslims in navigating the neo-liberal social world they live in. The article uses survey data to explore the social status and religious views of participants in the mass rally, and delves deeper through interviews with urban, middle-class female Muslims who envision a cross-class ummah that defends Islam against an imagined oppressor. This paper discusses their role in social process related to politico-religious conservatism, specifically in defending the ideal marriage and family through market mechanisms. Through this analysis, I find that the combination of Islamic morality and neo-liberal values politicises the domestic and traditional role of the female Muslim; this has contributed to social changes that hinder democratic developments.