The rise of populist parties in Europe has generated an enormous amount of academic literature. Previous research has thoroughly examined the factors contributing to the electoral success of populist parties. Surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to the role of decentralization, one of the most widespread forms of governance in the world. This paper aims to fill this gap by presenting a theoretical and empirical account of the effect of decentralization on the electoral fortunes of populist parties in Europe. Using aggregated data from election results in 30 European countries, this paper puts competing hypotheses to the test. I argue that the mechanism linking decentralization and populist parties’ national election results is, in fact, indirect and depends on the existence of a regional tier of government. Results suggest that having representation in subnational parliaments plays a significant role in the national success of populist parties, and this effect is contingent on the degree of regional authority.

Since 2017, Republican lawmakers in a growing number of US states have formed ideological intraparty organizations, modeled after the US House Freedom Caucus, that seek to move state policy further rightward. What explains the appearance of these state freedom caucuses, and what kinds of lawmakers are more likely to join them? We show that the creation of these caucuses was initially motivated by concerns that state-level legislative Republican parties are too ideologically heterogeneous but has since been driven by conservative entrepreneurs seeking to spread freedom caucuses nationally. We also provide evidence that conservative legislators are more likely to join a new state freedom caucus, as one would expect, but also that, in a few states, lawmakers who are more electorally vulnerable lawmakers or lack internal influence have also been more likely to join. These findings underscore how state-level ideological caucuses can appeal to members’ multiple goals and serve as instruments of vertical polarization in a federal system.

John Stuart Mill is central to parallel debates in mainstream contemporary political epistemology and philosophy of federalism concerning the epistemic dimension(s) of legitimate authority. Many scholars invoke Mill to support epistemic arguments for democratic decision-making and decentralized federalism as a means of conferring democratic legitimacy. This article argues that Millian considerations instead provide reason to reject common epistemic arguments for decentralized federalism. Combining Mill's own insights about the epistemic costs of decentralization and recent work in philosophy, politics, and economics undermines purportedly Millian arguments for federalism focused on political experimentation, diversity and participation. Contrary to many interpretations, Millian considerations weaken, rather than strengthen, arguments for federalism. Any valid justification for federalism must instead rest on non-epistemic considerations. This conclusion is notable regardless of how one interprets Mill. But it also supports Mill's stated preference for local decisions subject to central oversight.

In political science, federalism is often treated as an “antithesis” to empire. While Canadian Politics has recently become more attentive to the importance of ongoing settler colonialism as conditioning Canadian political life writ large, this has yet to induce a paradigm shift in understanding how the institutional logics of the state were established by, and in order to advance, colonial and imperial ends. This article contributes to this broader understanding by exploring how, in Canada, the federal arrangement congeals a constitutionalized whiteness that facilitates both the internal coherence of a settler class and its subsequent continental expansion. Attentive to the importance of this constitutional development within a world-spanning imperial context, this article also suggests that the simultaneous innovation of Dominion status contoured the early twentieth-century's global colour line, as self-determination was increasingly devolved to other white settler polities. The contradictory realities of these processes are also noted.

The characterisation, legal status and future of islands are increasingly prominent in international and legal affairs. This emerging ‘legal era of islands’ demands a clearer understanding of the multiple distinctive legal issues that islands, whether as sub-national political units or as the territory of continental or mainland States, raise. This article conducts the first contemporary study of these issues by examining the international and constitutional legal status of island territories. It finds that although the relationship between islands and mainland States is characterised by incredible diversity, island territories are pursuing a range of innovative strategies to preserve and protect their autonomy.

Using a unique dataset of legislators' electoral and biographical data in the Canadian provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the federal parliament, this article analyses the extent to which family dynasties affected the career development of legislators since the mid-18th century. We find that the prevalence of dynasties was higher in provincial legislatures than it was in the federal parliament, that the number of dynasties in the Senate increased until the mid-20th century, and that the proportion of dynastic legislators at the subnational level was similar to the numbers seen in the United Kingdom during the early 19th century. Our results confirm the existence of a clear career benefit in terms of cabinet and senate appointments. In contrast to the American case and in line with the United Kingdom experience, we find no causal relationship between a legislator's tenure length and the presence of a dynasty.

May 11, 2023, marked the end of the federal COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (PHE). During the PHE, regulatory flexibilities allowed telehealth to more effectively connect physicians providing care and patients seeking it. This paper discusses the implications of the end of the PHE on telehealth coverage, payment, reimbursement, and licensure, and exposes inconsistencies and inequities in extant state regulations.

The rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) technology and its application by businesses has created a potential need for governmental regulation. While the federal government of the United States has largely sidestepped the issue of crafting law dictating limitations and expectations regarding the use of AI technology, US state legislatures have begun to take the lead in this area. Nonetheless, we know very little about how state legislatures have approached the design, pursuit, and adoption of AI policy and whether traditional political fault lines have manifested themselves in the AI issue area. Here, we gather data on the state-level adoption of AI policy, as well as roll call voting on AI bills (classified on the basis of consumer protection versus economic development), by state legislatures and analyze the political economy of AI legislation. We find that rising unemployment and inflation are negatively associated with a state’s AI policymaking. With respect to individual legislator support, we find that liberal lawmakers and Democrats are more likely to support bills establishing consumer protection requirements on AI usage. The results suggest that economic concerns loom large with AI and that traditional political fault lines may be establishing themselves in this area.

This article contributes to the hitherto limited scholarship on the Chinese federalist movement in the 1910s and 1920s by conducting a thorough investigation of its ideological underpinnings and political blueprints. It compares the federalist ideas, plans, and activism of three thinkers—Zhang Taiyan, Zhang Shizhao, and Chen Jiongming—who stood firmly against the centralist trajectory of state-building in China after 1911 and advocated the formation of a Chinese federation. It argues that Chinese federalists, instead of emulating Western models, critically engaged with a broad spectrum of ideologies—Daoism, Buddhism, social Darwinism, parliamentarianism, guild socialism, anarchism etc.—when formulating their federalist agendas. Emphasizing the Chinese tradition of self-government, which underwent reinterpretations during the late Qing and early Republican periods, this article examines the extent to which Chinese federalism presented an alternative to Western political modernity.