Why do people migrate? We review existing answers that focus on the role of economics and social networks. This work fails to appreciate that, all else equal, far more people remain at home than express an interest in moving abroad. Focusing on political conditions, we argue that political conditions and institutions are just as important to understand human mobility. Analyzing a wealth of globally representative, individual-level data on the emigration process, we find that factors such as the quality of public goods, confidence in political institutions, and perceptions of physical safety drive migration decisions. The importance of political conditions grows with an emigrant’s level of education, and quality governance can mitigate the impact of other “push” factors such as declining economic conditions and social networks. We emphasize that any understanding of the decision to migrate must grapple with political conditions in migrant-sending countries.

After establishing why people migrate, in this chapter we turn to an investigation of how migrants economically re-engage with their homeland. Specifically, we explore how migrants facilitate flows of international financial capital. We argue that migrants, because they possess critical knowledge about investment opportunities in their homelands, help international investors overcome information asymmetries which drives both portfolio and foreign direct investment into their homelands. Our empirical analyses leverage a wide range of data on migrant stocks and portfolio and foreign direct investment to test our argument. We find that migrants are key to explaining international capital flows, especially in environments where formal political institutions that protect property rights are absent or weak.

Just as there are determinants of health of individuals and communities, there are determinants of health system organization and performance which we term structural determinants. This chapter focuses on a set of such determinants considered key in understanding and strengthening health systems in low- and middle-income countries (L&MICs). These determinants include politics and governance; the economy, livelihoods and poverty; climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters; social and organizational culture; wars and conflicts. Each of these determinants has its own set of issues. For example, with regards to politics and governance, it is intersection of the form of authority, institutional arrangements, political values, citizen participation, corruption, and informal governance channels that determine health system performance. While the influence of structural determinants on health systems is acknowledged, there is still limited attention to integrating work on structural determinants in health system thinking, policies and practice. This chapter argues for a multi-pronged strategy to address this gap: focusing on tackling inequities; removing misconceptions about health determinants among health workers; easing the path to health system work on health determinants; engaging concerned communities; evaluating innovations to address health determinants; and strengthening intersectoral collaboration.

This Chapter provides health policymakers, managers, and care providers with an overview of strategies that enforce the key principles of good governance presented in Chapter 4. Strengthening participatory governance, building policy capacity, institutionalizing procedures to incorporate evidence in policymaking, and building regulatory capacity are critical for strengthening participation, transparency, and accountability and enforcing the rule of law. There is a variety of potential strategies that health system managers can adapt to improve governance of health systems at the policy, institutional, and healthcare professional levels, these include: (1) strengthening effectiveness of decentralization at the policy level; (2) linking accreditation to incentives, such as public funding or contractual agreements, at the institutional level; and (3) professionally led self-regulation at the health care professionals’ level. Control of corruption requires political reforms with a focus on open exchange of information, channels for participation of citizens in policymaking, and penalties for the misuse of power. It is important to note that the evidence on governance strategies in L&MICs remains elusive. Health leaders and managers need to cautiously assess and adapt strategies to their own contexts.

After the American Revolution, the British gave away Six Nations lands at the negotiating table in 1783. The loyalist Six Nations claimed territory in what would become Upper Canada in 1791. The chapter first examines the corruption scandal around Guy Johnson’s abuse of Indian department funds in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. It then follows the move of the Six Nations to territory that would become Upper Canada, where their presence posed questions about Indigenous sovereignty and the extent of imperial control. Joseph Brant tried to exploit his interstitial role both to accumulate personal power and to promote Indigenous sovereignty, even as the Grand River community struggled over the best economic strategy to adopt and many rejected Brant. Despite considerable ambiguity and the enduring importance of kinship-based political strategies, the eventual colonial response to the challenge of Indigenous claims would eventually be to seek to control the membership of Indigenous communities, while failing to protect Indigenous lands or investments, even as ‘white’ and ‘Indian’ increasingly became separate social categories. Attacks on the power of Indigenous peoples were linked rhetorically to attacks on corruption and on family bio-power.

Latin Americans can feel insecure for many different and overlapping reasons. U.S. and Latin American leaders don’t always agree on what these are, what causes them, and what should be done about them. Given all the previous chapters, this shouldn’t surprise us. In 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence pointed to threats stemming from economic crisis (exacerbated by Covid-19), crime, narcotics trafficking, corruption, and Venezuela. It also noted the threatening presence of China and Russia. Latin American leaders show widely varying degrees of agreement about these. This chapter highlights U.S. policy dealing with insecurity and Latin American divergence from it. The dynamics of the economy, as well as extrahemispheric actors, are already addressed in other chapters. That leaves a focus on crime, drug trafficking, and corruption, but also considered is climate change, which the Organization of American States keeps front and center.

The treatise On Generation and Corruption (GC) consists of a general account of generation and corruption (offered in the first book) plus an elemental theory (advanced in the second book). This introduction explores the relation between these two pieces. The upshot of this exploration is that the unity of the treatise is stronger than it is often thought. Far from being a suboptimal amalgam of various pieces, the treatise is the best and most efficient way to fulfill the promise made at the outset, where an account of the nature and causes of generation and corruption is announced, including how they differ from other natural processes such as alteration and growth.

GC II 9 resumes the task announced already in GC I 3: explicating generation and corruption so as to account for the fact that these processes are ontologically distinct from alteration. Aristotle identifies the causes of generation and corruption with a view to explaining their contribution in bringing these processes about. First, the chapter discusses the material cause and identifies the kind of matter that functions as a cause of these processes. Rather than presenting matter as merely passive the chapter paints a picture of it as contributing to the causation of generation by supplying the capacities without which form would be unable to fulfill its forming function, and as contributing to that of corruption by its readiness to both lose properties and gain others. The chapter goes on to censure Aristotle’s predecessors for failing to point to an efficient cause of generation and corruption, even though they claim that identifying such a cause is a principal motivation for their theorizing. Though largely critical, this discussion is carefully calibrated to unveil essential features of the efficient cause and in that way prepare the account for this cause in GC II 10.

The main contribution of this book lies in narrowing the existing research gap on the accountability of transnational corporations from emerging and developing states. In addition, it provides a new perspective on the widely documented poor track record of EU Member States in terms of holding ‘their’ corporate nationals, which are directly competing with these corporations for the same ‘share of wallet’ in the globalised marketplace, accountable. Any legal study of a level playing field requires the study of mandatory requirements as a matter of regulatory compliance. This book thus needs to study ‘hard law obligations’ in business and human rights. It assesses how regulation (in laws and trade agreements) and civil judicial remediation in the EU and its Member States function in relation to corporations from emerging and developing states in our globalised world. This book relies on two models of international law-making: constructivism and rationalism.

“Loyalty and Suspicion: The Making of the Civil Service after Independence” compares how colonial classifications of identity according to loyalty and suspicion were used by bureaucracies in the new states to define the administrators themselves and to shape the making of the civil services. Purification committees to vet former civil servants of Mandate Palestine, campaigns that designated certain types of corruption as disloyalty, and the explosive fight over representation by ratio in Cyprus were all carried out along the graded axis of suspicion. The chapter follows how political affiliation, mobility, and identity shaped perceptions of loyalty and belonging to the civil service that, in turn, dramatically delineated the boundaries of citizenship through mundane and routine practices of appointment and selection in the transition from colonial rule to independence.

Despite its increasingly repressive institutions, Liberia enjoyed rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. This was due in large part to the expansion of exports produced by foreign companies granted generous concessions by the Liberian government. The first major concession was in 1926 to the Firestone Rubber Company. Rubber exports were the main source of economic growth in the 1930s. This was followed after 1945 with numerous concessions in mining, forestry, and agriculture. This chapter compares Liberia’s economic history during this period with that of Mexico under the presidency of Porfirio Diaz (1876–1911), which also grew rapidly through the attraction of foreign capital. While research on institutions and economic development has often stressed the importance of limited government, periods of economic growth haven often occurred under authoritarian governments through various means to create substitutes for limited government. Histories of Porfirio Diaz’s government have argued that a system of elite coordination and rent-seeking made contracts with foreign companies credible even in the absence of representative institutions. Ultimately, however, this system fractured with the beginning of the Mexican civil war. This chapter argues that a similar system operated in Liberia, and that the inability of the elite to integrate new members resulted in the overthrow of the Americo-Liberian regime in 1980 and, ultimately, the beginning Liberia’s devastating civil wars.

In recent years, nations around the world have faced a veritable crisis of ineffective government. Basic governmental functions – preventing private violence, resolving disputes through lawful means, providing an infrastructure to enable people to meet their most elementary needs for shelter, nutrition, transportation, communication, education – go unmet. In some countries, these basic functions are met but longer-term governance issues languish, and government is perceived to be unresponsive in ways that some believe contribute to political backlashes, including those against minority groups. These failures in governance are also perceived to have contributed to a global upsurge in authoritarianism and a concomitant decline in democracy.1

Moreover, the basic freedoms protected in many democratic constitutions – freedom from state-sanctioned torture and from punishment or coercion without fair process; freedom of expression, of religion, of movement; freedom from invidious discrimination; enjoyment of property without arbitrary government interference; free exercise of the suffrage – cannot exist, in an organized society, without government effective enough to control itself and its agents and otherwise to secure the protection of those rights.

The theme of this volume – constitutionalism and the right to effective governance – has important connections with the fight against public corruption.1 This short contribution to the volume will briefly introduce three aspects of this topic: (1) How might corruption pose a threat to effective constitutional governance? (2) How might anticorruption efforts also put strain on the constitutional system? (3) In what ways might constitutional design choices affect the scope, prevalence, or type of corruption? The hope is that, by sketching out these relationships, this discussion can help to stimulate more dialogue and engagement between constitutional theorists and anticorruption specialists, who sometimes occupy separate intellectual and professional universes despite the close connections between their subject areas.

This chapter uses a close reading of The Lancet medical journal, and its radical, charismatic editor Thomas Wakley, to delineate the ‘high-water mark’ of Romantic sensibility as an emotional regime. It explores the ways in which Wakley and The Lancet leveraged the emotional politics of contemporary melodrama to critique the alleged nepotism and corruption of the London surgical elites. More especially, it analyses their campaign to expose instances of surgical incompetence at the city’s leading teaching hospitals, demonstrating the ways in which this strategy weaponised the emotions of anger, pity, and sympathy, and considering its implications for the cultural norms of an inchoate profession and for the ultimate stability of the emotional regime of Romantic sensibility.