This chapter provides an introduction to preferential trade agreements or regional trade agreements. It considers trade creation and trade diversion within a supply and demand framework of PTAs. It then summarizes the examples of the European Union, NAFTA, Mercosur, ASEAN and its AFTA, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Forming a line of linkage and transition between national orders and the international order, regional structures influence, and are influenced by, these orders. Regional structures that accommodate sub-components of geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural lines are sometimes unifying, sometimes divisive, but always dynamic in terms of their order-forming mission. While this dynamism plays a seminal role in the formation of order when appraised with an inclusive approach, it can also lay the ground for regional chaos in conditions of exclusionary polarization.

The seventh chapter of the book discusses the possibility and conditions of an inclusive regional governance under the light of lessons from recent regional initiatives of Turkey (Platform for Neighbors of Iraq, Syria-Israeli Peace talks and Tehran Agreement) and recommends the following principles of stability: shared destiny/common security, high level political dialogue, economic interdependence and cultural pluralism and co-existence.

Pan-Americanism’s promotion of liberal internationalism and pan-Africanism’s appeals to transnational solidarity among African people(s) provided useful frames for critics of non-interference to make it the subject of debate. I argue that the content and political salience of pan-Americanism & pan-Africanism empowered – or even inspired – critics of non-interference in these regions. In this chapter I offer a long-term account of the (uneven) erosion of non-interference at the regional level in the global South, an account centering on the contestedness of this norm within the OAS and OAU compared to ASEAN during the Cold War period. This contestation (at the level of discourse) contributed over time to norm erosion (at the level of law and practice). Pan-Asianism did not serve the same function. Since non-interference was less contested in Southeast Asia (and not on these grounds), it was therefore more robust or resilient over time. Because of the history of norm contestation and erosion, the three regional groupings arrived at the 1980s with different normative priors. This meant that Latin America and Africa were more amenable to the intrusive regionalism trend than was Southeast Asia.

Because of variation in the discursive foundations of regionalism and in the degree and nature of norm contestation and erosion, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia arrived at the end of the Cold War with different normative priors. These normative priors interacted with other key variables during the second wave of regionalism, one of which is regime type. Democratization in Latin America during the 1980s was extensive, and, by the end of this decade, the region boasted a high “density” of democracy. The achievement of this critical mass of democracies contributed to the renewal of the development of intrusive regionalism (especially aimed at democracy promotion) in the region. Neither Africa nor Southeast Asia has achieved this density. Although average democracy scores in these other regions have been on the rise in the last twenty years, they remain in the “anocracy” range. Even though high democratic density was not achieved in these two regions, though, individual states democratized, and emerging democracies with regional leadership aspirations, like South Africa and Indonesia, have been at the forefront of regional reform campaigns.

This conclusion both briefly revisits the causal arguments that make up the book’s general(izable) framework and highlights the role of idiosyncrasy, contingency, and agency in the divergent normative trajectories of regional societies of Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. It then considers the applicability of the book’s theory to a new case – the “Arab” region (defined by membership in the League of Arab States).The last section of the chapter discusses the status of sovereignty in the South today; challenges for intrusive regionalism moving forward; and the normative implications of non-interference and its institutionalized violations.

This chapter examines Third World regional organizations’ discursive foundations, focusing on macronationalism as a movement and discourse, and tracing the development of the OAS, the OAU, and ASEAN. Decolonization produced sovereignty-sensitive states. It also, in some cases, produced regional international societies founded on macronational ideologies, like pan-Americanism and pan-Africanism. And because macronationalism appeals to values and solidarities that transcend the nation state, it holds the potential to challenge strict sovereignty norms. In Latin America and Africa, the establishment of regional organizations in some ways culminated pan-American and pan-African movements, but the formation of ASEAN did not culminate pan-Asianism – the latter had long lost favor in the wider region due to its cooptation by imperial Japan. ASEAN’s discursive foundations served more to reinforce strict sovereignty norms – in the long run – than to create openings for contestation of them. Non-interference did not have to compete with transnational pan-Asian discourses or liberal ideas about human rights and democracy that were more prominent in the African and Latin American cases.

This chapter addresses a puzzle set up in Chapter 5: Why did Africa become so much more intrusive than Southeast Asia in the post–Cold War period, given that neither region experienced widespread democratization? A partial explanation for this variation in outcomes is that Africa’s normative priors were different – by the time these regions arrived at the 1980s, the norm of non-interference had already eroded to a greater extent in Africa than Southeast Asia. In this chapter, I make the case for another more proximate factor – economic performance. Poor economic performance renders states materially and socially vulnerable and creates legitimacy deficits, and these vulnerabilities make states more open to normative and institutional reform. In Africa, reform took the form of more intrusive regional norms and institutions. Southeast Asia’s stellar economic performance prior to the 1997 financial crisis served to reaffirm and reinforce its norm set – including non-interference. The crisis prompted some reform (and some erosion of non-interference) but not to the same degree as in Africa.

This chapter takes a regionalist perspective in exploring ways ASEAN can protect and advance consumer interests regarding consumer finance. Presently, ASEAN, as an organisation, is paying relatively little attention to the opportunities and challenges presented. The chapter explores some of the ‘traditional’ issues arising at the domestic level, including lenders: charging excessive interest rates; misleading and deceiving consumers; and harassing them or engaging in illegal activity when recovering loan repayments. Emerging issues include the rise of fintech. It offers new opportunities for financial inclusion, but also presents new challenges due to the rise of non-financial institution lenders, including those operating online platforms. Lack of proper regulation of these lenders risks regional financial instability and the exploitation of low-income consumers. Given the pace and complexity of change and the increasingly borderless nature of fintech, a regional approach could best assist with developing appropriate responses. The chapter proposes that enhanced shared knowledge and more effective networking amongst key players within ASEAN would advantage the region as a whole.

What is ‘ASEAN’ exactly? Is it a collective noun for describing ten states in Southeast Asia, or is ASEAN something more than that – and if so, what? These deceptively simple questions need answering to understand what has been achieved and what is achievable within and by ASEAN for consumers. This chapter therefore examines what is meant by the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ – a term frequently adopted by key players to explain and justify ASEAN’s role and existence. It also explores the influences of the European Union’s structures and instruments on ASEAN’s use of formal governance mechanisms and its use of concepts such as an ‘economic community’ to define itself. The chapter also considers ASEAN’s meaning and purpose from a range of theoretical perspectives, including: new regionalism; game theory and reciprocity; collective action; and social networks and the networked polity. The chapter further explores ways ASEAN can become more effective in advancing consumer interests through transgovernmentalism, ‘trading up’ and legal transplantation. Some of these perspectives are adopted when examining the topics covered in the following chapters in this volume.

This chapter introduces the backdrop to the achievements and challenges experienced as ASEAN has intensified its program of harmonising minimum standards of consumer protection across Southeast Asia, especially over the last decade. A key factor outlined is economic integration both among ASEAN member states and with their wider regional and global economies. Yet diversity among member states (demographics, economic development, legal and political systems, NGOs and press freedom) can influence the timing and extent of consumer law reform and implementation in each country. The chapter ends with summaries of the scope and key lessons of the remaining substantive chapters (examining product safety regulation, consumer contracts, financial and health services, and interaction of consumer law with competition law) as well as the concluding chapter (adding proposals for enhancing more public-private ‘shared regional value’).

Consumer product safety law has become a core element of consumer protection law in almost all ASEAN member states. Reforms began by creating post-market intervention powers for consumer affairs regulators, allowing them to ban or recall goods found to be unsafe; and sometimes pre-market powers, to set minimum safety standards. Yet many general consumer affairs regulators still lack capacity and jurisdiction, especially for pre-market powers, limiting capacity to exercise even post-market regulatory powers and to engage in proliferating cross-border standard-setting networks. The Chapter also examines the relationship between regulators and NGOs, as well as with private litigants who may wish to turn instead to the court system to obtain relief for harm from unsafe goods. Five ASEAN states have enacted strict product liability legislation. Indeed, although inspired by 1985 European Union legislation, the versions in Southeast Asia generally are more pro-plaintiff in various ways. Yet there are almost no court filings. Appendices present two extended case studies: informal networks promoting food standards and safety, and formal agreements harmonising cosmetics regulation.

Consumer law and policy generally envisages that consumer interests are best advanced by prohibiting abusive marketplace practices and promoting competition. This chapter proposes the framework be sophisticated for the provision of professional health services. Arguably, universal access to health services is a basic human right. Thus, the consumer interest is best understood within a human rights and a marketplace framework. These two frameworks do not always sit comfortably together, as illustrated in this chapter. The chapter explores the impacts of ASEAN’s market liberalisation strategies upon the delivery of professional health services. One strategy involves regional mutual recognition of health qualifications. This could enhance consumer interests by increased movement of medical practitioners to areas of regional need. Conversely, it could lead them to shift from low-income countries where universal access needs are acute to countries where practitioners receive higher incomes. The chapter concludes with an examination of how ‘health tourism’ is being promoted by some ASEAN members for economic benefit. However, these apparent benefits maybe somewhat illusory.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed reading of the progress achieved to date in the negotiated opening of services markets under both AFAS and PTAs entered into (or currently being negotiated) with third parties both by ASEAN as a whole and by individual ASEAN Member States.

Chapter 2 situates the role of services and services trade in the ASEAN economic landscape, providing a range of contextual metrics with which to gauge the contribution that services and services trade make to the region’s insertion into regional and global value chains and the overall regulatory and institutional setting in which such efforts proceed. It further investigates the actual (as opposed to negotiated) degree of openness of service regimes maintained in a sample of leading AMS, using a database developed by the World Bank Group.

Chapter 3 explores whether ASEAN displays the attributes of an optimal regulatory convergence area for services, examining a number of factors likely to challenge the pursuit of an integration agenda in policy environment characterized by a continued aversion towards more institutionalized forms of normative convergence and the regional pooling of regulatory sovereignty that a sustained commitment to deep integration generally requires in the services field.