The Inter-American Human Rights System takes into account domestic political contexts in ways that sometimes have not been fully recognized. International human rights courts face a tension between the goal of expanding rights and the need to gain legitimacy with domestic constituencies. Cases involving national amnesty laws have posed this dilemma in acute fashion in the Inter-American System. An analysis of those cases and their domestic political contexts shows how the Commission and the Court have taken into account domestic circumstances, the first through the timing of referrals and the second through the Court’s jurisprudence.

International courts (ICs) with human rights mandates have recently faced instances of backlash aiming to curb their authority. Taking cues from research on the functioning of ICs, we argue that ICs will be resilient—able to maintain their competences and authority in the face of backlash—to the extent that they are embedded in domestic “legal complexes.” Our framework identifies key sites of embeddedness and stresses the importance of synergies between them, including: (1) the incorporation of treaties into domestic law; (2) independent courts; (3) acceptance and use of IC jurisprudence by domestic judiciaries; (4) strong national human rights institutions; (5) incorporation of international law into legal training and research; and (6) the presence of NGOs that rely on ICs. This article explores resilience in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. First, we discuss and map the state of each source of resilience across Latin America. Second, we show how the activation of sources of resilience helped preserve the integrity of Inter-American institutions in the face of backlash orchestrated by several countries between 2011 and 2014.

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order, Stone Sweet and Ryan suggest that ‘from the standpoint of global law, we see that the [European Court of Human Rights] has taken its place in a pluralist, rights-based international order, as one trustee of this global order’. This article is a preliminary attempt to evaluate signs of movement toward global rights review. A multi-level charter of rights exists in the network of international and regional human rights treaties and in national constitutions. An incipient structure of global rights review exists in the form of the regional human rights courts, which see themselves as trustees of the larger global human rights system. Judicial dialogue among the regional courts allows for informal, decentralized coordination among them. The European Court of Human Rights serves as a point of reference for the African and Inter-American systems, though these also cite each other. Transregional judicial dialogue establishes a rudimentary, informal and decentralized mechanism of coordination among bodies that exercise a review function in the multi-level system of international human rights.

International courts regularly cite each other, partly as a means of building legitimacy. This study aims to show that judicial dialogue among the regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee has an additional effect: it contributes to the construction of a rights-based global constitutionalism. Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is purposeful because the courts see themselves as embedded in, and contributing to, a global human rights legal system. Cross-citation among the human rights courts advances the construction of rights-based global constitutionalism in that it provides a basic degree of coordination among the regional courts. The jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), as an authoritative interpreter of core international human rights norms, plays the role of a central focal point for the decentralized coordination of jurisprudence. Using original data, this study demonstrates the extent of citations among the regional human rights courts and from them to the HRC. The network of regional courts and the HRC is building an emergent institutional structure for global rights-based constitutionalism.

Airbus strategies in Asia operate in an environment shaped by three forces: the technical constraints of building modern aircraft, the demands of world and regional markets, and the structure and objectives of the consortium itself. These factors map onto an integrated strategy analysis. The positional analysis for Airbus must focus on its status as the challenger to the dominant firm, on the consortium's peculiar organizational structure, and on the opportunities and constraints offered by its nonmarket context (multiple national governments plus the European Union). One way of looking at Airbus's experience is as a continual series of disruptions aimed at creating openings for Airbus to enter markets dominated by well-established competitors, in particular, Boeing. These strategic moves have involved both market and nonmarket elements. This article assesses the market and nonmarket strategies that Airbus has employed to establish itself in the crucial Asian market.

The Russian Federal Law on Cultural Valuables Displaced to the USSR as a Result of the Second World War and Located on the Territory of the Russian Federation purports to establish the legal basis for the Russian state to hold permanent title to the vast majority of the cultural valuables removed from Germany to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Russia claims that the cultural objects seized by the Soviet Union constitute “compensatory restitution” for the hundreds of thousands of cultural and artistic valuables seized or destroyed by the Nazis during the war. This article assesses the compatibility of the Russian claim with relevant international law. It does so by tracing the development of the international antiplunder legal regime. It then assesses the Russian claim with respect to three categories of cultural valuables, based on prewar ownership: property belonging to private persons and organizations, property belonging to nonenemy states, and property belonging to enemy states (Axis powers). “Compensatory restitution” does not exist as a category or principle in international law, so the analysis focuses on the legal concept that is most similar and therefore of potential relevance, restitution in kind. If restitution in kind is impermissible under international law, then the broader “compensatory restitution” is, with even greater force, also impermissible. The key finding is that international law does not permit “compensatory restitution,” nor does it permit unilateral seizures of cultural objects under some broader notion of compensation.

How do rising levels of international interconnectedness affect social, economic, and political conditions for women? Research on gender and international relations frequently offers clear propositions but seldom submits them to broad, quantitative testing. This article begins to fill that gap. We advance the hypothesis that, on balance and over time, increasing cross-national exchange and communication lead to improvements in women's status and equality. Economic aspects of globalization can bring new opportunities and resources to women. But equally important, globalization promotes the diffusion of ideas and norms of equality for women. In an analysis of 180 countries from 1975 to 2000, employing cross-sectional–time-series regression techniques, we examine the impact of several measures of globalization on women's levels of life expectancy, literacy, and participation in the economy and parliamentary office. International trade, foreign direct investment, membership in the United Nations (UN) and World Bank, and ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), are associated with improved conditions for women.A grant from the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, supported this research. The authors are grateful for constructive comments from participants in the faculty research colloquium of the Department of Political Science at Brigham Young University. The authors also received helpful suggestions from their fellow panelists at the 2004 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association and from the editor of IO, Lisa Martin, and two anonymous reviewers.

We argue that greater degrees of international integration lead to lower levels of corruption, which we define as the misuse of public office for private gain. We theorize that international factors affect a country's level of corruption through two principal channels. One acts through economic incentives, altering for various actors the costs and benefits of engaging in corrupt acts. The second mode is normative. Prevailing norms in international society delegitimate and stigmatize corruption. Countries that are more integrated into international society are more exposed to economic and normative pressures against corruption. We therefore test the following hypothesis: the more a country is tied into international networks of exchange, communication, and organization, the lower its level of corruption is likely to be. The analysis of data from approximately 150 countries strongly confirms our expectation.

A yearlong nightmare for the European Monetary System (EMS) began in September 1992. Amid name–calling, finger–pointing, and hand–wringing, the British pound and the Italian lira dropped out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). In succeeding months, virtually every other ERM currency came under attack.1 Three of them—the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo, and the Irish punt—devalued within the system. Three others—the French franc, the Belgian franc, and the Danish krone—avoided devaluation, but only at the price of recurrent and costly rounds of intervention by multiple central banks. Finally, in August 1993, the defenders of the parities surrendered. The twelve EMS countries agreed to expand the fluctuation margins from 2.25 per cent on either side of parity (6 per cent for Spain, Portugal and the UK) to 15 per cent on either side of parity. The wider margins eliminated the potential for speculative attacks, but left the system only the thinnest veneer of exchange rate coordination. This article seeks not to assess the causes of the crisis but rather to explain why the EMS governments did not defuse it with a realignment—the mechanism built into the ERM for precisely such occasions.

The member states of the European community are not just liberalizing telecommunications but are cooperating extensively in the sector. Breaking with a past dominated by rigid national monopolies (the PTTs), EC states in the 1980s undertook collective action in research and development, planning future networks, setting standards, and opening markets. This article seeks to explain telecoms liberalization and cooperation in Europe. Two conditions are necessary for international collective action to emerge. The first is policy adaptation at the national level, such that governments are willing to consider alternatives to pure unilateralism. In telecommunications, technological changes induced widespread policy adaptation in EC states. This adaptation was a necessary prerequisite for European cooperation. The second necessary condition is international leadership to organize the collective action. This paper extends the analysis of international leadership by outlining the conditions under which international organizations can exercise leadership to organize collective action. The case study, focusing on three dimensions of EC telecoms reform, shows how the Commission of the EC led in organizing collective action.

At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.

Under the banner of “1992,” the European Communities aim to remove all barriers to the movement of persons, capital, and goods among the member countries. The 1992 movement comprises a set of bargains among European elites. Structural change (relative U.S. decline and Japanese ascent) provoked a rethinking of European roles and interests. The 1992 project emerged as a response because of: (1) the policy leadership exercised by the Commission of the European Communities, with support from a transnational business coalition; and (2) a changed domestic political context in several key countries—specifically, the failure of previous national economic strategies and the transformation of the left. The changes under way will alter regional business competition and politics and will affect the world economic system.