This chapter describes the Chilean Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy, PPD) as a group of independents. Since its inception during the transition to democracy, the PPD has achieved meaningful electoral support. However, its electoral stability contrasts with its lack of organizational structure, its difficulties executing horizontal coordination during elections, in Congress, and between local and national levels. Regarding vertical interest aggregation, the PPD builds upon personalistic linkages with particular interest groups in the different electoral districts. The PPD is thus no more than a group of politicians with personal electoral capital in their districts who achieve a minimum level of coordination during elections and in Congress.

This chapter analyzes the case of the Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA) in Uruguay as an unusual organization. Since its founding, the FA has exhibited a dual structure: a coalition of various factions that compose the party and a movement comprising a common grassroots structure (Base Committees). The latter is not necessarily affiliated with any particular faction and it participates in all of the party’s decision-making structures. The FA fulfills the essential functions required to qualify as a political party. These functions manifest themselves in the participatory processes that develop the party’s electoral platforms and also control the nomination of presidential candidates. More critically, the coalition and the grassroots movement tended to influence the policy decisions of the party’s parliamentary caucus when the FA was an opposition party, as well as the decisions of the executive branch when the FA was in government (2005–20). In this process, grassroots party activists exercised significant influence over political decisions that were particularly sensitive for the Left. Regarding vertical interest aggregation, the FA has developed strong, informal links with various social actors, especially with labor unions.

There is currently a resurgence of interest in political parties. This resurgent interest embraces a minimalist definition of political party, according to which any group that competes in elections and receives a handful of votes qualifies as a party. Parties, however, are expected to contribute to democratic representation, and the party politics literature has extensively shown that many “parties” do not fulfill this expectation. Entities that exhibit some but not all of the features that define political parties can be considered diminished subtypes of the category. A thorough conceptualization of diminished subtypes could improve the analytical value of the study of political parties and of other forms of electoral political organizations. In this introduction to the edited volume, we propose a new political party typology that includes diminished subtypes. The typology is based on the presence or absence of two primary attributes: horizontal coordination of ambitious politicians during electoral campaigns and while in office and vertical aggregation to electorally mobilize collective interests and to intermediate and channel collective demands.

This final chapter of the edited volume summarizes each case study’s main contributions. It also provides comparative insights concerning the determinants of the presence or absence of a given type of electoral vehicle. Finally, the chapter discusses how the volume’s conceptual framework can advance our understanding of the processes of party building, institutionalization, decay, and collapse.

The FA, like every political party organization in a democratic context, has a tension between choosing policies and candidates that are closer to the preferences of the median voter versus those that are closer to members´ preferences. This chapter analyzes the role that the organizational structure exerts over the party in opposition and the party in government. The chapter presents observational evidence concerning the influence of the party on crucial policy issues and on the government’s decision-making. Also, it briefly details the process of ideological transformation of the FA. The chapter shows that the FA organizational structure limits the leaders’ and government’s room to maneuver. It limits party leaders´ incentives to moderate their positions because major decisions need to have the organization´s explicit support, or at least an absence of opposition. When the FA is in government, the party organization also constrains government action concerning substantive and crucial policy issues. The lesson from the analysis in this chapter is that the party´s organizational structure can present challenges for strategic adaptation but provides insurance against the risk of brand dilution.