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There is little scholarship on museums and heritage sites that memorialize courts, judges, and law. Engaging with literatures on penal history and law and culture, we explore representations of law and power in court museums across Canada. Based on observations and interviews, we examine the meanings of the artifacts curated at court museum sites. In a post-Truth and Reconciliation Commission context, where heritage sites have been called upon to account for the atrocities experienced by Indigenous peoples in colonial institutions, we show how court museums in Canada continue to be curated in ways that naturalize the Canadian state and law, deny colonialism, and reproduce myths regarding the Canadian penal system. In our discussion, we reflect on the implications of our findings for literatures on representations of penality and law. We contend penal history museums must learn from critical, decolonizing trends in museological studies.
Extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS) affect 15% to 30% of patients with schizophrenia treated with antipsychotics and have been associated with poor patient outcomes.
To examine the incidence and economic burden of EPS in patients with schizophrenia initiating treatment with atypical antipsychotics (AAPs).
Patients with schizophrenia newly initiating AAPs with no prior EPS were identified in the MarketScan Commercial and Medicare Supplemental database from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2018. Incidence of EPS (new diagnosis or medication) was assessed in the year following AAP initiation. Patients were classified as developing (EPS cohort) or not developing (non-EPS cohort) EPS. All-cause and schizophrenia-related healthcare resource use and costs were compared between cohorts over the year following the first EPS claim (EPS) or randomly assigned index date (non-EPS). Multivariate models were developed for total healthcare costs and inpatient admissions.
A total of 3558 patients qualified for the study; 22.1% developed EPS in the year following AAP initiation (incidence: 26.9 cases/100-person-years). Multivariate analyses demonstrated that EPS patients had a 34% higher odds of all-cause (OR:1.3361, 95% CI:1.0770-1.6575, P < .01) and 84% increased odds of schizophrenia-related (OR:1.8436, 95% CI:1.0434-2.4219, P < .0001) inpatient admissions, as well as significantly higher all-cause (EPS: $26,632 vs non-EPS: $21,273, P < .001) and schizophrenia-related (EPS: $9018 vs non-EPS: $4475, P < .0001) total costs compared to the non-EPS cohort.
Approximately 20% of patients developed EPS in the year following AAP initiation. The significant increases in healthcare resource utilization and costs in the EPS cohorts highlight the need for treatments that effectively target schizophrenia symptoms while reducing the risk of EPS.
While previous studies have suggested that higher levels of cognitive performance may be related to greater wellbeing and resilience, little is known about the associations between neural circuits engaged by cognitive tasks and wellbeing and resilience, and whether genetics or environment contribute to these associations.
The current study consisted of 253 monozygotic and dizygotic adult twins, including a subsample of 187 early-life trauma-exposed twins, with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging data from the TWIN-E study. Wellbeing was measured using the COMPAS-W Wellbeing Scale while resilience was defined as a higher level of positive adaptation (higher levels of wellbeing) in the presence of trauma exposure. We probed both sustained attention and working memory processes using a Continuous Performance Task in the scanner.
We found significant negative associations between resilience and activation in the bilateral anterior insula engaged during sustained attention. Multivariate twin modelling showed that the association between resilience and the left and right insula activation was mostly driven by common genetic factors, accounting for 71% and 87% of the total phenotypic correlation between these variables, respectively. There were no significant associations between wellbeing/resilience and neural activity engaged during working memory updating.
The findings suggest that greater resilience to trauma is associated with less activation of the anterior insula during a condition requiring sustained attention but not working memory updating. This possibly suggests a pattern of ‘neural efficiency’ (i.e. more efficient and/or attenuated activity) in people who may be more resilient to trauma.
Enns and Koch question the validity of the Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson measure of state policy mood and defend the validity of the Enns and Koch measure on two grounds. First, they claim policy mood has become more conservative in the South over time; we present empirical evidence to the contrary: policy mood became more liberal in the South between 1980 and 2010. Second, Enns and Koch argue that an indicator’s lack of face validity in cross-sectional comparisons is irrelevant when judging the measure’s suitability in the most common form of pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. We show their argument is logically flawed, except under highly improbable circumstances. We also demonstrate, by replicating several published studies, that statistical results about the effect of state policy mood can vary dramatically depending on which of the two mood measures is used, making clear that a researcher’s measurement choice can be highly consequential.
Neuropsychopharmacologic effects of long-term opioid therapy (LTOT) in the context of chronic pain may result in subjective anhedonia coupled with decreased attention to natural rewards. Yet, there are no known efficacious treatments for anhedonia and reward deficits associated with chronic opioid use. Mindfulness-Oriented Recovery Enhancement (MORE), a novel behavioral intervention combining training in mindfulness with savoring of natural rewards, may hold promise for treating anhedonia in LTOT.
Veterans receiving LTOT (N = 63) for chronic pain were randomized to 8 weeks of MORE or a supportive group (SG) psychotherapy control. Before and after the 8-week treatment groups, we assessed the effects of MORE on the late positive potential (LPP) of the electroencephalogram and skin conductance level (SCL) during viewing and up-regulating responses (i.e. savoring) to natural reward cues. We then examined whether these neurophysiological effects were associated with reductions in subjective anhedonia by 4-month follow-up.
Patients treated with MORE demonstrated significantly increased LPP and SCL to natural reward cues and greater decreases in subjective anhedonia relative to those in the SG. The effect of MORE on reducing anhedonia was statistically mediated by increases in LPP response during savoring.
MORE enhances motivated attention to natural reward cues among chronic pain patients on LTOT, as evidenced by increased electrocortical and sympathetic nervous system responses. Given neurophysiological evidence of clinical target engagement, MORE may be an efficacious treatment for anhedonia among chronic opioid users, people with chronic pain, and those at risk for opioid use disorder.
Competition is commonplace among militant groups. Although political scientists have begun recognizing its importance, they lag behind other fields in the general study of competition. This is critical due to the strategic depth that competition brings. How one group behaves affects another group, and vice versa. Moreover, target governments and international organizations can manipulate the environment in which the groups must then interact. This chapter argues that building models to examine these issues is a useful strategy, but that the literature on political violence has not yet explored the implications. We then set the stage for the results we develop throughout the book.
Target governments can reduce grievances among disaffected populations who might otherwise pledge support to a group. Incorporating this into the workhorse model, we show an unexpected relationship between the total number of groups and total violence observed. When few groups exist, the target state has little incentive to reduce grievances. Due to the lack of competition, the government calculates that paying that price in violence is worth offering fewer concessions. In contrast, when many groups exist, the competition instills great fear in the target state. As a result, it may calculate that entirely abandoning the objectionable policy is the best solution. Without any supporters to recruit, the groups then drop their violence outputs. Thus, violence may decrease in the number of competing groups because violence deters the government. We characterize the circumstances under which the deterrent effect dominates the competition effect and provide broader tips for the empirical literature on outbidding.
One way a target government can try to mitigate outbidding violence is to increase enforcement efforts to intercept contributions and arrest volunteers to militant groups. We expand the workhorse outbidding model to account for this decision. States with greater enforcement capacity indeed benefit, partially from directly stopping contributions and partially from deterring supporters from making contributions in the first place. The decreased prize therefore also tempers outbidding violence. As a result, competition is contingent on enforcement capacity, with the effect of another group growing larger as that capacity declines. Statistical analysis finds broad empirical support for our mechanism: competitive violence is most pronounced when governments incur higher marginal costs of enforcement. These results increase our confidence that competition drives violence more broadly, as competing explanations do not predict this conditional effect.
This chapter reflects on the generalizable lessons that our theoretical and empirical results generate. Two central ideas emerge. First, strategic interaction is a central component of political violence. Failure to account for it risks generating invalid theoretical mechanisms and ineffective policy recommendations. Second, there is no silver bullet for terrorism. Some policies may be more effective on average than others. But even some seemingly sensible solutions can backfire under the wrong circumstances. As such, policymakers wishing to influence political violence outcomes must have a strong understanding of the causal process that guides the violence before making interventions. We also unite various subthemes that have reoccurred throughout the book, such as the role international institutions play in affecting terrorism patterns.
This chapter develops the workhorse model we explore throughout the book. We begin by substantively motivating many aspects of competitive violence: the marketplace has limited resources, violence is costly but increases a group’s share of those resources, opposing violence decreases one’s own share, and others. These components lead us to conclude that a "contest" model is ideal to study the implications of competition. Doing so allows us to recover a central implication from existing theories of outbidding: that more groups imply more total violence output. However, our model concludes that outbidding is a collective effect rather than an individual one. Even as total violence increases in group numbers, the per-group rate of violence drops. These central results are robust to a variety of alternative assumptions.
We directly assess the empirical evidence of the propositions derived in the previous chapter. First, we conduct a large-n analysis of terrorist violence in every country between 1970 and 2015. We then examine whether there is a relationship between the number of active militant groups in a state and the aggregate amount of violence. We find evidence to support the basic outbidding hypothesis: more militant groups are significantly associated with more violence at the state level. We subsequently analyze the effect of increasing numbers of groups on per group violence. In accordance with our model expectations, we find that while increasing competition appears to lead to more violence overall, per group violence declines on average. Finally, to more fully explore the causal mechanisms at work in this process, we examine in detail the multi-dimensional insurgency in Northeast India since 2009. We find that as aggregate violence in the country and the region increased, groups curtailed their own use of violence due to concerns over diminishing returns and increased costs.
This chapter endogenizes a would-be militant group’s decision to enter the marketplace for violence. We show that an existing group may overproduce violence to corner the market and make its potential rivals calculate that recuperating their costs will be impossible. As a result, violence may be greater when we observe one group than when we observe many. We then investigate four ways in which a target government might mitigate the violence: offensive measures that undermine the lead group’s marginal cost of violence, defensive measures that absorb a portion of all violence, deterrent measures that increase the cost of group formation, and concessions to the group’s audience to reduce grievances. Of these, only specific types of defensive measures are guaranteed to decrease violence. In contrast, increasing the burden of entry and decreasing grievances can counterintuitively increase violence.
Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and test the model's implications with statistical analysis and case studies. A series of model extensions allow the authors to incorporate the full range of strategic actors, focusing in particular on government efforts to counter and deter violence. The results indicate that the direct effects of competition are not as clear as they may seem, and interventions to alter competitive incentives may backfire if states are not careful. This is a timely contribution to a growing body of political economy research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence.