This chapter tells the largely untold story of the political economy of international drug regulation in the 1950s. It will tell the story of producer country efforts, led by Turkey, Iran and India, to agree an international quota system for opium and thus to divide up the licit global market. It examines the simultaneous efforts to suppress the global illicit market and minimise the numbers of producers to a small select few who would enjoy an enforced oligopoly. It highlights the quiet diplomatic pressure placed on countries viewed as epicentres of the global trade and a conscious ignorance of strategically important states – for example the US State Department refusing to criticise French Indochina and Mexico. Further, it tells the story of Harry Anslinger’s efforts to incorrectly portray Communist China as the world’s leading narcostate. It concludes with a look at the breakdown of multilateralism over the 1953 Opium Protocol, a treaty which few accepted but was rammed through by the US and some select allies. It was this Protocol which ultimately galvanised moderates and producer states around the need for a Single Convention to roll back the excesses of the 1953 Protocol.

The division between internalist and externalist perspectives has dominated many areas of philosophy over the last few decades. In broadest terms, the issue is how best to individuate or otherwise categorize properties of agents that bear upon them being rational, perceiving, acting creatures. Are the properties internal to the agent, to the exclusion of external factors, or are they essentially involving of properties and things external to the agents? In the philosophy of language, the relevant properties pertain to general linguistic competence, and so we may ask if language itself (appropriately understood) is an internal property of speaker-hearers, or, say, if a word’s meaning is essentially world involving. Only a cursory survey of internalism in the philosophy of language would be possible in the space available; the chapter’s ambition, instead, is to offer something of a rapprochement.

This chapter outlines the early development of UN CND and how it progressed towards its first new international treaty in 1948. Emerging from the tense post-war negotiations the key uncertainties for CND were: how it would operate in practice; how it would fit into broader UN and geopolitical streams; and whether it would function as a talking-shop or, as per the US vision, a tool to enforce regulations and publicly bludgeon member states as needed. The first three meetings of CND in 1946– 1948 would be pivotal. The first two served to sound out the political context within which CND would operate and how the structures would function in practice. Following this, a major political push occurred around the Third Session, first concluding a new Protocol and then spring boarding into discussions on a new production limitation convention and even advocating a new ‘single convention’ to unify all previous drug treaties.

This introduces the topic of multilateral drug control, its contemporary relevance and the areas under examination within the book. It highlights the key themes grouped by three overarching focuses: historical, contemporary-legal and international relations theory. It examines the major debates under way in UN drug control and their direct relation to the historical-legal regulatory discussion encapsulated within the book. It outline existing historiography on international drug control and examines more recent developments. It points to continuing gaps in historiography, international relations, legal and policy literature which this book will fill. In particular it highlights the extensive literature on international legal fragmentation and its relevance for drug control debates. It offers an overview of regime theory and international relations approaches, suggesting a new and emerging framework based on evaluating drug control as a ‘regime complex’ in a similar lineage to climate change and intellectual property regimes, which will be covered in a more breadth in the Conclusion.

At the outbreak of War in 1939 the drug control system stood as a mixture of contradictions and uncertainty. On the one side were the strict control advocates, led by the United States. On the other side were producing states, agrarian countries whose economic, cultural and political systems were entwined with the very drugs the system sought to limit. In the middle were the old colonial powers, recognised the role opium played within many their colonies. The outbreak of war would fundamentally reshape international drug control. Moreover, it was driven by US-led bilateral efforts, utilising its wartime leverage, while other states were confined to rear-guard defensive actions. The reshaping of control during wartime was in many ways the result of aggressive wartime diplomatic manoeuvring by Harry Anslinger and key members of the Washington drug control lobby. The most radical wartime departure occurred in 1943 when Britain and Holland promised to adopt a policy of total prohibition of opium smoking and monopolies in many of their colonial territories. This shift, enabled Anslinger to bring new pressure to bear on the traditionally recalcitrant states such as Iran and Afghanistan to impose stricter controls and prohibitions.

This chapter examines the legal legal of the Single Convention and its successor treaties. The passage of the Single Convention represented a high-water mark in the international regulatory system. While it contained little in terms of innovation, it streamlined the complex array of drug treaties, while moving the terrain of control forward marginally. It essentially solidified an economic regulatory framework for a global licit commodity market in certain essential medicines. To enforce this market it mandated certain action around controlling and prohibiting non-medical production and manufacturing. Key questions around dealing with ‘addiction’ and suppressing non-medical consumption were left largely unanswered. The US may have lost the battle around the Single Convention and control of the system in the 1960s but they would enter the 1970s ready to refight many of these battles, beginning with the declaration of the ‘war of drugs’ and an aggressive new round of bilateral drug diplomacy. Ultimately the ‘war on drugs’ was not an inevitable outgrowth of these documents, but instead represented a specific set of interpretations, bureaucratic and normative trajectories and member state implementations.

This chapter charts the occasionally tense inter- and intra-governmental infighting surrounding the creation of the UN drug control system. It highlights the key institutional, legal and geopolitical issues as well as foundational member state divisions over market control, regulatory reach and legal enforcement capabilities. The deep regulatory and oversight structures of the League treaty system were transferred wholesale, with no formal wartime interruption. However, reconstruction of the political apparatus proved a much more contested issue. Strict control advocates in the US pushed the creation of a more uniform, stringent and enforcement-oriented system. The majority of states, however, simply aimed for conservatism and continuity with the League drug apparatus. They were supported in this aim by the US State Department which sought to minimise areas of disagreement within the fledgling UN organisation. Drug control was far from a strategic or geopolitical post-war priority and entrenched interests among producing states and colonial powers remained. Astride the enormous economic, social and political challenges facing the post-war world, a consensus-oriented system appeared the path of least resistance for most, including the US State Department.