It is generally acknowledged that alternative strategies are required to enable children with disability to access storytelling activities. In this study, we sought to analyse the benefits of one such strategy: an arts-based multisensory story and rhyme program delivered to children with Down syndrome and autism spectrum disorder. In order to determine the engagement and impact of the program on the participants, data were collected through a series of multisensory session observations, focus group interviews with parents of participants, and interviews with performing artists delivering the program. The findings of this study revealed multiple benefits of using sensory stimuli to engage children with disability in storytelling processes, including increased engagement, focus, and interaction with other children and family members. The performing artists used their knowledge and skills to create an engaging environment that was responsive to the children’s needs. It was observed that language development could be further enhanced by integrating written text into the performance and increasing the use of nonverbal communication methods. Further, the engagement of siblings without disability in this program suggested that it could be developed to be inclusive of children with and without disability.

In 2017 the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) made only procedural decisions, one on preliminary objections, one on counterclaims, and two on provisional measures. Three other new applications were made to the Court, all linked to earlier cases: Malaysia applied for the revision, and interpretation, of the judgment in the Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh case; and Costa Rica brought a case against Nicaragua concerning their land boundary in the area of Los Portillos, the latest in a long line of cases between the two states. Judges Ronny Abraham (France), Dalveer Bhandari (India), Antonio Cançado Trindade (Brazil), and Abdulqawi Yusuf (Somalia) were reelected to the Court, and one new judge, Nawaf Salam (Lebanon) was elected. The UK failed to secure the reelection of its judge, Christopher Greenwood. For the first time since the establishment of the ICJ, the UK will have no judge on the Court. This failure may be taken as an indication of its declining influence in international relations, arguably attributable in part to Brexit, and it marks the end of the convention that each permanent member of the Security Council will have a judge of its nationality on the Court. Nor was the UK able to prevent a request by the UN General Assembly (passed by ninety-four in favor to fifteen against, with sixty-five abstentions) for an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965—a sensitive issue for the UK, and one that has already been the subject of much litigation.

The three disparate cases decided by the International Court of Justice (Court or ICJ) in 2014 may not contribute much to the development of substantive international law, but they are instructive about the operations of the Court. Perhaps the Court was not at its finest in terms of coherent legal reasoning in these three cases; it certainly avoided difficult questions in all of them. Yet each of the three cases had significant numbers of separate and dissenting opinions, which sometimes reveal more about the Court’s reasoning than is apparent from the judgment or order itself.

The role of the UN and the legitimacy of its collective security system have been seriously challenged in recent years. First, because of the Security Council.s failure to act in cases of genocide or other humanitarian disaster. There has been much criticism of the limited and delayed response of the Security Council to events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, somewhat unfairly in so far as it was the lack of political will on the part of the Member States rather than any institutional failure that was responsible for the failure to act. Secondly, the UN's central role in collective security has been undermined by unilateral use of force by States. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the UN was sidelined with regard to the forcible response against Afghanistan: in Operation Enduring Freedom the USA preferred not to act through the UN or even through NATO. Subsequently, the US National Security Strategy (September 2002) famously made no mention of the UN as a means of addressing perceived new threats from global terrorists. Most seriously, the US Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was undertaken unilaterally, that is, without express Security Council authorization.1 This was often portrayed as a crisis of legitimacy for the UN as much as for the USA and the States which participated in the invasion. As the Deputy Secretary-General put it recently:

Recent research has shown that biologically inspired approaches to materials synthesis and self-assembly, hold promise of unprecedented atomic level control of structure and interfaces. In particular, the use of organic molecules to control the production of inorganic technological materials has the potential for controlling grain structure to enhance material strength; controlling facet expression for enhanced catalytic activity; and controlling the shape of nanostructured materials to optimize optical, electrical and magnetic properties. In this work, we use organic molecules to modify silver crystal shapes towards understanding the metal-organic interactions that lead to nanoparticle shape control.

Using in situ electrochemical AFM (EC-AFM) as an in situ probe, we study the influence of a cationic surfactant cetyltrimethylamminobromide (CTAB) on Ag growth during electrochemical deposition on Ag(100). The results show that the organic surfactant leads to a unique crystal growth habit. With CTAB present in the growth solution, Ag islands grow in a truncated pyramidal shape. To understand the shape evolution of the Ag islands, we utilize electron backscatter diffraction (EBSD) in conjunction with microscopic ellipsometry to characterize the facet-specific binding of the organic molecules to large-grained polycrystalline Ag substrates.

There is evidence to suggest that GPs experience significant difficulties associated with lack of support from, and communication with, hospital and other specialists in palliative care. The establishment of cancer and palliative care facilitator schemes by Macmillan Cancer Relief reflects these current concerns very clearly. This paper presents some of the findings from the first phase of an evaluation of one such GP facilitator scheme in the Welsh county of Powys. It examines the perceptions and expectations of GP facilitator post-holders during the first year of the facilitator scheme, based upon data gathered from qualitive interviews conducted on three separate occasions. The picture that emerges from the first year of this facilitator project is broadly a positive one. Facilitators have tailored their roles to fit in with and augment the practices with which they deal. Attitudes vary, but their goals of facilitation and education appear similar. Themain challenges facing post-holders is that of being aware of the possible existence of professional rivalries whilst developing their role in ways which do not encroach upon the territories of long-established colleagues.

The duties, if any, of European states to participate in multilateral operations in Africa are currently a matter of some controversy. What are the obligations of European states with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa? How far is it legitimate for them to avoid the contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa? Does the reluctance of European and other developed states to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa have significant legal consequences? This article will consider these issues in three main sections. The first provides an overview of UN peacekeeping in recent years at a time when there has been a substantial surge in demand for peacekeeping troops. It discusses the problems that the UN has faced in securing troops from developed member states, particularly for operations in Africa. The second section describes the pattern which has emerged in recent practice with regard to peacekeeping and enforcement action in Africa. Although developed states have generally been reluctant to provide troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, they have undertaken Chapter VII operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire as ‘coalitions of the willing’. They have also provided assistance to certain African governments threatened with violent overthrow, such as the governments of Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. They have turned to regional and sub-regional organisations to take the lead in certain conflicts: they have provided financial assistance, logistical support and military training for such organisations.