An increasing trend in private international law cases decided by courts in the United Kingdom has been to refer to the European Convention on Human Rights and, in particular, to Article 6. This article will examine the impact of this provision on private international law. The article will go on to examine why the impact has been so limited and will put forward a new approach that takes human rights more seriously, using human rights law to identify problems and the flexibility inherent in private international law concepts to solve them.

The fact that the International Criminal Court has not been granted universal jurisdiction exercisable proprio motu has often been criticized on the basis that it will leave some offences beyond its power to prosecute. This article investigates whether the drafters of the Rome Statute were necessarily wrong in deciding not to grant the court such jurisdiction. It concludes that to have given the Court universal jurisdiction would have been lawful under current international law, and would have provided a welcome reaffirmation of the concept. Still, the nature of the cooperation regime and of the Prosecutor's investigatory remit, would mean that such jurisdiction would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to use. As the Court has to operate in a world of sovereign States, not all of whom are sympathetic to it, the drafters' choice was a prudent one.

Can the law of countermeasures be used to police the high seas? The freedom of the high seas is guaranteed by the immunity of a State's flag vessels from interference by the public vessels of other States, subject to limited exceptions. However, this rule of non-interference may shield those engaged in unregulated or illegal fishing or transporting weapons of mass destruction and their precursors. This article argues that while such conduct may breach obligations protecting the common interest, unilaterally boarding and arresting a vessel involved would constitute an illegal use of force and cannot be justified as a countermeasure.

The ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003 raised many international legal questions, which all have been more or less addressed in the academic literature since then. However, the thrust of the relevant legal etiology pertained to the implementation of a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, whose hermeneutics, ie the rules of interpretation, in contrast to other issues, have been scarcely explored and elucidated. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to address the latter question of the hermeneutics of Security Council Resolutions, and propound a coherent thesis in this respect, which would be applicable not only in the Iraqi conflict but even beyond. It will examine, first, whether the provisions of Articles 31–33 of VCLT are applicable either ipso jure or mutatis mutandis in this respect and then having deprecated both of these options, it will turn its focus to the question of which theoretical framework in relation to the hermeneutics in international law could better serve its purposes. Drawing insights from, amongst others, Stanley Fish, Ian Johnstone and Aharon Barak, it will be possible to propound the thesis that any relevant regulatio interpretations should pay due regard to the institutional setting of the ‘community’ of the Council, which in turn qualifies the ‘inter-subjective’ approach or the collective will of the Council in light of the object and purpose of the Charter, ie the maintenance of peace and security, as the most pertinent hermeneutic paradigm. Premised upon the latter, the article proceeds and articulates a rubric of interpretive principles and presumptions to be applied in this regard, which, at the end, will be tested in the case of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’.

This article examines the evolution of the EU anti-money laundering legislative framework (which in recent years has also included measures to counter terrorist finance), by focusing in particular on recent legislation such as the third money laundering Directive and the Regulation on controls of cash entering the EU, both adopted in 2005. The analysis highlights the relationship between these instruments and international initiatives in the field (in particular FATF standards), and addresses the challenges posed to the European Union legislative and constitutional framework when attempting to accommodate global standards.

The International Court of Justice's decision in DRC v Uganda touches on, but fails to address, the circumstances under which a State has a right to use force in self-defence against non-State actors.1 In particular, the Court holds that, because the attacks carried out by anti-Ugandan rebels operating from the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) territory are not attributable to the DRC, Uganda has no right to use force in self-defence against the DRC.2 The separate opinions in DRC v Uganda lament the Court's failure to take the opportunity to address the right to act in self-defence against non-State actors3–an issue of such obvious importance to the international community in an age of terrorism. As will be examined below, there are arguably good reasons–on the facts of the case–for the Court's refusal to pronounce itself on the matter. Furthermore, its decision need not be read as absolutely precluding a use of force in foreign territory in response to armed attacks by non-State actors.

The role of the UN and the legitimacy of its collective security system have been seriously challenged in recent years. First, because of the Security Council.s failure to act in cases of genocide or other humanitarian disaster. There has been much criticism of the limited and delayed response of the Security Council to events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, somewhat unfairly in so far as it was the lack of political will on the part of the Member States rather than any institutional failure that was responsible for the failure to act. Secondly, the UN's central role in collective security has been undermined by unilateral use of force by States. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the UN was sidelined with regard to the forcible response against Afghanistan: in Operation Enduring Freedom the USA preferred not to act through the UN or even through NATO. Subsequently, the US National Security Strategy (September 2002) famously made no mention of the UN as a means of addressing perceived new threats from global terrorists. Most seriously, the US Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was undertaken unilaterally, that is, without express Security Council authorization.1 This was often portrayed as a crisis of legitimacy for the UN as much as for the USA and the States which participated in the invasion. As the Deputy Secretary-General put it recently:

The outcome of the litigation before the International Court of Justice can be seriously affected by the Court's treatment of the parties' submissions, not just because the Court's disregard of the submission of the party can affect the legal rights of that party. The final decision can end up being substantially different from what most people would expect. This happened, for instance, in some cases in which much was at stake, such as Arrest Warrant, Oil Platforms or Legality of the Use of Force. The reasoning and outcome of these cases, involving the issues of the use of force and the account-ability for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, was important not merely for the parties' rights and interests, but also had a wider dimension of clarifying the applicable law on the important questions that very frequently arises within the international legal system and affects its operation and efficiency. It is therefore crucial to ascertain what the Court's powers are in dealing with the parties' submissions and if such powers are subject to certain limits.

Any observer of the practice of the International Court of Justice (hereafter the ICJ or the Court) may have noticed the growing tendency of the United Nations judicial body to formulate recommendations to the parties that have appeared before it. Indeed, the Court is more and more inclined to recommend that the parties allay their dispute and alleviate all ensuing human sufferings. This leaning is particularly observable when the Court simultaneously dismisses a request for the indication of provisional measures. For instance, in the recent order rendered by the Court in the case concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), the Court made the following declaration:

In July 2006, three bankers, all UK nationals, were extradited to the United States on charges of conspiracy to defraud their one-time employers, a British bank, a subsidiary of Natwest. The conduct took place under the shadow of the ‘Enron’ affair. The defendants were said to have conspired with senior officials of Enron. Enron was the subject of the largest corporate bankruptcy in US history. In comparison the sums involved in the Enron collapse, those at stake in what the papers called the ‘Natwest Three’ case were small, but the involvement of persons implicated in the Enron affair made the defendants of interest to US prosecutors. The cases enjoyed an unusual public profile, partly because the extraditions took place under the unique legal regime which governs US-UK extradition,1 partly because this case was simply one of several cases in which persons charged with what one might loosely call economic crimes were sought by US prosecutors2 and partly because the defendants argued that their offences (which they denied) were allegations of what were ‘really’ English crimes which should have been proceeded with here. Although the extradition aspects have loomed largest, this last matter, possible conflicts of criminal jurisdiction, is the most interesting.