Although philosophy has undergone a number of revolutions since the turn of the century, the existence of universals is still debated largely in the terms employed by Moore and Russell around 1910. A recent article by Alan Donagan illustrates this nicely, for Donagan expounds and defends what he takes to be the principal argument for universals given by Russell in The Problems of Philosophy. I shall comment critically on the case Donagan makes for Russell's metaphysical realism, but my main concern is to establish a point of more general interest—namely, that the most plausible strategy for defending a commitment to universals actually raises more problems than it promises to solve.

Herbert Feigl was one of the most admirable people I have known. I was fortunate to have him a a friend and as a teacher (he directed my PhD dissertation). He was a very special friend and a very special teacher. To round out what is being said here, I want to share my impressions of him as a teacher and as a person.

I don't think I ever took a course from Herbert; he taught me informally as a thesis director and as a helpful older friend. When he guided me through the writing of my thesis, I was almost unaware fo the teaching he was doing. It is only in recent years that I have come to appreciate how important it was for me.

In comparison with other teachers, Herbert was extremely permissive—the opposite of coercive. For him, nothing was off-limits.

Fisk begins his discussion by asserting, that the FS model attempts to complete the SR model by accounting for the necessity with which, according to the SR model, a capacity will be exercised when certain operations are performed. He argues that the FS model ultimately fails in this task, and he seeks to improve upon the FS approach by grounding the relevant necessity in an entity's nature - a component that defenders of the FS model ignore or misinterpret. For the most part my comments will concern the general strategy of his paper rather than details of the arguments he offers.

Since the major focus of Fisk's paper is on the necessity with which, according to his description of the SR model, a capacity is exercised under certain conditions, it is worth emphasizing that this idea is pretty implausible.