Of the many puzzling elements in Kant's Idea for a Universal History (hereafter the Idea), one that has seemed to me most puzzling, and in some ways most provocative, is its effacement of the individual moral agent. Persons are around in the story, most often as the vehicles for envy and greed, or the other aspects of human unsocial sociability. But the sincerely good person, careful and thoughtful in ends and deeds, might as well not bother, at least not from the point of view of the questions that the Idea is about (and then also, perhaps, from the point of view of human history). In the post-Hegelian world-view, that may seem right. But in Kant's philosophical voice, it is jarring.

A related source of puzzlement concerns the intended audience for the Idea. There is some reason to think it is Frederick the Great (the tone of the remarks in the Ninth Proposition suggests a worldly advisor whispering in the king's ear about honor and posterity). In “What is Enlightenment?” Kant made a plea for the protection of freedom of the press as necessary for the liberation of human rational powers; in the Idea there is something like a plea for the end of war-making in order to liberate resources for the education and culture of citizens. But the Idea doesn't read like an argument for princes, and it is not entirely clear that Kant regards peace, as he does freedom of thought and expression, as a possible aim of public policy (as opposed to something one hopes for and should not impede).

There is an often unspoken assumption at work in modern moral philosophy that morality is in important ways independent of social and political institutions. The intuitive idea is that whatever morality requires of us as individuals, it will be something that we are, as individuals, able to do, or able to do to the degree that we are virtuous or good. The assumed moral effect on us of political and social institutions is either, positively, to provide us with a set of benefits and burdens, the enjoyment and discharge of which may give us occasion for moral action, or negatively, if we hold political office or have some role with special responsibilities, to sometimes call for compromise with moral principle in order to do what is politically or institutionally necessary.

Kant's ethics has often seemed the exemplar of such a “separate spheres” conception of ethics and politics. Social and political institutions are presumed to arise as the necessary strategy for negotiating the natural lawlessness of collective life. Morality, by contrast, has its source in the a priori requirements of practical reason. It is thus both independent of and prior to politics. Moral action, accordingly, is a matter of bringing the will into conformity with a priori principles of practical reason. What calls for philosophy is the demonstration that this is possible.

The complement to this view of morality is a conception of the moral person as an autonomous individual acting under the burden of practical reason (in particular, the necessitation of the categorical imperative).

John Rawls is known all over the world for the revolutionary achievements in political philosophy embodied in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Almost immediately upon publication, Rawls's account of the aims and values of liberalism became the starting point for subsequent work in political philosophy. Many philosophers following Rawls have disagreed with him, taking issue with his methodological devices (e.g., the veil of ignorance as a device of representation), or the two principles of justice, or the account of primary goods as the proper basis of distribution. Others have denied that liberalism as he describes it draws on a sufficiently substantive conception of the self, or would lead to a sufficiently rich and supportive community life; or they have been skeptical of his attempts to show that those who disagree deeply on religious and metaphysical issues and favor different conceptions of the good life may still agree on principles of justice and political institutions. And many other philosophers have been convinced by Rawls's views, and have taken up their defense. There is little dispute on either side that these are the central issues and the appropriate terms of discussion. In this way, Rawls's work has provided the focal point for much of the political philosophy of the last twenty-five years.

It is also now fairly commonplace to credit Rawls's work with the revitalization of moral philosophy that began in the early 1970s. By the late 1960s, moral philosophy was in danger of becoming sterile and trivial. The prevailing emphasis on the analysis of ethical concepts and “metaethical” issues had turned the attention of philosophers away from practical questions.