Avrum Stroll, in his article “Russell's ‘Proof’ “ (this Journal, IV.4, June 1975) makes a number of interesting ——though, as I shall argue, misconceived ——observations about Russell's philosophy of language. The points on which I take issue with Stroll concern, first, his claim that the arguments used in Principia Mathematica (hereafter abbreviated to PM) to distinguish names from descriptions differ significantly from the arguments to the same purpose in My Philosophical Development (MPD); second, his challenge to Russell's view that descriptive phrases acquire meaning by being put into a sentential context; third, his contention that Russell's various attempts to prove that names differ from descriptions are based on fallacious arguments; and fourth, his speculations about the factors prompting Russell to make the assumption that proper names have meaning and that this meaning is independent of any sentential context. I will discuss each of these points in turn.