THE question of how countries in Africa are dealing with
the control
and restructuring of their military forces and security agencies has
aroused some scholarly and political interest but little systematic
research. The story of the transition in Ghana may be said to have
begun when the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was removed by
a coup d'état on 4 June 1979 and replaced by the Armed
Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) headed by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry
Rawlings. The young officers had intervened, as they soon explained,
because of the growing corruption and deteriorating conditions of
service, the severe economic crisis and reduced military budgets, and
the mismanagement of both the Armed Forces and the national
government. Although power was restored to civilians only four
months later, Rawlings intervened again on 31 December 1981 after
the régime headed by President Hilla Limann had failed in the view
of
supporters of the ‘June 4 Movement’ to respond effectively
to the
problems faced by Ghana. Ironically this coup by Rawlings, widely
known as his ‘Second Coming’, and described with some truth
as
‘a popular affair’, interrupted efforts that were being made
to
re-professionalise the Armed Forces and restore civilian control.