EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Southeast Asia's Internet users are far more diverse than usually reported. They range from the urban youth with laptops and high-speed Wi-Fi, to the older generation semi-rural and rural users with affordable mobile phones for Facebook and WhatsApp.

• • Southeast Asians generally trust social media platforms more than in Western societies. This trust in social media reflects a lack of trust in local mainstream media and official sources of information.

• • What campaign information (and disinformation) is being spread and which ones are most successful are essential for understanding how voters in Southeast Asia use and trust social media.

• • Social media platforms and Southeast Asia's “app industry” need clearer and enforced regulation on their use of data and the extent to which they can sell data to advertisers. These advertisers include, but are not limited to, politicians and political parties.

• • Since the future of social media usage will likely lie in closed groups, the role of big data analyses that have dominated research on social media over the past ten years, is likely to regress. Instead, ethnographic scholars who can access these groups and engage with their particular interests and identities are more likely to be useful in understanding the digital sphere in the future.

INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asians with Internet access are ranked as some of the world's most ubiquitous users of social media platforms. Yet, it is true that in Southeast Asia as elsewhere, scholars, analysts and governments are still trying to understand how “the informational underpinning of democracy have eroded”. In this article, I assess the kinds of information society that are emerging in the digital public sphere in Southeast Asia. To comprehend social media's impact, we need to think more about the different ways through which citizens access the Internet, and the circumstances under which they engage with certain social media platforms. We also need to understand the historical and cultural backgrounds that shaped the way digitalization has entered the existing public sphere. Finally, we need to take note of the political context and reasons for the spread of digital media material. I examine these three aspects of social media adoption in three Southeast Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

SOUTHEAST ASIA's SHIFTING INFORMATION SOCIETY

There are some common mistakes that analysts make when writing about social media usage in Southeast Asia. The first mistake is overstating Internet access in the region. We often think of the “digital divide” as a clear distinction between those who have access to the Internet and those who have no access at all. In this frame, surveys show that some 64 per cent of Indonesians, 65 per cent of Filipinos and 75 per cent of Malaysians have regular access to the Internet. But these statistics are often beset with erroneous conclusions––for example, many citizens answer “yes” to having Facebook, but “no” to having Internet access when answering professional surveys. Some digital surveys, such as WeAreSocial, often only collect information on people who have Internet access. Others, such as AC Nielson, only examine responses from citizens in large cities where Internet signals are strong and where wealth is greater. These surveys only scratch the surface of the vast disparity in how Southeast Asians access the Internet. As Elizabeth Pisani wrote: “Millions of Indonesians are on US$2 a day and are on Facebook.” So the number could be skewed but more importantly, these percentages do not tell us the disparity within Internet usage. The millions of Southeast Asians “on the digital divide”, who have minimal access to the Internet, are generally understudied.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of digital media in the Malaysia was due to the government's initiative to tap into the information and communications technology (ICT) sector in an effort to open up new economic frontiers. The introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in 1996 was an attempt to lure world-class multinational technology companies into Malaysia to boost the local digital industry. While this move spearheaded Malaysia into the digital economy, it also set off a chain of events that influenced the political and democratic process. Digital media enabled the opposition and civil society to compete and break the government's monopoly of traditional media—print, television. and radio—by circulating news and information that challenged the official narrative. Furthermore, the MSC's Bill of Guarantees stated that the Malaysian government would not censor the Internet as part of its commitment to provide a conducive environment for the digital economy to develop.

Thus, the entry of digital media into Malaysia enhanced political competition and became a catalyst for political change because it provided alternative news and information. This was evident during the sacking of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim and the Reformasi movement in the late 1990s, with the usage of emails and Usenet newsgroups. Short message service (SMS) was employed in the 2004 general election, while socio-political blogs dominated the 2008 general election. Facebook and other social media such as Twitter were the main forms of political communication in the 2013 general election; in 2018, it was Facebook Live and WhatsApp. Every new iteration of digital technology into the Malaysian ecosystem had an impact on communication in general election campaigns.

IMPACT OF DIGITAL MEDIATIZATION OF POLITICS

Digital mediatization of politics in Malaysia has several consequences, such as cyberattacks and cyberbullying, cybertroopers and propaganda, as well as fake news, disinformation and misinformation.

Cyberattacks and Cyberbullying

Interference with online access, especially to alternative news portals and opposition content, intensifies especially in the run-up to general elections. For example, during the 13th general election in 2013, independent news website Malaysiakini experienced a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack which affected its operations for a period of time. Cyberattacks also occurred in the 14th general election in 2018 when some political candidates found their mobile phones hacked and spammed by calls from the US and UK on polling day.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor in 1996 was due to the Malaysian government's initiative to tap into the ICT sector. While this move spearheaded Malaysia into the knowledge economy, digital media enabled the opposition and civil society to compete and break the government's monopoly over information flows.

• • Digital mediatization of politics in Malaysia encouraged cyberattacks such as DDoS attacks, hacking and spamming. Cyberbullying on social media is also on the rise.

• • Information warfare is being perpetuated by organized teams of cybertroopers who disseminate propaganda, fake news, and disinformation in order to influence public opinion.

• • Digital mediatization of politics has opened up the public sphere and given ordinary citizens, especially youths, the opportunity to voice their opinions on the issues of the day. Social media campaigns, especially on Twitter, discuss the trending issues through the use of hashtags.

• • PN component parties have the incumbency advantage going into the next election. Its narrative is likely to be ethno-religious. The challenge for the opposition PH, therefore, is to provide an alternative message of inclusivity, unity and acceptance of diversity.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Vietnamese nationalism has a strong undercurrent of anti-China sentiments, and Vietnam's leaders have regularly tapped into such sentiments to shore up their legitimacy and boost Vietnamese nationalism.

• • Over the last decade, the helter-skelter growth of social media has bred new popular actors in Vietnamese cybersphere, who are deeply nationalistic but who pursue entirely different political and social agendas. In sum, they give rise to a new nationalistic narrative, one that paints the Vietnam Communist Party as being often too meek and subservient to China, and calls for drastic reforms to the political system—regime change not excluded—to deal with Chinese threats.

• • An examination of prominent cases of online Vietnamese nationalism shows that anti-China sentiments have been a recurrent theme and a consistent trigger. The online nationalistic movements have been mostly instigated by popular figures, with state actors playing a facilitating role in stoking and harnessing them for their own ends.

• • Manifestations of online nationalism, especially those centred on anti-China and sovereignty issues, may hold serious consequences, including violence and deadly riots. In some instances, online nationalistic campaigns both galvanize and dissipate relatively quickly once state and popular actors have somehow managed to achieve their aims.

• • The growing salience of online Vietnamese nationalism has posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the regime. The authorities have had to encourage nationalistic patriotism without letting Sinophobia spiral out of control or turn against the regime.

INTRODUCTION

A multinational fashion retailer. The prime minister of Singapore. A COVID-19 patient who is the daughter of an ultra-wealthy Vietnamese family. They have all been the targets of online Vietnamese nationalists under different circumstances.

Indeed, recent manifestations of potent online nationalism in Vietnamese cybersphere have forced the authorities to become acutely wary of, sensitive to and even accommodating of it. This marks a significant development in the social media landscape: At the very outset, Vietnam's Internet users turned to social media to mostly challenge the official narrative of the mainstream media and to offer a counter-narrative to it. But social media users have also become increasingly vocal and frequent in defending Vietnam's image abroad by flagging content they deem controversial and inappropriate. This dynamic has created complex challenges and dilemmas for the authorities who have at times found it useful to leverage nationalistic sentiments to advance its foreign policy positions and yet have reiterated that the task of cracking down on anti-state content in cyberspace has never been more crucial.

This paper seeks to answer these questions: What triggers an online nationalistic backlash in Vietnam? Who are the actors behind such campaigns? What are the tactics and strategies used and what are their end goals? Has nationalist online expression been able to shape Vietnam's foreign and domestic policymaking or has it been shaped by them? Has nationalist online expression influenced discourse in the mainstream media?

The paper lays out key characteristics of Vietnamese nationalism and examines how it has evolved. It then takes a closer look at the emergence of online nationalism and high-profile case studies in an effort to sketch out common themes of online nationalistic narratives. The paper also explores what role the Vietnamese state plays in shaping these narratives and how much influence it wields in controlling and managing online nationalism. It concludes by outlining some major dilemmas facing the authorities if they continue seeking to play the online nationalism card in the future.

HOW VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM EVOLVES AND TAKES OFF ONLINE

To examine expressions of nationalism in Vietnam, it is useful to look at how such sentiments have panned out in China and put them in a comparative context.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

This chapter traces the role and challenges of the electronic media, particularly those of television, at various key junctions in Indonesia's political history. It also examines the status of television today as Indonesia grapples with its difficult transition to democracy.

Political leaders habitually seek to manage the media. They can enforce a regimen of control for a certain period of time, but the process is fraught with political tension and harbours a great potential for crisis, conflict and chaos. Although press freedom and freedom of expression are basic human rights acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19), as well as in Indonesia's 1945 Constitution, the implementation of these rights has had a chequered history. For more than 50 years after Indonesia's Independence (1945–1998), freedom of expression and press freedom were very much controlled by the rulers, except during two “honeymoon” periods.

In the present post-Soeharto period, press freedom and freedom of expression are safeguarded by an August 2000 amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the People's Consultative Assembly Decree no. XVII/1999 on Human Rights, and the Press Law no. 40/1999. However, written statutes alone cannot safeguard press freedom. Having the appropriate laws is important, but a free press will only thrive if it becomes part of a larger democratic culture within the country. Unfortunately, a democratic system and its values are not well-established yet in Indonesian society. Many individuals or groups are already complaining that press freedom in the current liberal climate has gone too far. On the other hand, there are those who do not understand that freedom should be tempered by a strong sense of responsibility.

The shifting dynamics of media politics are contained within a nexus of activism, media and political power that is a prevailing motif in the history of the Indonesian nation. In the twentieth century, Indonesia's political history was shaped by popular activism.2 The media played a central role in raising public consciousness and galvanizing people into action. Politicians therefore understood the importance of the media in seeking and maintaining power — and this realization informed an official media policy that sought to control, while at the same time make allies of, the media.

ASEAN has been undergoing a tremendous change in the last decade. Just as the region has diverse cultural and political systems, the Southeast Asian media scene is no different. It ranges from the very free in the Philippines to those strictly following party lines as in Vietnam, Laos and military-ruled Myanmar. Is the nature of the media industry highly dependent on the power of media practitioners or does the state have greater control over it instead? Although it is ideal to believe that the pen is mightier than the sword, in reality the governments in most of the ASEAN countries have greater control. However, media ownership and market dynamics also play a role in defining the position of media in the region.

In some ASEAN countries, governments view media as a tool of national development. Yet in others, media practitioners are not protected and are constantly putting their lives in danger when they report what they believe to be true. In more press-liberal countries like the Philippines and Thailand, media has become a toy of the owners, usually big business groups or politicians who serve their private agendas. Sometimes the media itself lacks a clear concept and direction, making it unreliable, irresponsible and corrupt.

The original ASEAN members who have experienced a higher level of economic development have better media technology, both print and satellite, and are now embracing multimedia. The newer members are still struggling with limited television and radio coverage in rural areas. New technologies pose new challenges for ASEAN governments. Direct satellite broadcasting has increased significantly and foreign-owned media broadcasts are easily accessible today. Technological breakthroughs together with public demand are making it difficult for the governments to restrict access to international information.

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, with the support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, initiated the workshop on “Media and Transition in ASEAN”. This book, which analyses the position of media in a changing region, is a result of the contributions of eleven researchers covering eight countries. The position of the media in each country is unique and thus the results should be analysed bearing in mind the developments influencing the economic, social and political environment in the respective countries.

INTRODUCTION

In keeping with the country's socialist political system, Vietnam has a media system which is state-owned and funded. However, beginning in the early 1980s, a wave of market reforms brought about significant changes to the economy in general, and the media in particular. This signalled the beginning of a new policy to stop subsidizing the economy and let market forces take over. Within this new economic orientation, media organizations, like business enterprises, had to learn how to operate without the usual financial handouts. In line with its reduced largesse, the state also eased its control of the economy, thereby allowing media organizations to experiment with new ideas and increase their popularity with consumers. Adjusting to market reforms was, therefore, both a matter of necessity and opportunity. Some of the changes in the media are easily evident, for example the increase in the number of publications. But besides these obvious changes, there remain a few outstanding questions about the Vietnamese media which do not have clear answers yet. An examination of these issues therefore provides an understanding of how far advanced the media is in the transition to a market model.

ADVENT OF MARKET FORCES

In 1986, the VCP (Vietnam Communist Party) formally endorsed doi moi, a reforms programme that began the country's transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy. One fundamental change that came about was the phasing out of state subsidies for most sectors of the state-owned and state-run economy, including the media. Before doi moi, the state provided all media organizations with their operating expenses such as office space, equipment, newsprint, wages and other running costs. In return, the state set the price and the size of the print runs, and regulated the content.

The newspapers before 1986 did not rely on advertisements as a source of revenue. Only one paper in Ho Chi Minh City, Tin Sang (Morning News), which was also the only privately-owned newspaper, had some space for classified advertisements. The print media relied entirely on its circulation for revenue. Whether this covered the cost of production did not matter, because the state always made up for any shortfall.

INTRODUCTION

The close of the twentieth century has witnessed one of the most profound transformations in the history of the mass media in Indonesia. This, in turn, may open the way for a new era in the country's political history. We do not refer to the widely-discussed and often over-estimated social change brought about by information technology in general and the Internet more specifically. While Indonesia is not immune to some of the symptoms of the Internet fever, another series of developments has taken place in the mediascape, one which has been much less noted by observers inside and especially outside the country. We refer to the social tensions that have accompanied the recent rapid industrialization of the mass media.

This chapter examines a major transition that the Indonesian mass media has been undergoing under the New Order regime (1966–98) and beyond. Crudely, the media's transition can be described as one from personifying an idealist force of “truth-seeker” that is subjected to constant state repression, to an increasingly autonomous, professionally managed, and essentially self-serving industrial empire. However, our main interest is not in that broad and too familiar phenomenon. Like all transitions, the case at hand is full of contradictory elements, movements and tendencies. The ensuing discussion will describe and analyse the various details of tensions among old and new forces that constitute the case in its specific contexts. The main agent of change in the process is neither the abstract state apparatus, nor any specific state agents, nor crusading journalists either. It is the whole network of industrial capitalism at global, national and local levels that has been responsible for the transformation of the media as an institution, as well as its relations with other institutions, including the state.

For many decades the relation between the state and the institution of mass media in Indonesia, as in most of its neighbouring countries, has been one full of suspicion and tensions. The state has both sponsored and controlled media developments as part of the consolidation of nation–state building and modernization. Today, the Indonesian state has lost nearly all of its paternalistic control of the mass media. And, comparable to situations in neighbouring Thailand and the Philippines, state officials and institutions have been regular targets of criticism and derision by the press.