EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The emphasis on cultural connectivity in China’s growing presence and involvement in Southeast Asia highlights the importance China places on people-to-people exchanges as part of its global engagement strategy.

• The remarkable ascension of China over the recent decades has precipitated a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of a “discourse war” with Western powers, as expressed in the latter’s “China threat” narrative.

• In response to such challenges, China has made substantial investments in cultural diplomacy, to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives.

• This article examines Chinese cultural diplomacy in the realm of entertainment, specifically “The Melody of Spring: Transnational Spring Festival Gala” hosted in Nanning, Guangxi, and disseminated globally each Chinese New Year.

• Against the legacy of China-Indonesia bilateral relations as well as Indonesia’s treatment of its Chinese minority, this study explores China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power in contemporary Indonesia.

• Through the case study of the “Transnational Spring Festival Gala”, this article posits that China’s cultural dissemination as an instrument of soft power has yielded little influence on the Indonesian public and has limited impact on the formation of a transnational imagined community.

INTRODUCTIONAn energy transition is underway in Southeast Asia. This process is dependent on an uninterrupted supply of the minerals and metals that are essential to produce low-carbon technologies. These raw materials are termed ‘critical minerals’ (CMs), owing to three broad features: their necessity as inputs in low-carbon technology, the lack of viable substitutes, and significant supply constraints. The demand for CMs such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, rare earth elements (REEs), copper, and silicon3 is expected to increase exponentially in the coming decades. To meet the global net zero target by 2050, mineral inputs will need to increase sixfold by 2040, compared to current levels. According to scenarios developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the demand for minerals used in electric vehicles (EVs) will increase thirty times compared to current levels, while mineral requirements for low-carbon energy generation will triple by 2040.

The development of CMs is impeded by several supply constraints. Currently, a handful of countries dominate the CMs market, with China playing an outsized role in both the upstream and downstream parts of the supply chain. For example, China currently extracts 65 per cent and processes 85 per cent of the world's REEs. The largest amount of copper, nickel and cobalt are extracted in Chile, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), respectively. Yet, as shown in Figure 1, China dominates the processing of all three minerals, as well as alumina and lithium.

There is growing academic and policy consensus on the need to develop sustainable and reliable supply chains for CMs, which is of great relevance to Southeast Asia. On the one hand, the region can become a major supplier of critical minerals, due to the existence of substantial deposits of bauxite, nickel, tin, REEs, cobalt, manganese and graphite. On the other hand, Southeast Asia is likely to become a significant consumer of critical minerals, owing to the region’s growing solar photovoltaic (PV) and electric vehicle industries. Malaysia and Vietnam are the world’s second and third-largest solar PV manufacturers and accounted for one-fifth of global shipments in 2020.9 Thailand has become the region’s leading producer of EVs, while the Philippines and Indonesia have undertaken initial steps to develop integrated battery and EV supply chains.10

INTRODUCTION

The cultural impact of China's growing presence and involvement in the region has generated significant discussion. Beijing's official narratives, particularly in the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have consistently emphasized not only physical connectivity but also cultural exchanges through people-to-people interactions (Kuah 2019). This highlights the importance China places on the deepening of cultural ties as part of its global engagement strategy. This is further demonstrated in China's recent launch of the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which purportedly features an alternative to Western modernization (Hoon and Chan 2023).

President Xi Jinping's vision of creating a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” is designed to closely intertwine with China's soft power approach, wherein cultural exchanges with partner nations and people-to-people connections play a pivotal role. The emphasis on human and cultural exchanges also extends to the discourse presented by both the Indonesian and Chinese governments when managing their bilateral relations. The overarching strategy is encapsulated in the phrase proposed by Xi Jinping to “tell China's story well” (讲好中国故事).

However, the remarkable ascension of China in recent decades has also engendered a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of the “discourse war” with Western powers (Shambaugh 2015). This frequently finds expression under the aegis of the “China threat” narrative (Pradt 2016). In response to this conundrum, China has invested substantially in cultural diplomacy and sought to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives (Chen, Colapindo, and Luo 2012).

Operating as an instrument of international relations, soft power conveys a modality of influence characterized by subtlety and allure, in contradistinction to coercion (Nye 1990). In tandem with material assistance and the China model of development paradigms, China's soft power strategy encompasses multifaceted endeavours. These include the establishment of the much-debated Confucius Institutes (CI) across the globe, the endowment of international academic exchange programmes, the instigation of international outreach endeavours and the expansion of its premier state television broadcaster, CCTV, across diverse linguistic contexts worldwide (Rawnsley 2012).

Concurrently, China's cultural diplomacy initiatives extend into the realm of entertainment as well. In the past two decades, the Chinese state has authorized the creation of patriotic and nationalistic television series, singing competitions and variety shows that coalesce artists from the broader cultural tapestry of China, spanning Taiwan, Hong Kong and the global Chinese diaspora.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The clean energy transition momentum is gathering pace globally, and in Southeast Asia as well. The transition is dependent on an uninterrupted supply of critical minerals and metals that are essential for the production of low-carbon technologies.

• The supply of critical minerals is impeded by several constraints. First is the dominance of a handful of countries in both the upstream and downstream parts of the supply chain. Second is the current geopolitical race to secure supplies leading to greater protectionist behaviours, exhibited through export bans and trade impediments.

• This study focuses on four selected critical minerals which are important to the region. Two criteria are used in determining a mineral having high significance: (1) There are significant deposits of it which can be tapped on to bolster Southeast Asia’s strategic position in the supply chains; and (2) It is an essential input in industries and sectors of importance in Southeast Asia. The four critical minerals examined in this study are: copper, nickel, bauxite (alumina), and rare earth elements (REEs).

• The study makes three recommendations to enhance ASEAN’s role in the critical minerals supply chains. The first addresses the insufficiency of investments in early-stage exploration and exploitation of critical minerals and, in the process, calls for an embracing of circular economy principles. The second appeals for investments at all stages, including in technology to tap into downstream activities beyond refining and purification, and in the manufacturing of component parts such as battery cell storage and permanent magnets. The third calls for improvements in sustainability management in the mining sector, which is generally extremely environmentally and socially damaging to communities.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

As explained in the introduction to this volume, political parties play an important role in shaping the demand for women's representation and participation in politics, while gendered cultural values and norms often influence whether women opt to participate in politics. In this chapter, we explore the ways that attitudes and experiences correlate with men and women's sense of political efficacy and their attitudes towards women's participation in politics in Myanmar as of 2019—i.e., before the 2021 coup. Though the 2015 election resulted in a higher proportion of female members of parliament (MPs) being elected (10 per cent) than at any other previous time in the country's history, women's parliamentary representation remained very low compared to other countries in the region and globally (Gender Equality Network 2017, pp. 10–11). To better understand the sources of women's political underrepresentation in Myanmar, we examine the experiences and attitudes that affect political participation through a nationwide survey conducted between September and December 2019. As detailed in Chapter One, our survey asked a total of 2,889 respondents in four states/ regions that cover a range of Myanmar's geographic and demographic characteristics (Mon, Mandalay, Ayeyarwady, and southern Shan) to reflect on their experiences and attitudes about politics and women's participation in politics.

We begin by analysing men and women's attitudes towards gender equality and gender roles. We find that men and women did not differ much in their overall opinions about gender roles in society. However, when we examine potential reasons why men and women held certain opinions about gender equality, we find that age, political knowledge, satisfaction with democracy, and early life experiences, such as witnessing violence against their mother, have different associations with expressions of support for gender equality among men compared to women.

Then, we turn to three attitudes related to women's participation in politics. First, we examine internal political efficacy, which refers to whether someone feels they are able to participate in politics, which is an important determinant of whether they engage in political behaviour, such as voting, contacting a government official, or running for political office (Finkel 1985). If women feel less politically capable of participating in politics than men, they also will be less likely to engage in politics. We find that men in Myanmar were more likely to express political self-efficacy than women, in general.

Ethnic parties make up a significant portion of the electoral landscape in Myanmar politics. In fact, 48 per cent of the political parties that competed in the 1990 general election were ethnic parties, 62 per cent in 2010, 60 per cent in 2015, and 59 per cent in 2020. Between 1990 and 2020, the proportion of female candidates in Myanmar elections also increased. Are these two trends linked? Is there something distinctive about ethnic parties as a type, and do they more effectively facilitate women's political representation than their catch-all counterparts?

Existing literature highlights the important role of political parties in explaining varying levels of women's representation around the world (Caul 1999; Pitre 2003). Parties play a critical role in recruiting and selecting candidates, thereby contributing to the gender makeup of legislatures and political bodies (Tan et al. 2020). As we discuss in greater detail below, existing literature finds mixed results regarding the effect of ethnic parties. Broad studies on women's representation have often concluded that electoral rules and circumstances that benefit women can also be applied to other marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities (Matland and Taylor 1997; Caul 1999). Yet, others find a potential for competition between different under-represented identities (Lien et al. 2007), or express fears over patriarchal attitudes among specific ethnic groups that would disadvantage women candidates (Okin 1999).

Ethnic parties might therefore be less likely than catch-all parties to pay attention to gender inequalities (Goetz 1998; Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar 2010). However, ethnic parties seem to perform differently under different electoral rules. Ethnic parties in single-member districts (SMD), where voters elect a single candidate to represent the constituency by plurality or majority vote, have been found to include more women than their catch-all counterparts. However, ethnic parties appear to exclude women—that is, do not nominate female candidates—at an even higher rate in proportional representation (PR) systems, where parties secure seats in larger constituencies per the share of the popular vote they or their candidates win, without gender quotas (Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar 2010). This is perhaps because the nomination and candidate selection decisions in PR systems are more heavily concentrated among the party elite and provide more opportunity for patriarchal attitudes to dominate (ibid.).

Yet, existing literature also suggests a moderating effect of party institutionalization, rather than just electoral rules.

Section (3) Political and Social Attitudes

1. Please tell me how you feel about the following statements. Would you say you (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) somewhat disagree, or (4) strongly disagree? (7) *Do not understand the question, (8) *Can't choose, (9) *Decline to answer

1) In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group's collective interest.

2) I think I have the ability to participate in politics.

3) When a mother-in-law and daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother.

4) If one could have only one child, it is more preferable to have a boy than a girl.

5) In politics, women should not be involved as much as men.

6) If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.

7) I would support my daughter to join parties and participate in politics if she so wished.

8) When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

2. I prefer to have neighbours who are of the same religion than to have neighbours who are from a different religion.

1) Strongly agree

2) Agree

3) Neither agree nor disagree

4) Disagree

5) Strongly disagree

6) Refuse to answer

Section (4) Political Knowledge and Attitudes

1. I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Is it (1) a great deal of trust, (2) quite a lot of trust, (3) not very much trust, (4) none at all? [For the enumerator: Mark 97 as “No answer/Don't know” and 98 as “Refuse to answer”]

1) The president

2) State/Region government

3) Political parties (not any specific party)

4) National Parliament

5) Civil service

6) The military

7) The police

8) Ward/Village/Tract Administrator

9) Health care administration

10) Education professionals (teachers, etc.)

2. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group (1) completely, (2) somewhat, (3) not very much, (4) not at all? [For the enumerator: Mark 97 as “No answer/Don't know” and 98 as “Refuse to answer”]

1) Your neighborhood

2) People of another religion

3) People of another nationality

The coup that overturned Myanmar's elected government in early 2021 clearly upended the roadmap to democracy the country had been following, however haltingly, for over a decade. As of this writing, Myanmar's political future is uncertain; the military (called the Tatmadaw) has shown no sign of relenting in its assault on the prior elected government and the broad resistance the coup triggered. One might question the utility of exploring the status quo ante in light of the desperate situation now. We contend that understanding how, and how well, aspects of democracy worked during Myanmar's ill-fated experiment is, in fact, essential. Not only might we still hope for restoration of civilian, elected government, under the National Unity Government (NUG) currently contesting the military junta or otherwise, but the underlying sociopolitical patterns evident in the recent past, reflecting societal attitudes and priorities, remain germane. Especially salient in this vein are attitudes towards women's leadership: while neither women nor men can currently seek or hold elected office, institutional features alone were hardly the only arbiters of women's political standing when they could do so.

This book investigates the extent to which men and women have faced different opportunities and challenges in securing election, especially as members of parliament (MPs), but also at subnational tiers, in Myanmar, and why. For instance, have the relevant hurdles been more at the local or national level, in society or in political parties, and structured largely by gender or more by class or other attributes? Understanding these patterns is essential to knowing the extent to which a return to civilian government will likely empower women, or what attitudinal changes, beyond structural ones, would be necessary. Moreover, this investigation allows us to consider Myanmar in comparative context, to see how sociopolitical attitudes and constraints here align with those elsewhere in the region, coup aside.

To answer these questions, we set out to examine women's political representation and opportunities to participate in party politics in Myanmar. Our findings are based on a three-year (2017–20) project funded by the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) on “Engendering Political Recruitment and Participation at the Party, Local and National Level in Myanmar”.

Party Recruitment, Candidate Selection and Attitudes Towards Political Leadership (Gatekeepers)

Personal Political Experiences

1. Please describe your occupational/educational background (Icebreaking question).

2. Did you have any experience participating in politics or public life before joining party?

3. What were your main motivations for becoming involved in politics/ party?

4. Has anyone else in your family been involved in politics? If so, please give details.

5. How many years have you been an active member of ______________ party? (ask only if you cannot get the information publicly)

6. Has your participation in politics resulted in any difficulties or improvements in your home life?

7. Did you face any harassment or intimidation being a party gatekeeper? (Note to interviewer: this can be in the form of online, social media, verbal harassment, physical threats, attacks or exclusion from places to campaign)

Intra Party Rules and Candidate Selection Procedures

8. Please tell me how people in your party get chosen to be members of central committee (CC) or central executive committee (CEC)?

9. Different levels of candidate selection:

a. Did your Central Committee play an important role in selecting candidates?

b. Did your Township Chairman play an important role in selecting candidates?

c. Were there other individuals who played a key role in the candidate selection process? (please identify gender)

10. Experience in Party Positions:

a. Have you held any position within your party? (e.g. Central committee, township committee, Youth wing, Women's wing)

b. If so, how did you get chosen for that position?

11. How do people in your party get chosen to become members of the party's township committee? (prompt to interviewer: please record separately the process for: i) chairperson, ii) secretary, and iii) other positions)

12. Can you explain more of your party's rules, criteria and procedures in selecting candidates for the last general election? (Please check if there is an internal election process, check if ordinary party members have a chance to be nominated as candidates). Can you describe the process in more detail?

13. Can the ordinary party members decide who the party nominates as a candidate for a general election?

14. If you could change the rules and procedures used by your party for candidate selection, what would you change?

Violence is a constant factor influencing Myanmar politics. The return to repressive, military rule in 2021 demonstrates how relevant violence is—and probably always was—for understanding political participation in Myanmar. This chapter investigates the political and gendered roles that violence plays, and the interlinkages between violence taking place in the public and private spheres. Whether violence is carried out by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) during an armed conflict or by an intimate partner against another, it follows gendered patterns and contributes to a gendered culture of violence. The relevance of the feminist slogan “the personal is political” is striking in the many examples of how this culture of violence affects the formal political process in gendered ways. This chapter brings together findings from previous parts of the book to shed light on how party politics and political candidates are affected by and experience gendered public attitudes and how a persistent culture of violence—public manifestations of militarization as well as tolerance of domestic violence—shapes gendered politics, even in a period of relative liberalization.

The chapter will demonstrate why and how the culture of violence in general, and domestic violence in particular, is crucial in shedding light on the opportunities and hurdles for “putting women up” in precoup Myanmar. It draws on the findings about violence that emerged from the various data collection efforts of the project as well as on sources external to the project. In doing so, it recognizes that violence is complex and continuous. It operates along a continuum that stretches from armed conflict to legacies that remain in peacetime (Cockburn 2004). The chapter also shows how violence that takes psychological forms, such as harassment and intimidation, and that takes place in the private sphere, such as domestic abuse, also has political and gendered repercussions (Bjarnegård 2018). The more democratic and peaceful period that Myanmar experienced around the elections of 2015 is here seen and analysed in light of the fact that it was both preceded and succeeded by more violent and repressive forms of governance. For a while, the introduction of democratic elections in Myanmar seemed to constitute an important step towards the peaceful resolution of conflict in the violence-ridden country, but political actors nevertheless operated with political violence in fresh memory and the period was not itself free of political violence.