The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of the previous decade, the term “Trump Derangement Syndrome” (TDS) became part of common parlance in American opinion pages. For supporters of Donald Trump, the term refers to a tendency by progressive elites and media organizations to view everything the President does as destructive to American leadership and institutions because these elites and organizations have never come to terms with the victory of Donald Trump over Hilary Clinton in the 2017 presidential elections. For detractors of the President, TDS represents an outrageous coinage by Trump's supporters to deflect what are legitimate and serious charges against the President's exercise of his powers.

The temptation to treat the Trump's administration's policies as being irretrievably tied to the character and whims of America's historically most unconventional commander-in-chief is strong, the embedded implication being that a different President in the White House will lead to a very different suite of external policies.

However, allowing TDS to define what American approaches to regional policy might look like over the next four years—with or in the absence of a change of administration—would be a mistake. To be sure, every President has their own idiosyncrasies, the current one more than others, while every administration has their own approach. But overemphasis on the uniqueness of Trump is the wrong place to begin. Some aspects of his presidency might well be an aberration but many more are not, either because the current administration represents an evolution or synthesis in pre-existing thinking or else because Trump has deeply changed the policy dial on many issues. Getting the balance of factors and mindsets right is crucial when it comes to understanding the future of frameworks such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and the grouping of the United States, Japan, India and Australia known as the Quad.

This article does not attempt to predict specific policies that a secondterm Trump administration or a first-term Democrat one will pursue. Specific policies are mostly shaped by empirical events and by the responses of senior individuals in the administration. Especially in the case of a possible Democrat White House, it is impossible to know these factors ahead of time.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Party mergers are a new development in Myanmar politics. Given that such mergers often assist the consolidation of new democratic regimes, some broader system-wide effects may also occur. Myanmar's ethnic parties consistently choose merger strategies over other forms of pre-electoral coalition. This highlights a transition from a focus on questions of authoritarianism and democracy to one on the creation of a federal system of government with a stronger cleavage between competing Bamar and ethnic nationalisms.

• • Despite cooperation among political parties outside the electoral process, pre-electoral coalitions such as constituency-sharing or campaigning for allies have generally not been successful. Five of the six mergers among ethnic parties attempted prior to the 2015 general election failed. However, between 2017 and 2019, five mergers involving parties representing the Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin or Karen, and Mon ethnicities, achieved success.

• • The successful mergers were motivated not only by desires for electoral success in 2020 but also by shared federal aims, which involve ethnic parties in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin or Karen, and Mon states forming a strong local party in their respective regions to strive for ethnic equality and self-determination.

• • The mergers are between parties with markedly different platforms and their success is conditioned by their preferences for particular kinds of federalism. Mergers cannot guarantee electoral success. And other pre-electoral coalitions, such as avoiding competition for the same constituencies, also proved successful in the 2018 by-elections. But what mergers can uniquely do is respond to public demand for parties to unite and make the resulting party stronger in terms of resources and public support.

• • In general, mergers can reduce system fragmentation, avoid vote wastage and lead to the formation of stable parties. Ethnic party mergers also simplify party labels for voters and make it easier for them to vote on the basis of ethnic preferences. In addition, mergers can increase public interest and political participation among members of ethnic communities.

• • Three common factors behind the five successful mergers are previous electoral losses, public pressure and shared federal aims. The durability of these mergers depends on continuous party building, negotiations and equality among party members. Meanwhile, a greater number of new parties will form and continue to exist under the multi-party democracy principle granted in Myanmar's 2008 Constitution.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia's 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, when Parti Pribumi BERSATU Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition.

• • The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition's time in power.

• • PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government.

• • Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister.

• • BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15.

• • This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party's decision to leave PH.

• • Following Mahathir's sudden resignation on 24 February 2020, BERSATU immediately announced their departure from PH. This led to a series of events that culminated in the collapse of PH and the formation a Perikatan Nasional government led by the three biggest Malay parties, UMNO, BERSATU and PAS.

• • The whole episode shows that any coalition or political parties that wish to govern Malaysia must not ignore sentiments among the Malays, especially those in rural areas.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• This article traces China's foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping's doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989–91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines.

• From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China's foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng's Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its “No’s”, while Xi Jinping's Xin Xing is marked by its “New’s”. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China's foreign policy.

• Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi's “new” narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of “non-interference” or “no hegemony”, are still alive, albeit in a different form.

• This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China's Ambition to be a “great country” and a “non-hegemon” in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as “unprecedented major changes in a century” (Da Bian Ju).

• As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge.

• While China's foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious “One Belt and One Road” strategy, for instance, was replaced by the “Belt and Road Initiative”; “constructive intervention” was replaced by “constructive role”; and “common destiny” was replaced by “shared future”. Looking ahead, China's foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • China's influence over economic and political affairs in Cambodia is undisputed. It is the biggest investor in Cambodia, adding nearly US$5.3 billion between 2013 and 2017, especially into real estate development, the garment industry and the tourism sector.

• • For Phnom Penh's SMEs, “new” Chinese migrants are an increasingly important clientele, and raw materials, machinery, consumer goods and capital from Greater China have been vital resources. At the same time, they face competition from entrepreneurs from China entering the Cambodian market.

• • For Cambodia's elite entrepreneurs, known as oknha, China is an export destination for Cambodian timber and cash crops, and “new” Chinese investments provide business opportunities in the form of construction contracts and joint ventures in real estate and tourism development, industrial parks or the energy sector.

• • Recent Chinese investments and migrants have reinforced Cambodia's established politico-economic order, which is characterized by ethnic Chinese economic dominance as well as a divide between the business-state elite and the general population.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Indonesia in 2014 re-energized violent extremism in Indonesia. As a result of effective counterterrorism policing, however, IS networks have been decimated and the structure of jihadism in Indonesia has shifted from organizations to autonomous networks and cells, increasingly organized via the Internet.

• • Although support for violent extremism in Indonesia remains marginal, cells of IS followers maintain a low-level capacity to conduct lethal attacks against civilian and government targets.

• • Most IS operations in Indonesia are sporadic and low-level attacks against the Indonesian police. Religious minorities have also been high-profile targets, as in the Surabaya church suicide bombings of 13 May 2018. There are some indications, however, of militants’ renewed interest in attacking foreign targets, such as tourists on the resort island of Bali.

• • IS returnees from the Middle East have begun to play a role in recent attacks. The presence of this population in Indonesia raises the risk of militant capabilities being enhanced above their current relatively low level. Most returnees are women and children, and the increasing involvement of this cohort in IS attacks promises to complicate counterterrorism operations. The rise of pro-IS charities in Indonesia, poised to service returnees and reintegrate them into Indonesia's jihadist community, further exacerbates this problem.

• • The overall threat of terrorism to the Indonesian state and to the stability of the Joko Widodo administration remains low. Surprise attacks by unknown cells, however, have the potential to shock the Indonesian political system, provoking government repression of Islamists and exacerbating political polarization and community tensions.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Hun Sen's state visit to Beijing in 1996, ties between Cambodia and China—or more accurately, between Hun Sen's ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—have only grown stronger. The state visit was a watershed moment. The Chinese had supported the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–78), while Hun Sen came to power under the auspices of China's rival, the Vietnamese, who had pushed the Khmer Rouge forces towards the Thai border, and founded the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (1979–89). The 1996 state visit not only signalled a rapprochement between China and Cambodia, but also China's confidence that Hun Sen was Cambodia's strongman in the making. The Chinese had invited Hun Sen but not Prince Rannaridh, whose Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) had formed an unstable coalition government with the CPP after the 1993 elections organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Perhaps encouraged by China's backing, Hun Sen ousted Rannaridh in a coup de force in 1997. In June 2016, roughly two decades after Hun Sen's state visit and around US$3 billion in Chinese loans and grants later (Veasna 2016), warm ties were once again reaffirmed. Reportedly, as it had done in 2012, Cambodia demanded that ASEAN tone down its statement on China's disputed claim over the South China Sea, and a few days later China pledged another US$600 million in loans and grants (Hutt 2016a).

Political interdependencies have emerged alongside the influx of Chinese investments, businesses and economic migrants since the 1990s. Cambodia's infrastructural development, including the construction of bridges, roads and hydropower dams, is largely undertaken by Chinese state-owned companies and financed by Chinese banks (Sullivan 2011). The majority of Cambodia's garment factories, which account for over three-quarters of total exports, are owned and managed by Chinese from “Greater China” (i.e., mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) (Ear 2016). China is the biggest investor in Cambodia, adding nearly US$5.3 billion between 2013 and 2017 (Hin 2019), and Chinese firms currently hold over forty Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) allocated for tourism development or the cultivation of crops such as rubber, sugar and cassava (LICADHO 2019).

INTRODUCTION

Business groups and governments throughout Southeast Asia have a long history of mutual interaction, joint service delivery and involvement in economic policy. In Malaysia, this has largely developed during several decades of continuous rule by the same governing coalition, who held office from independence in 1957 until May 2018.

When government is stable and long-lasting, business groups, public servants and ministers develop a familiarity and knowledge of each other, and of their respective goals and views. However, when administrations change, these relationships are also up-ended and the relationship can become much more challenging.

What impact did the installation of a new government have on business associations in the country? How were business groups able to adapt and respond to the change? What lessons can be learnt from this when dealing with future changes of government? And how can business associations ensure they maintain their role as effective policy advocates going forward?

This paper details the views of a diverse range of Malaysian association leaders to these questions, based on a series of personal interviews held between February to April 2020. It begins with some background on the key characteristics and current status of associations in Malaysia today. A detailed discussion of the change in government, along with other observations and reflections from business chamber office bearers, is then provided. Finally, the report concludes with some suggestions from interviewees for the future enhancement of association advocacy when dealing with future governments.

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

Business associations are a well-established feature of all modern economies, and play an important role in business development, management, trade, entrepreneurship, skills training, public policy, and politics. Also, sometimes referred to as “industry associations”, “chambers of commerce”, and “professional associations”, there are over a hundred of these organizations in Malaysia today, representing at least 600,000 firms across the country.

The functions of business associations typically include lobbying and advocacy; workplace relations and human resources assistance to employers; the provision of training, skills development and education to members; organizing networking and social events; information collection, knowledge sharing and policy development; conducting trade missions; and acting as a public voice on behalf of business to politicians, public servants, ministers, the media and other interested external parties.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Vietnam-US relations have kept strengthening since bilateral normalization in 1995, including in the defence and strategic domains. This has turned the two countries into increasingly important security partners for each other.

• • The shared perception of the China threat, especially in the South China Sea, provided the strongest momentum towards bilateral strategic rapprochement in recent years despite the strategic uncertainties generated by the Trump administration. Such strategic dynamics also shaped Vietnam's supportive view of the US-led regional and global orders.

• • In the short to medium term, challenges for bilateral relations include the further improvement of mutual trust and the building up of Vietnam's capacity to participate in more substantive defence cooperation initiatives with the United States. In the long run, how to balance its strengthening ties with Washington and the troubling yet important relationship with Beijing remains a challenge for Hanoi.

• • Vietnam's support for the US-led rules-based international order should remain persistent, but will vary depending on the shifting dynamics in Vietnam's relations with China as well as Sino-US strategic competition.