The COVID-19 pandemic is having serious and disproportionate effects on nationals abroad and their families globally. Many states have adopted positive measures including temporarily suspending forced returns as well providing visa and work permit extensions, temporary residence, or other forms of regular status to ensure that migrants are accounted for in national responses to the pandemic. Nevertheless, the human rights of nationals abroad and nationals with foreign family members have faced significant challenges. Some states have fully or partially closed entry to all of their own nationals and their foreign family members, in violation of nationals’ right to return and their right of family unification. Other states’ nationals abroad have been unable to enjoy the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health. Many have also encountered the burdens of hate speech in both their home states and the states in which they live, the effect of which has been to undermine freedom of opinion and expression and the right to equality and non-discrimination. This essay identifies and explains these threats to human rights in the era of COVID-19. The essay encourages states to recommit to rights protection.

The international law of mobility has by and large been focused on the question of immigration. Its emphasis has therefore been on what I will call, for convenience's sake, the host state. It is there that some of the most intense dilemmas around the question of mobility have arisen in a context of populism, xenophobia, and racism. The state of nationality is not invisible in that context, but this has not typically been the primary variable in trying to understand and assess the normative challenges of global mobility. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has refocused attention on distinct patterns of mobility, particularly return mobility, of nationals to their country of origin as well as limitations on leaving that country in the first place. The state of nationality has increasingly been asked to mediate demands for security and public health that are extra-territorial and that implicate its nationals in sometimes far-flung locations. I argue that the pandemic is a further opportunity to shift attention onto the state of nationality as a locus of key decisions concerning transnational mobility and thus to rebalance our sense of what goes into the global “mobility equation.”

COVID-19 has had a profound impact on migrants and refugees the world over. Their pre-existing vulnerabilities were immediately exacerbated as national health systems were often overwhelmed and many disease control measures were either inaccessible to them or had disproportionate socio-economic effects. But migrants and refugees have also been framed as prima facie causes for the transboundary spread of the virus, and public health exception and derogation clauses in both national and international refugee and human rights instruments have been used to block their entry, suspend asylum processing, or trigger deportations. Taking the example of Brazil as a point of departure, the present contribution argues that (for at least some states) the appearance of the virus seems to have served as a legal carte blanche for fundamentally reconfiguring or closing down border regimes. More specifically, we argue that the strategic mainstreaming of global health regulations into border regimes points to the emergence of a “pandemic law” that encroaches upon already fragile transnational legal regime complexes, with the potential to upend or hollow out existing frameworks for migrant and refugee protection.

As the COVID-19 crisis developed, the International Labor Organization estimated that 4.7 percent of the global labor pool, comprising 164 million people, were migrant workers who were living and working outside their home country. While some were laid off and sent home for the lockdown, others continued working. These others were migrants performing crucial jobs in the front line of the crisis. They help to produce our food, pack our orders, and build or clean our houses, among other tasks. Many COVID-19 infections appear to be labor-related, with many of the crucial sectors exhibiting an extra-high risk of virus transmission. Migrant workers on the frontline can be low-waged, hold a temporary job, lack knowledge of their legal position and the local language, and have a limited social network and high dependency on others—such as recruiters or temporary employment agencies—for work and housing. This essay addresses these migrant vulnerabilities in the labor market and identifies measures that might simultaneously curb the vulnerabilities and account for industrial needs for labor in essential sectors. We argue that the vulnerability of migrant laborers is structural; the COVID-19 crisis has put a magnifying glass on a preexisting vulnerability and clarified the need for solutions.

Immediately after the first signs of COVID-19 in West Africa in March-April 2020, twelve countries officially closed their borders. Other countries, such as Benin, Ivory Coast and Senegal, adopted a more pragmatic approach by merely limiting to essential crossings any arrivals or departures over land, and by adopting humanitarian corridors. Many of these measures are based on Article 4 of the 1979 Dakar Protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Article 91 of the amended Treaty of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known under its French acronym UEMOA), which authorize states to limit the freedom of movement and residence for reasons of public order, public security, or public health. The measures, however, have heavily impacted the legal regime of free movement of persons throughout the ECOWAS area. In the following analysis, I will show that the measures have (1) contributed to the disintegration of the legal regime of free movement of persons in ECOWAS and (2) instrumentalized COVID-19 for political ends in ways that are counterproductive for the region.

The European Union's external border regime is a manifestation of continuing imperialism. It reinforces particular imaginaries of Europe's wealth as somehow innate (rather than plundered and extorted) and of Europeanness itself as whiteness—euphemistically packaged as a “European Way of Life” to be protected. This exposes international law's structural limitations—if not designs—as bound up with racial borders in the global context. In the wake of COVID-19 and with a climate apocalypse already underway, these realities need to be urgently ruptured and reimagined.

One measure of how and whether the COVID-19 pandemic reshapes the emerging field of international migration law will be the extent to which transnational civil society and activist movements can counteract the intensification of state border controls that the pandemic has triggered. Before the pandemic, transnational efforts to establish a new normative framework for migration seemed to be accelerating. These efforts included new, if non-binding, global compacts on refugees and migration, and new, if modest, efforts at facilitating global cooperation, alongside innovative approaches to scholarly engagement. Such developments arguably contributed to an emerging framework for protecting migrants under international law. Has the pandemic defeated this potential? State responses to the pandemic have eschewed multilateralism, brought migration to a near standstill, and ignored well-established human rights obligations. Moreover, states are poised to deploy a range of new border management technologies and even more assertively manage migration in the name of “health proofing” borders. Yet at the same time, some progressive state practices have emerged alongside a call from the UN Secretary-General to “reimagine human mobility for the benefit of all.” In this essay, we chart some areas of potentially progressive expansion beyond the status quo, noting not only the substance but also the process by which these norms are emerging.