INTRODUCTION

It is not often that a country changes the geographic definition of its primary strategic environment. But that is precisely what Australia has done in recent years by embracing the concept of the Indo-Pacific.

Below is a personal perspective on what lies behind this change from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific and the key strategic challenge facing the Indo-Pacific: how to reach a new strategic equilibrium in the region as U.S. primacy is challenged by a China with ambitions to become the predominant power in the region.

The Asia-Pacific, with Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia at its strategic centre, has been the conceptual foundation of Australian strategic thinking for most of the post-World War II period. It was seen as a coherent strategic system bringing in the major powers and also reflecting a long period of trade and investment integration, best captured by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Australia saw this economic integration as giving the Asia-Pacific added coherence. The Asia-Pacific construct provided a framework for thinking about the management of major power relationships especially the vital U.S.–China relationship. It was Australia's frame of reference for charting the strategic impact of shifting economic weight, most notably the extraordinary expansion of the Chinese economy.

In more recent years, however, Australia has moved from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific to describe the crucible of its strategic environment. And a large part of that shift is driven by how we see India.

WHAT IS THE INDO-PACIFIC?

The concept of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic system is very much a work in progress. It is both an act of imagination and a recognition of an emerging structural shift in our strategic environment.

At its heart, the Indo-Pacific reflects two propositions. First, that the maritime environment is likely to be the primary focus of strategic planning and strategic competition over the next several decades. Secondly, that India's strategic focus will over this period shift well beyond India's immediate neighbourhood and embed India in the strategic dynamics of the broader region in a way it has not in the post-war period.

These two propositions do not, in themselves, create a coherent Indo-Pacific strategic system.