Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-hfldf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-03T08:38:15.060Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Stability and Security in the Region after ANZUK (1975)

from THE REGION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 May 2019

Get access

Summary

Implicit in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of 16 April 1971 is an assessment, generally agreed upon by the participating states, of the contemporary situation in Southeast Asia. Explicit in ANZUK, established in November 1971, is the action which Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom agreed at the time was required in the circumstances by their national interests, and which was acceptable to Malaysia and Singapore, the other two partners. But in the changed circumstances of 1974 their assessments of the regional situation have diverged, and priorities in the pursuit of national interests have been changed by political choices and economic pressures. ANZUK (an integrated command of the three services set up by Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom independently of the FPDA on the grounds of efficiency and economy), a modus operandi of the FPDA, was neither its purpose nor its prescription. With the end of the process of dismantling ANZUK on 1 January 1975, the FPDA remains intact as a convention of consultation on what is still agreed to be an area of common concern, though not necessarily of common diagnosis in description, or common direction of action. The strategic baby has not been thrown out with the tactical or political bath-water. Whether it will be more or less effective as a pentagonal pattern of power without ANZUK can only be assessed in the light of the new circumstances as reflected in the five facets of the national interests of the members.

Changed Circumstances

What were the circumstances out of which grew both the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the ANZUK Force? The precipitating issue was the announcement by the British in 1968 of the accelerated and specific timetable of their withdrawal from their base in Singapore, and from their commitments under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. The robust image of Mountbatten of SEAC (Southeast Asia Command) in 1945 and of Mountbatten of India in 1947 had faded in the eyes of the world and in the esteem of the British people. Dilatory, if not dilettante, strategic thinking was caught up by the urgencies of political party change and economic stringency which set the background and the pace of the Labour Government's announcement in 1968 of complete British withdrawal before the end of 1971, thus setting the terminal date by which alternative arrangements were required to be made.

Type
Chapter
Information
Turning Points and Transitions
Selections from Southeast Asian Affairs 1974-2018
, pp. 9 - 19
Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
Print publication year: 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×