Since the beginning of exploration in the South China Sea, the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) has controlled the Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands), Zhongsha (Macclesfield Bank), Nansha (Spratly Islands) and Dongsha (Pratas Islands). Inherited from recorded history, the ROC has undeniably claimed sovereignty over the large part of the South China Sea within a “U-shaped line” for many decades. Over the last few decades or so, although the ROC's claim has not changed at all, its ambiguous political status in the international community weakens its position in the disputes of the South China Sea (SCS). As a result, diplomatic setbacks in the international community have discouraged the government in Taipei from any new efforts to activate its South China Sea policy. The typical focus of the political agenda in Taipei has been very much on an inward-looking approach of democratization. Political inability and a lack of political will to cope with the challenges in the SCS seem inevitable for Taipei.

For political reasons Taiwan has over the last decades been neglected in the process of negotiating the code of conduct in the South China Sea. Taiwan remains the only claimant to not have diplomatic relations with any country in the region. Further, political confrontation in the Taiwan Strait continues to be critical to Taiwan's survival. As a result, not only have neighbouring countries been very cautious of the Chinese attitude in dealing with Taiwan, but Taiwan has also contradicted itself on its position in the SCS.

When cross-strait relations were antagonistic, Taiwan stood almost no chance to engage in any discussion of international affairs on the official level in the region. For decades hostility was the nature of the cross-strait relationship. Nevertheless, President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in May 2008 and has since shifted the negative course in the relationship with Mainland China. Up to the end of 2010, fifteen formal agreements were signed to facilitate mutual cooperation across the Taiwan Strait. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) has proven to have made the most important progress made so far, as it has led to broader institutional cooperation. It has opened new opportunities and demands for China and Taiwan to cooperate in the context of the South China Sea. How has Taiwan extended efforts to cooperate with China in SCS affairs? Are there internal or external political obstacles to cross-strait cooperation?