Introduction

Indonesia's transition towards democracy entered its fourth year in 2002. However, that transition remains difficult, messy, fragile and, above all, painful. The final outcome of the transition process remains uncertain, and the country still risks the return of authoritarianism. Indonesia is still to cope with multiple threats to the fragile democracy. Ongoing inter-religious and inter-ethnic violence, and the threat of ethnic-based armed separatism, constitute such a threat. The very foundation of the Indonesian state — religious and ethnic tolerance — has clearly been shaken when this problem results in thousands of people dying and hundreds of thousands becoming internally displaced. The nature and the magnitude of the problem becomes more complex when the state itself has become part of the problem rather than the solution. Indeed, a society plagued by such religious and ethnic divisions and conflicts serves as the worst enemy, not only to Indonesia's democratic transition and consolidation but also to the very survival of the Indonesian state itself.

It should be noted at the outset that any discussion on the state of ethnic conflicts in post-Suharto Indonesia — regarding their causes, dynamics, and solutions — faces a number of formidable challenges. First, the nature and number of the conflicts, and the magnitude of the problem, make it difficult for any analyst to do justice to them in a short chapter such as this. The country is now faced with at least four major conflicts (Poso, Maluku, Aceh, and Papua) and has experienced several other conflicts that temporarily seem to have subsided (such as ethnic conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan provinces). As the country continues to face inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions, the potential for future conflicts in other areas cannot be discounted. Second, while some conflicts share common characteristics and patterns, it is also important to recognise that each conflict has its own distinct and unique cause and dynamics, thus demanding different solutions. Third, it is not always easy to characterise what constitutes an ethnic conflict. For example, the conflict in Ambon, Maluku, might have had an ethnic dimension in the beginning of the conflict, but soon turned into interreligious conflict. Similarly, the problems in Aceh and Papua, despite their nature as secessionist conflicts, cannot be properly understood without taking the ethnic dimension into account.