For twenty months following the loss of Burma in May 1942, despite constant pressure and aspirations for a counter-offensive, the British in South-East Asia had been forced almost completely onto the defensive to hold the ring while they made the necessary operational and logistic preparations to take the war back to the enemy. They simply did not have the resources, the means or the skill to attack the enemy successfully in any strength until the beginning of 1944. The first Arakan offensive over the winter of 1942–3 had been attempted before India or its Eastern Army were ready for battle, with concomitant results. If it achieved anything, it was to convince the British once and for all that the infantry were the dominant arm in the jungle and had to be properly manned, trained and equipped for their demanding role. Fortunately, at the same time, Operation LONGCLOTH proved that British troops, properly trained and supplied by air as well as animal transport, could actually operate effectively in the jungle, independently of ground LofC. During that period, therefore, valuable lessons were learned, experience was gained and the overall capability of British forces was gradually much improved. The combined tactical and logistic lessons from these two operations, as well as increasingly successful patrol contacts with the enemy, were to have a profound influence on the outcome of battles and the shape of the campaign from then on.

By the spring of 1944, although much remained to be done, measures to address the principal economic and logistic shortcomings in the theatre were beginning to bear fruit. India, at immense cost to her domestic economy and people, was proving to be an adequate base for operations in South-East Asia and the American support for China, as well as continuing, though now reducing, her contribution to the wider war effort. Although the newly formed 14th Army still suffered a number of important equipment and supply deficiencies, India was able to provide, through imports or her own industrial and agricultural output, most of the really essential requirements of troops at the front.